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1 Introduction
There has been much talk about responsibility in world politics in recent
years. In particular, the allocation of responsibility has been central to inter-
national climate negotiations, in which the principle of common but differ-
entiated responsibilities has been agreed upon as a guiding principle. As these
negotiations have made clear, however, responsibility is a remarkably vague
concept, and its meaning in world politics in particular remains altogether
uncertain. In negotiations with stakes as high as Earth’s climate, a few ques-
tions about responsibility thus need to be asked. For example, what is
responsibility? When it comes to states, for what are they responsible and to
whom? On the international stage, who judges responsibility, its assignment
and its fulfilment? What do states need to do, or refrain from doing, in order
to be viewed as responsible members of international society?
Responsibility has become an especially popular word in speculations
about whether the so-called ‘rise’ of China will pose a risk or an opportunity
for the world. Likewise, an extensive body of academic literature has dis-
cussed whether China is, or will become, a responsible player in world politics
(e.g. Chan 2006; Clark 2014; Deng 2008; Gill 2007; Gill et al. 2007; Patrick
2010; Shambaugh 2013; Xia 2001; Zhang & Austin 2001). Political debate
over China’s responsibility has been particularly heated in international cli-
mate negotiations, where China has been accused of ‘being irresponsible’ and
‘blocking progress’ for years on end (e.g. Lynas 2009; Porter 2009; Vidal
2009). From an adjacent angle, academic research on China’s climate policy
has focused on the country’s contributions to international climate negotia-
tions, its climate policy decision-making process, its national interests in cli-
mate negotiations and its responsibility for causing climate change (e.g. Chen,
G. 2009; Chen 2012; Ella 2016; Gong 2011; Harris 2011; Harris & Yu 2009;
Marks 2010; Moore 2011). In both contexts, China’s policies have largely
been evaluated with a rubric of Western interests and expectations, and too
little attention has been paid to China’s own notions of responsibility in
international climate politics, particularly on what ethical basis the Chinese
government considers itself to be responsible, for what, to whom and, above
all, why (cf. Chen, Z. 2009; Foot 2001; Jin 2011; Jones 2014; Scott 2010;
Yeophantong 2013; Zhang & Austin 2001).
In this book, I investigate China’s evolving notions of great power respon-
sibility, both in general and in the particular context of international climate
politics.1 To some extent, China’s rise to the status of a great power can be
perceived as a typical change in the international order and thus merely
another factor that will shape the diplomatic practices of negotiating proce-
dures and rules about specific international issues. However, I presuppose that
China’s rise to great power status and its increasing engagement in interna-
tional practices will not only shape the contemporary international order but
also generate a transformation of international norms. China is no doubt
relevant to discussions of all norms of international responsibility because its
rise could facilitate more profound changes in international society. In the
context of climate responsibility in particular, China’s role is especially cen-
tral, both theoretically and practically – not least because China is now the
world’s largest carbon emitter, so presents a tremendous challenge to miti-
gating climate change and human security around the world. Consequently,
China’s engagement in international climate politics is imperative, for without
its participation, no global effort to combat climate change will succeed. At
the same time, despite its miraculous economic development, China remains
a developing country, in which millions of people continue to live in poverty.
These trends raise a variety of political and ethical questions about the
expectations of China’s role in international climate politics, including in
relation to international justice and the allocation of responsibility.
Regarding theory, this book builds on and contributes to the English
School of international relations, which maintains that states form an inter-
national society, the workings of which great powers have special responsi-
bility to safeguard. Because I find it more interesting, as well as more
important, to analyse how such responsibilities are constructed and allocated
in practice, I assume that states – and individuals – have ethical responsi-
bilities. Indeed, I argue that responsibility is always a situational ethics, the
content of which is continuously made and remade via social practices in a
process that I call responsibilisation. During that process, by using language
and action, states and non-state actors attempt to create a common under-
standing of what it means to be responsible in international society in specific
contexts. As a result, realising understandings of responsibility in interna-
tional politics always involves competition. Today, when states define and
distribute state responsibilities as well as great power responsibilities, the
rising power of China undoubtedly plays a key role and will continue to do so
in the future. In that sense, international climate politics is an especially
interesting case of China’s emerging notions of great power responsibility, for
China has increasingly identified itself as a great power with great responsi-
bility and, in turn, formulated ambitious climate policies to live up to that
responsibility. As US leadership in great power responsibility for climate
change declines in the era of President Donald Trump, China’s emergence as
a leader of global efforts to tackle climate change becomes more possible than
ever before.
2 Introduction
In an attempt to answer the looming question in international relations
about how a great power should be defined in today’s global era, I draw from
the pluralism–solidarism debate within the English School. In particular, I
focus on two international norms of responsibility – great power responsibility
and climate responsibility – and investigate their interaction, as well as
China’s contribution to each. In that way, I demonstrate that responsibility is
a principal criterion that states seeking recognition as great powers must fulfil
and has constituted the ideological basis for the rule of the so-called ‘great
power club’ since the early 1800s. With the end of the Cold War and China’s
rise in international status, the United States elevated responsibility as an
imperative in the great power club. Accordingly, China’s alleged irresponsi-
bility can thus be viewed as the primary reason why it has not been accepted
as a full member in the club. However, as climate responsibility increasingly
becomes an international norm with which states, including great powers,
must comply if they want to be and be recognised as responsible members of
international society, China’s central role in the institutionalisation of climate
responsibility has become increasingly apparent. At the same time, the import
of China’s contribution cannot be understood without first understanding the
political, economic and cultural-historical context in which China’s practices
of state responsibility have evolved. To that end, I study not only China’s role
in international climate negotiations but also the underlying domestic inter-
ests and values that have shaped its contributions to those negotiations.
Necessity of normative inquiry in international relations theory
Climate change is not only a neutral, natural and scientific phenomenon but,
perhaps more importantly, a discursively created political problem that raises
a range of moral questions about how humans should and do respond (e.g.
Gardiner 2011; Gardiner et al. 2010). Instead of moral questions, however,
traditional international relations studies have sought to discover in the first
place whether and then, if appropriate, how and why states can cooperate to
resolve global problems, including climate change. Realists argue that, in an
anarchic world, there is little room for cooperation and always the risk of
conflict. Conversely, liberals maintain that international cooperation is possi-
ble as well as necessary to address global challenges such as climate change
and to prevent conflicts. By extension, many neorealist and neoliberal insti-
tutionalists focus on problem solving, especially regarding the potential role
of international regimes in resolving conflicts and motivating cooperation
among states. Although both sets of thinkers agree that states generally
cooperate because ‘it is in their interest to do so’ (Hurrell & Kingsbury 1992,
23), they also tend to take actors and their interests as givens and pay little
attention to the normative aspects of politics, including environmental poli-
tics. Unlike those ways of thinking, constructivism can offer unique insights
into climate responsibility, for a significant, if not the most significant, part of
international climate politics is ‘discourse and dialogue concerning what
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policies or activities, ours as well as theirs, are desirable of advisable or
appropriate or acceptable or tolerable or prudent or politic or judicious or
justified in the circumstances’ (Jackson 2000, 37). Climate change discourses
define the nature of the phenomenon of climate change, its causes and its
consequences and thus situate and control how climate-related issues are
conceived and what actions are possible and prohibited in response. However,
discourse is only one part of responsibility; the other, more critical part is its
demonstration in action. Among its other limitations, constructivism does not
consider the specific social contexts in which discourses and norms are pro-
duced. In particular, they tend to dismiss the intentionality of state behaviour
as well as the role of (great) power in international society.
To clarify how states define and ought to define and fulfil their climate
responsibility, in this book I integrate ‘empirical knowledge and normative
reasoning’ (Reus–Smit 2013, 602). Although I draw inspiration from both
liberal institutionalists’ work on international organisations and con-
structivists’ work on collective identities and discourses, my approach to cli-
mate responsibility differs profoundly from both. One reason for my
departure from those ways of thinking is that they tend to frame environ-
mental changes as technical and economic problems that have to be solved by
collective inter-state action. Consequently, they fail to recognise that ‘states
are themselves (or alternatively, the state’s system is itself, through generating
certain practices on the part of states) prime environmental destroyers’
(Paterson 2000, 2). Another more important reason is that liberal institu-
tionalists and constructivists tend to treat norms and discourses as ‘indepen-
dent variables’ and problem-solving endeavours such as international treaties
and organisations as ‘dependent variables’ (Navari 2014, 209). In other words,
they assume that norms and discourses cause change in a state’s domestic and
international behaviour via processes of socialisation (e.g. Finnemore & Sik-
kink 1998; Wendt 1999). Such approaches suggest that norms and practices
exist ‘out there’ and that states ‘internalise’ them in their social interactions.
By contrast, I emphasise that responsibilities are not given or static but
always produced and reproduced in social interactions. Values and intentions
are therefore important factors in how international responsibilities are
defined, allocated and implemented by agents in specific contexts (cf. Navari
2018).
Among other reasons for regime theory proving an inadequate theoretical
framework for studying climate responsibility is that the many important
international treaties developed in recent decades have been unable to respond
effectively to ecological challenges due to three major problems. First, inter-
national environmental agreements are compromises and do not provide an
adequate basis for ending, preventing or even decreasing environmental
degradation. In short, international regimes are too ineffectual to secure
effective international environmental protection. States regularly avoid agree-
ing to legally binding obligations and instead prefer to commit to non-binding
guidelines or principles because failing to meet such guidelines does not
4 Introduction
expose them to international criticism. On pressing issues such as climate
change, despite decades of negotiations, states have failed to agree upon a
sufficiently appropriate international treaty as well as to define their respective
responsibilities. In particular, before the 2015 UN Conference on Climate
Change in Paris, it seemed that international society was failing or had
already failed to resolve the problem of climate change. Second, even when
states manage to form international environmental agreements, their com-
pliance is not guaranteed. That problem begs the question of how states can
be ensured to implement and comply with the international rules that they
have agreed to follow. When such actions are not taken, even the most ser-
ious international agreements become mere paper and fail to effect real dif-
ference. Third, international environmental agreements avoid reckoning with
the ‘question of why global environmental change occurs in the first place’
(Paterson 2000, 3) and do not suggest that humans are part of Earth’s eco-
systems instead of separate from them. On the contrary, just as human
practices have significant impacts on the environment, environmental changes
have harmful impacts on human lives.
Given those shortcomings, this book builds on the English School theory,
which is not only a theory about practices and norms, but a practice-guiding,
normative theoretical framework that attempts to direct how human practices
ought to be. In his landmark volume The Anarchical Society published in
1977, Hedley Bull coined the conception international society, which later
emerged as a key concept of the English School. According to Bull (2002
[1977], 13), international society exists
when a group of states, conscious of certain common interests and
common values, form a society in the sense that they conceive themselves
to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one another,
and share in the working of common institutions.
The concept of international society lays the foundation for the normative
framework of the English School: that states have rights and responsibilities
due to their membership in international society. At a minimum, governments
need to take the opinions and interests of others into consideration, and they
cannot focus only on their narrowly defined national interests but are obliged
to cooperate with others. For example, climate change politics does not sup-
port the normative logic of a sovereign state’s right to do whatever it wants
inside its borders, because states are bound to cooperate in order fulfil their
climate- and environment-related obligations to other states. The capacity and
willingness to accept and fulfil those responsibilities defines the status of their
membership in international society, in which great powers have greater
responsibilities than less powerful states. That idea makes the English School’s
theory unique in the field of international relations as the sole theoretical
framework that stresses the special responsibilities of great powers. Other
theoretical perspectives such as realism and neoliberalism, by contrast, focus
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on the balance of power or the sphere of interests of great powers but fail to
consider the normative underpinnings of great power management. As Chris
Brown (2004, 11) points out, to neorealists the idea of great powers’ respon-
sibilities towards international society as a whole does not make much sense
because the idea of international society itself is unappealing to them. In the
English School, however, great power management ranks among the common
institutions of international society, in which great powers have a responsi-
bility to sustain its efficient functioning. Nevertheless, environmental issues
have been of interest to surprisingly few English School theorists, even though
climate change can be conceived as a showcase for solidarist ethics (cf. Fal-
kner 2012; Falkner & Buzan 2018; Hurrell 2007; Jackson 1996, 2000; Kopra
2018, forthcoming; Palmujoki 2013). Lately, however, some scholars in the
English School have suggested that environmental stewardship is emerging or
has already emerged as a new primary institution (Buzan 2004a, 186; Buzan
2014, 161–163; Falkner 2012, Falkner & Buzan 2018; Kopra forthcoming).
Institutional change: an English School approach
Change is a normal state of affairs in life, part of which in today’s global era
is international relations. In academic literature, change is usually explained
by certain types of markers, including trends, great events and significant
technological and social innovations (Holsti 2004, 7–12). A major technolo-
gical development could, for example, dramatically lower the costs of miti-
gating climate change or carbon capture and storage and thus generate
greater political will to shoulder broader climate responsibilities among states.
In certain circumstances such changes can also produce new players on the
international stage, including new sovereign states and non-state actors. In
general, markers identify when change happens but do not specify what kind
of change is happening (ibid., 12). In response, in Taming the Sovereigns:
Institutional Change in International Politics, K. J. Holsti differentiates six
types of concepts of change: change as novelty and replacement, change as
addition or subtraction, change as increased or decreased complexity, change
as transformation, change as reversion and change as obsolescence (ibid.,
12–17). Nevertheless, those conceptualisations do not pinpoint why change
occurs.
Many theorists of international relations, particularly neorealists and liber-
alist institutionalists, clarify change with reference to material factors. For
example, Keohane and Nye (2012, 32–51) explain regime change in light of
changes in economic and technological processes, overall power structures in
the world, the power structure within specific contexts and power capabilities
affected by international organisations. At times, change is the result of an
external shock such as war, revolution or another crisis or shift in circum-
stances. For the time being, climate change has not caused a dramatic crisis;
instead, its impacts have progressed slowly and thus remain invisible to gen-
eral audiences, so to speak. If climate change were to cause a sudden
6 Introduction
humanitarian crisis, then states most likely take more urgent action. Not all
changes in international society, however, can be explained by momentous
events or material elements. For constructivists, the primary reason for
change is the transformation of collective ideas.2 They maintain that identities
matter in inter-state relations and that when a state’s identity changes, its
behaviour in international society also changes accordingly. However, idea-
tional change cannot alone explain institutional change because relationships
informed by power and interests are important factors in shaping interna-
tional society.
The English School underscores that both material and ideational factors
induce change in international society. From that perspective, international
institutions and practices are the most important markers and metrics of
change in international society because they mirror international order and
common ideas, problems, interests and norms among states during a given
historical era (Holsti 2004, 18–19). Given their centrality in English School
theory, it is thus surprising how premature agreement on the definitions,
identity and role of institutions has been (Wilson 2012). Even Bull (2002
[1977]) did not elucidate what elements constitute a common institution, on
what terms he chose his five common institutions or why he included others.3
Recognising that shortcoming, in his seminal From International to World
Society? English School Theory and the Social Structure of Globalisation,
Barry Buzan (2004a, 171) highlighted the ‘urgent need to acknowledge the
centrality of primary institutions in English school theory, to generate con-
sistency in the use and understanding of the concept and to make clear what
does and does not count as a primary institution’.
Buzan’s call has set in motion new institutionalists’ theoretical debate about
the (contemporary) primary institutions of international society and shunted
secondary institutions ‘into the realm of regime theory altogether’ (Spandler
2015, 2; cf. Buzan 2004a, 163–167).4 In fact, Buzan popularised the English
School distinction of primary and secondary institutions in order to further
elaborate upon Bull’s common institutions of international society and how
they organise that society. According to Buzan’s (2004a, 181) definition, pri-
mary institutions are ‘durable and recognised patterns of shared practices
rooted in values held commonly by the members of interstate societies, amd
[sic] embodying a mix of norms, rules and principles’. Although English
School scholars do not agree upon what the primary institutions of interna-
tional society are, they do agree that such institutions are critical to under-
standing inter-state relations because they, for instance, determine
membership, organise relationships between states, facilitate coexistence and
specify what legitimate international conduct is. Primary institutions are thus
constitutive of international society and constantly shape processes in which
responsibilities are made and remade. In this book, I study the ways in which
the primary institution of great power management constrains and enables
the institutionalisation of the international norm of climate responsibility. In
methodological terms, I do not join the new institutionalist debate but follow
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the classical approach of the English School by studying how primary insti-
tutions shape the institutionalisation of norms in practice (cf. Jackson 2000;
Jackson 2009).
Prior to Tonny Brems Knudsen’s (2013) pre-theory of fundamental institu-
tional change presented at the International Studies Association Annual
Convention in 2013, English School theorists focused largely on the ways in
which primary institutions induce change in international society. For exam-
ple, Buzan (2004a, 186) contended that clashes among primary institutions
are the ‘key driving force’ for institutional change in international society.
However, Knudsen’s paper pointed out that international organisations are
central to the ‘reproduction and working [of primary institutions], and there-
fore also to changes in their working’ (Knudsen 2013, 18; cf. Knudsen 2018).
In that sense, the relationship between primary and secondary institutions is
not a one-way hierarchical relationship because they both shape each other.
In explanation, Knudsen (2013, 16) identified two drivers of change: ‘change
in a fundamental institution’ caused by ‘changes in the practices by which the
constitutive principles are reproduced or maintained’ and the ‘change of a
fundamental institution’, referring to ‘changes in the constitutive principles
themselves’. Notably, Knudsen (2013, 34) concluded that secondary institu-
tions are the ‘most important frameworks for the reproduction and change of
fundamental institutions, and thus for the maintenance and development of
international order and justice’. Moreover, his conceptualisation leaves room
for the emergence of new primary institutions in the case that the constitutive
principles of international society fundamentally change (Knudsen 2013, 17;
Knudsen 2018).
Knudsen’s ideas have inspired many English School theorists, including me,
to study the role of secondary institutions in institutional change (e.g. Fried-
ner Parrat 2014; Knudsen 2016; Kopra forthcoming; Navari 2016; Spandler
2015). In particular, they facilitated the emergence of an active working group
led by Knudsen and Cornelia Navari within the International Studies Asso-
ciation’s English School section. In a pioneering volume International Orga-
nization in the Anarchical Society, the group synthesises neoliberal
institutionalist work on international institutions and classic English School
theory on fundamental institutions of international society in response to a
call for such synthesis issued by Robert O. Keohane (1989, 174) in the late
1980s. The volume clarifies that secondary institutions should be of interest to
the English School not only because they provide material evidence of the
existence of primary institutions but also given their unique role in promoting
the change of international society and change within that society (cf. Knud-
sen & Navari 2018). Whereas neoliberal institutionalists study how the
workings of international organisations could be improved as a means to
solve global problems, the Navari-Knudsen working group studies how pri-
mary institutions shape the workings of secondary institutions and vice versa.
Arguably, the English School’s theorisation on institutional change could
benefit from incorporating ideas from neorealist and neoliberal institutionalists
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by paying closer attention to the role of state agency – or statespeople, to
borrow Robert Jackson’s (2000) term – and the domestic politics of great
powers when investigating institutional change (cf. Navari 2018). The role of
great powers is pivotal in the evolution of international norms and practices
because powerful actors aim to define international rules in ways that serve
their (domestic) interests and values (Clark 2011; Simpson 2004). Given
such trends, this book focuses on not only China’s international policies
regarding the climate but also its historical development, domestic interests
and social values that have shaped the state’s international standing. Those
trends also explain why secondary institutions are of special interest to me,
for despite the impossibility of investigating an agent’s influence on the
evolution of a primary institution, a state’s contribution to developing sec-
ondary institutions can be investigated in considerable depth. In addition to
state agency, sub-national and non-state actors, including international
organisations, non-governmental organisations, social and religious move-
ments, scientists, media outlets, corporations, cities and provinces, influence
the institutionalisation of secondary institutions in various ways and are
thus significant subjects of change in international society (Clark 2007;
Epstein 2008; Falkner 2012). In particular, they politicise new (environ-
mental) problems, initiate or constrain international political agendas, pro-
duce and disseminate knowledge and participate in constructing the rules of
international practices. Furthermore, they can influence the development of
the domestic (climate) policies of individual states, as well as their positions
in international (climate) negotiations.
At the same time, when investigating institutional change, we should not
ignore the agency of individuals. After all, people influence and shape inter-
national practices, both negatively and positively (cf. Epstein 2008). For
example, French leaders, especially Laurent Fabius, French foreign minister
and president of the 2015 UN Conference on Climate Change in Paris, was
widely commended for his role in the successful outcome of the conference.
Or, had Hillary Clinton been elected as US president in 2016 instead of
Donald Trump, the climate policy of the United States and thus of other
states would have taken a drastically different path. At times, factors unre-
lated to a specific practice can nevertheless bear a significant impact upon
that practice. For example, the election of George W. Bush as US president in
2000 likely did not relate to climate politics but influenced climate practices
both locally and globally nonetheless. In China, the values, experiences and
interests of the chair of the Chinese Communist Party undoubtedly exert sig-
nificant influence on state practices due to the state’s rather autocratic gov-
ernance structure. In this book, however, I deliberately take a state-centric
approach to climate responsibility, for two reasons. First, states continue to
form the most important settings for negotiating practices at the international
level, forming international treaties and putting them into practice at the local
level. By contrast, the role of non-state actors remains quite limited; they can
usually only influence and inspire the negotiating parties.5 Second, the
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Chinese Communist Party has shown very little interest in promoting the
active participation of citizens in political decision-making processes at any
level. In fact, the first Chinese environmental non-governmental organisation
was founded two years after the establishment of the UN Framework Con-
vention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), and their autonomy remains ques-
tionable. Given those deliberate dismissals, further research on the influence
of non-state actors in both the evolution of international (climate) practices
and China’s notions of responsibility is highly recommended.
Secondary institutions in international society
Building upon the work of Knudsen, Navari, Keohane, Charlotta Friedner
Parrat and Kilian Spandler, I define secondary institutions as ‘stable, goal-
oriented international bodies intentionally designed by international actors to
manage and regulate common problems in specific areas of pragmatic issues
and to govern cooperation according to collectively settled norms and rules,
whether legally codified or not’ (Kopra 2018). Secondary institutions include
regimes, international organisations and even international rules that have
emerged as established practices in the course of time (cf. Keohane 1989,
3–4.). Secondary institutions are always products of a time and are thus cen-
tral to understanding power politics and the shared values of a particular era
(cf. Navari 2018). However, their temporality does not mean that they are
only ‘arenas for acting out power relationships’, as suggested by realists
(Evans & Wilson 1992, 330). By contrast, secondary institutions are deliber-
ately designed to solve global problems, and participants within them are
usually willing to make concessions in order to identify workable solutions. In
other words, participants not only engage in secondary institutions out of self-
interest but also because they believe that participating is the right thing to do
(Kopra 2018).
In this book, I aim to demonstrate that secondary institutions function
as bridges between primary institutions and real-world politics performed
by state and non-state actors on a daily basis. As I have argued elsewhere,
the relationship between primary and secondary institutions is a reciprocal
one (Kopra 2018; Kopra forthcoming). First, secondary institutions embed
primary institutions in the quotidian workings of international relations. In
general, I agree with Buzan (2004a) and Holsti (2004) that secondary
institutions are empirical manifestations of primary ones. However, that
perspective dismisses agency and interests in general and those of great
powers in particular. Second, and by extension, secondary institutions also
embody changes in the workings of the day-to-day international relations
in primary institutions. The domestic practices of strong-minded, influen-
tial individual actors and especially power shifts in international relations
can transform primary institutions via secondary institutions as well. For
example, the global impacts of China’s rise may not only transform
everyday politics in secondary institutions but also gradually shape the
10 Introduction
constitutive principles of primary institutions. By way of secondary insti-
tutions, non-state actors can also shape existing primary institutions such
as sovereignty or advance the emergence of new ones, as the cases of
international environmental and human rights practices demonstrate. Sec-
ondary institutions therefore also function as bridges between international
society and world society (Kopra 2018; Kopra forthcoming).6
In empirical terms, in this book I examine the institutionalisation of the
international norm of climate responsibility, which cannot be located in a
single secondary institution. On the contrary, members of international
society can negotiate the definitions, allocation and implementation of climate
responsibility within numerous international organisations. However, one
special secondary institution does exist – namely, the UNFCCC – which
plays a more central role in the construction of climate responsibility than
any other international organisation by bridging the gap between the inter-
national norm of climate responsibility and real-life experience. The
UNFCCC has no intrinsic value but is an instrumental regime that estab-
lishes a framework in which states and non-state agents can negotiate mean-
ings, rules and appropriate choices of action to respond to climate change and
to allocate climate responsibilities. As such, it formulates the infrastructure
for participants to debate and enact their climate responsibility both globally
and locally and provides a set of tools to do so. It also provides the infra-
structure for derivative sub-practices in which its participants can engage,
including the practices of climate finance and flexible market mechanisms.
Furthermore, the UNFCCC facilitates the operationalisation of climate
responsibility at national and local levels.
Consequently, observing the practices of the UNFCCC, including China’s
contribution to its processes, can provide valuable information about state
and non-state actors’ interpretations of climate responsibility. Given my
interest in the historical evolution of climate responsibility, however, inter-
views and direct observations are not workable methods for my research.
Moreover, it is exceedingly difficult to gain access to China’s political circles
in order to ask about their notions of responsibility. Therefore, I have relied
upon textual analysis to read how both international climate practices and
China’s in particular have emerged and transformed. I trace the policies,
treaties and statements by which states have negotiated, justified and agreed
upon rules for international climate practices. My empirical corpus consists of
four types of texts from 1968 to 2018: UN General Assembly resolutions and
international agreements on the environment and climate, China’s official
policy documents such as white papers and other strategies, China’s state-
ments presented at UN climate change negotiations and both statements and
acts of cooperation with other established and emerging great powers and
international forums outside the UN system. I complement that corpus with
newspaper articles, published academic studies and other relevant reports that
offer information about how China has defined and performed its climate
responsibility in real life.
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State-centric solidarism and climate responsibility
This book contributes to the ongoing pluralist–solidarist debate among
scholars in the English School about the possibility and potential of shared
interests, norms, values, rules and institutions in international society (e.g.
Bain 2014; Buzan 2014; Wilson et al. 2016). Pluralists regard states as the
dominant actors in that society as well as emphasise the importance of state
sovereignty. They focus chiefly on the ‘is-side’ of international ethics and ask
what the practices of international society are and which norms organise and
sustain international society and, in turn, notions of international responsi-
bility. Pluralism’s situational ethics raises questions about ways to manage
collective problems that threaten the coexistence of states: how far states
should go to put themselves at risk on the behalf of others, to what extent
they have a moral obligation to rescue others such as victims of genocide, and
to what extent they can ignore such humanitarian responsibilities if their
national security and the lives of their citizens and soldiers is at risk.
Regarding climate politics, an equivalent question asks to what extent states
can promote their national (economic) interests at the expense of mitigating
climate change and to what extent they have a moral duty to protect the cli-
mate. By contrast, solidarists assume that, in international society, states
share a relatively high degree of norms, rules and institutions. Solidarism
takes a cosmopolitan approach to the community of humankind – or world
society in English School terms – and gives moral priority to the universal
rights of individuals over state sovereignty. In other words, solidarism con-
siders humankind as a moral referent and raises questions about (humani-
tarian) justice. In practice, the English School remains ‘sharply divided over
the extent to which solidarism remains premature’ (Linklater & Suganami
2006, 229), and ‘few if any’ English School theorists have suggested a cos-
mopolitan world society without states as ‘either a theoretical or practical
option’, though many have doubted the potential for states to transcend
pluralism (Buzan 2014, 119). Nonetheless, solidarism has served as the ‘key
source’ of normative discussions characteristic of the English School
(ibid.,118). At the heart of the debate have been human rights, especially
pertaining to the question of humanitarian intervention and the responsibility
to protect (e.g. Wheeler 2000).
Because climate change is an ethical global problem I find the concept
of responsibility particularly apt for scrutinising international practices in
response to climate change. Accordingly, I have deliberately chosen to
study the norm of climate responsibility, which problematises the power
relations that shape international climate practices as well as emphasises
the finality and future orientation of those practices, for whatever states
decide to do today affects the wellbeing of future generations, and it will
be incredibly difficult, if not impossible, to remedy today’s wrongheaded or
ethically irresponsible policy choices in the future. My conceptual choice
also underscores that the terms responsibility and duty are not synonyms,
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although they are sometimes used interchangeably. Whereas some people
would argue that duty better describes the moral agency and obligations of
states, I choose to continue the conceptual tradition of both the classical
literature of the English School and international climate discourse.
Moreover, because the concept of responsibility highlights the significance
of good outcomes, it better suits international climate politics, the out-
comes of which are more important than the performance of certain
actions.
I formulate my approach to responsibility by combining elements from
the works of the English School scholars, mainly Jackson and Buzan, with
the framework of ecocentric thinking, as in the work of Robyn Eckersley.
Both Buzan and Eckersley argue that when we discuss ethics, we should
not focus on the polarisation of mutually exclusive positions such as rea-
lism–liberalism, pluralism–solidarism or anthropocentrism–naturocentrism
but instead consider moral standings as shifting positions on a broad
spectrum of moral orientations. Buzan (2004a, 139) suggests that the
pluralist and solidarist perspectives of the English School could be recon-
structed ‘not as mutually exclusive positions, but as positions on a spec-
trum representing, respectively, thin and thick sets of shared norms, rules
and institutions’. If seen as the ends of a spectrum, then those perspectives
would strengthen ‘the position of international society as the via media
between state-centric realism and cosmopolitan world society’ (ibid., 50).
Likewise, Eckersley (1992, 35–47) points out that the contemporary divi-
sion of anthropocentrism and naturocentrism showcases the ‘opposing
poles of a wide spectrum of differing orientations toward nature’ and that
most recent studies in environmental philosophy fall ‘between these two
poles’. In order to blend and mix the two camps, Buzan (2014, 114–118)
introduces the concept of state-centric solidarism, which I choose to adopt
in this book. Ontologically, state-centric solidarism is similar to pluralism
because it recognises that current international society is state-centric and
that the potential for world society thus remains limited. Politically and
morally, however, state-centric solidarism more closely aligns with solidar-
ism because it acknowledges humankind as the moral referent object.
State-centric solidarism is not only about world order and co-existence but
also about cooperation and the pursuit of collective objectives. In Buzan’s
(2014, 116) words, it is about the ‘possibility that states can collectively
reach beyond a logic of coexistence to construct international societies
with a relatively high degree of shared norms, rules and institutions among
them’.
Great powers in international society
Theorists in international relations have debated the definitions and roles of
great powers in international politics since the mid-eighteenth century
because, as Kenneth Waltz (1979, 72) puts it, ‘In international politics, as in
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any self-help system, the units of greatest capability set the scene of action for
others as well as for themselves.’ Realists define national power and there-
fore great powers mainly in terms of material capabilities but do not
entirely ignore social capabilities.7 Many realists find it useful to explain
changes in international systems by counting the number of great powers
and analysing the shifting distribution of power among states (cf. Waltz
1979, 131). English School scholars, who are interested in historical
developments in international relations, generally agree; instead of defining
what constitutes a great power, they maintain that ‘it is easier to answer it
[the question of defining great power] historically, by enumerating the great
powers at any date’ (Wight 1999 [1946], 41). As a result, many scholars
within and outside the English School have offered lists of previous, con-
temporary and potential future great powers.8 Such lists are, however,
often incoherent, and even Wight gives inconsistent reasons why he ranked
some states as great powers (Buzan 2004b, 59). By contrast, constructivists
emphasise the role of identities and social interaction when identifying
great powers. According to Brittingham (2007, 84), a ‘great power is an
identity that must be enacted by a state, and recognised and reinforced by
its peers’. In addition to those general definitions of great powers, some
scholars classify special categories of great powers – namely, superpowers
and regional powers – based on the ‘operational range of power holds’
(Buzan 2004b, 50–53).
In general, the English School conceptualisation of great power integrates
realist and constructivist perspectives. Its perspective holds that though great
powers need to have certain material capabilities, the status of great power
is above all an identity created in interaction with other states. For the
English School, power is a ‘social attribute’ that must be placed ‘side by
side with other quintessentially social concepts such as prestige, authority,
and legitimacy’ (Hurrell 2007, 39). Instead of providing a clear-cut defini-
tion of great power,9 thinkers in the English School describe at least five
important dimensions of what a state must fulfil in order to be and be
recognised as a great power (e.g. Bull 2002 [1977]; Buzan 2004b; Cui &
Buzan 2016; Hurrell 2007; Jackson 2000; Jones 2014; Simpson 2004;
Wheeler 2000; Wight 1999 [1946]). First, great powers have to have a cer-
tain level of capabilities. In Bull’s (2002 [1977]) opinion, it is essential that
great powers rank their military strength as being superior to that of other
states. In the post-Cold War era, however, military strength has become a
less important dimension of great power, whereas the significance of soft
power and credibility has increased. Second, great powers can exist only in
a plurality. In mainstream international relations theory, the international
society or system is anarchical; hence, two or more great powers are always
necessary. Realists would explain that situation as stemming from the bal-
ancing role of great powers in the international system, whereas liberalists
regard multilateral organisations as having an important role in the pre-
vention of inter-state conflicts. As constructivists and the English School
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would explain, by contrast, great power status is based on membership in a
social group with a shared identity and is thus always the result of ranking
the comparable statuses of states. ‘When we speak of great powers’, Bull
(2002 [1977], 194) writes, ‘we imply … the existence of a club with a rule of
membership’. Likewise, according to Wight (1999 [1946], 42), great powers
have a ‘tendency to club together as a kind of directorate and impose their
will on the states-system’.
Third, being great power means having a social identity that shapes how
certain states perceive themselves as well as how others treat them. National-
ism thus matters in power politics; to some extent, great powers are great
because their citizens consider or wish that their country is greater than other
states. Like individuals, states construct their identities in social interaction
and define themselves in relation to others. To quote Buzan (2004b, 61), ‘great
power identity (or indeed any international identity) is a reciprocal construc-
tion composed of the interplay between a state’s view of itself and the view of
it held by the other members of international society’. Fourth, even if a state
reaches a certain level of material capacity and has a certain national identity,
it does not automatically become a great power but has to be recognised and
accepted as such by others. Thus, it is important to ‘distinguish between
power that is based on relations of domination and force, and power that is
legitimate because it is predicated on shared norms’ (Wheeler 2000, 2). Given
the Eurocentrist nature of contemporary international society, it is usually the
West whose recognition matters the most. Consequently, China’s friendship
with rogue states such as North Korea does not raise its international status,
for its great power status must be recognised by the United States and the
European Union.
Last – and most importantly from the perspective of this book – great
powers have internally and externally recognised rights and responsibilities.
In contrast to other states, great powers have the capability and legally
authorised right to ‘play a part in determining issues that affect the peace
and security’ of international society (Bull 2002 [1977], 196). That right
comes with the responsibility to modify their ‘policies in the light of the
managerial responsibilities they bear’ (ibid.). International responsibility is
assumed to be more or less causal; the greater the power of a state, the
greater the international effects its domestic and foreign policy will have and
the greater its responsibility for the collective wellbeing of international
society.10 Within the English School, special responsibilities have thus been
largely attached to great powers, which have ‘fundamental global cap-
abilities and responsibilities that minor or medium powers do not’ (Jackson
2000, 21). That normative contribution of the English School adds an
important question to discussions of international climate responsibility –
namely, whether is it justified to assume that great powers should shoulder
more responsibility for mitigating climate change than other, less powerful
states. That question sparks an important discussion that I seek to engage
with in this book.
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Organisation of the book
This book examines the ways in which the primary institution of great power
management has shaped international climate negotiations and China’s role in
those processes following its entrance into the great power club. By analysing
China’s contribution to the institutionalisation of the international norm of
climate responsibility in the UNFCCC, it contributes to the Navari-Knudsen
working group’s research agenda on the role of secondary institutions in inter-
national society. At the same time, because climate responsibility does not
materialise from the UNFCCC but needs to be implemented as national poli-
cies and practised at the grass-roots level, the book also scrutinises how China
defines and enacts its climate responsibility at the domestic level.
Following this introduction, chapter 2 briefly introduces a general frame-
work of state responsibility in international society and distinguishes the
general responsibilities of all states from the special responsibilities of great
powers. The latter is the book’s chief focus, for the basic premise of the Eng-
lish School is that great powers have a special responsibility to sustain and
organise international society.
Chapter 3 investigates China’s notions of responsibility by questioning
what the concept of responsibility has meant to different generations of Chi-
nese leadership, as well as for what and to whom the Chinese government
considers itself to be responsible and why. In so doing it discusses the neces-
sary political and historical contexts, as well as the underlying interests and
values, that have shaped contemporary China’s conceptualisations of
responsibility.
Chapter 4 examines the particular notion of great power responsibility in
the context of international climate politics. To that end it sketches an ethical
framework of great power responsibility for climate change and debates the
extent to which such responsibility has been acknowledged and acted upon
within international society. In more empirical terms, the chapter discusses
the requirements a state needs to fulfil to become an accepted member of the
great power club, especially according to the notions of great power respon-
sibility of the UN Security Council, China and the United States. By probing
associated notions of great power responsibility in international climate poli-
tics and other fields, the chapter traces China’s evolving identity as a great
power in particular depth.
Chapter 5 discusses the process of institutionalising the norm of climate
responsibility and China’s contribution to that process. It begins by reviewing
the environmental awakening of international society, particularly by studying
how major international conferences addressing the environment and climate
have attempted to articulate states’ environmental responsibilities and moti-
vate their fulfilment of those responsibilities. Thereafter, the chapter examines
how general and special responsibilities have been defined and assigned by the
UN climate regime and pays close attention to how China’s changing notions
of responsibility have shaped its role in international climate negotiations.
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Chapter 6 investigates how China has demonstrated its climate responsi-
bility in actions at the international and local levels. Since the UN climate
regime does not specify how states have to implement their climate responsi-
bility, it falls to each state to decide which measures it will implement to fulfil
its responsibility. The chapter especially focuses on the sorts of policies and
actions that China has chosen to realise its climate responsibility and reviews
the key drivers of its climate practices.
Last, chapter 7 summarises the chief contributions of the book and dis-
cusses prospects for climate responsibility in the coming years. It also makes a
few recommendations regarding how international climate practices can or
even should be transformed in order to strengthen climate responsibility and
enhance efforts to mitigate climate change in the future.
Notes
1 I discuss these issues elsewhere as well (cf. Kopra 2018; Kopra forthcoming).
2 See Legro (2005) for a detailed framework of how ideas influence continuity and
change in international society.
3 For enlightened guesses of Bull’s reasons, see Buzan (2014, 97–98) and Schouen-
borg (2014, 80–81).
4 As Wilson (2012, 580) observes, new institutionalists such as Buzan and
Schouenborg methodologically depart from the English School’s traditional
focus on social reality and seek to construct abstract analytical categories
instead.
5 However, see Epstein (2008) for a rare case in which international practice has
emerged and diffused via a bottom-up process induced by non-state actors.
6 On the relationship between international society and world society, see Buzan
(2004a), Clark (2007) and Williams (2014).
7 According to Morgenthau (1993, ch. 9), the components of national power
include geography, natural resources, industrial capacity, military preparedness,
population, national character, national morale, the quality of diplomacy and the
quality of government. For Waltz (1979, 131), a state’s power ranking depends
on its capabilities: the size of its population and territory, its resource endow-
ment, its economic capability, its military strength and its political stability and
competence.
8 Scholars such as Kennedy (1988) include only states that meet Western (material)
definitions of great powerhood on their lists of great powers. By contrast, others
recognise the role of non-Western states in the history of great power politics.
Among them, Black (2008) addresses China’s changing role in great power politics
from 1500 to the present day.
9 However, Simpson’s (2004, 68) definition of legalised hegemony suggests a useful
definition of great power as well: ‘the existence within an international society of a
powerful elite of states whose superior status is recognised by minor powers as a
political fact giving rise to the existence of certain constitutional privileges, rights
and duties and whose relations with each other are defined by adherence to a
rough principle of sovereign equality’.
10 This is only a general correlation. In practice, a state’s global influence also
depends on its traditions, image, identity, experience and know-how, among other
things. Small states such as Switzerland and Scandinavian countries may play an
important diplomatic role in the resolution of a conflict or the formulation of
international norms, for instance.
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2 Responsibility in international society
Within and outside the English School it is widely accepted that organisations
such as states, corporations and institutions are moral agents. After all, they
are human constellations, and humans cannot evade moral questions of right
and wrong (cf. Erskine 2003; French 1984; French & Wettstein 2006; Mayer
& Vogt 2006). States – more precisely, the legitimate representatives of states –
bear ultimate responsibility for peaceful coexistence in international society
because they have the highest authority to make decisions and take actions,
including ones concerning the use of coercive power in their respective sover-
eign territories. This chapter offers an approach to responsibility informed by
the English School by discussing the ways in which responsibilities are nego-
tiated, allocated and implemented in international society. I begin with an
overview of theoretical accounts of responsibility by asking what responsi-
bility means in legal and moral terms. I deliberately avoid discussing rights at
length given the extensive body of literature on human rights, including
environmental ones.1 Clearly, responsibilities are tied to rights; if someone has
a right, then others have, at a bare minimum, a corresponding responsibility
to refrain from infringing that right. Next, I argue that responsibilities are
always constructed in social processes that I refer to collectively as responsi-
bilisation. As members of international society, states have to participate in
fulfilling and assigning responsibilities within that society. In the last section, I
examine how the practices of state responsibility materialise in real life and
ask what sort of multidimensional responsibilities states bear and ought to
bear regarding climate change. To that end, the English School provides
insightful standpoints for investigating those questions.
Many meanings of responsibility
Responsibility is a nebulous concept, and talking about what it means to be
responsible warrants the consideration of numerous dimensions. For instance,
we have to clarify the subject and the object of responsibility: who or what is
responsible for what, and to whom is the subject accountable? By extension,
we also have to draw a distinction between ‘identifying responsibility and
assigning it’ (Miller 2007, 84). According to David Miller, the former task
concerns determining ‘who, if anybody, meets the relevant conditions for
being responsible’, whereas the latter ‘involves a decision to attach certain
costs or benefits to an agent, whether or not the relevant conditions are ful-
filled’ (ibid.). In his landmark book Punishment and Responsibility, H. L. A.
Hart (1968, 212–230) characterises four types of responsibility: role-responsi-
bility, causal-responsibility, liability-responsibility and capacity-responsibility.
Role-responsibility suggests that all social roles have their own ‘sphere of
responsibility’; each position in a social organisation is attached to short-term
tasks or duties whose fulfilment somehow advances the goals of the organi-
sation. Accordingly, a responsible person is someone who takes those duties
seriously and behaves correspondingly (ibid., 212–213). By contrast, causal-
responsibility describes the relationship between cause and outcome; for
instance, ‘A is responsible for Y’ means that Y is a direct or indirect result of
what A has done. As Hart’s (1968, 211) story about a drunken captain
demonstrates, it is also possible for things, conditions and events to be
responsible for results. In that sense, no moral blame is attached to causal
responsibility. To some extent, causal responsibility is assumed to be an
important, although not an entirely sufficient, precondition for moral and legal
responsibility, or what Hart calls liability-responsibility. Hart’s conceptualisa-
tion of liability-responsibility distinguishes legal from moral liability-responsi-
bility. When considering liability in the context of legal responsibility, ‘A is
responsible for Y’ means that A is somehow at fault in causing Y and can be
rightfully punished for it in legal terms. For instance, a person who breaks the
law is usually regarded to be liable if a certain range of necessary and sufficient
(e.g. psychological) conditions are met.2 However, when considering moral
liability-responsibility, ‘A is responsible for Y’ means that A is blameworthy for
Y, which can be rightfully disapproved in moral terms. Similar to legal liability,
moral liability-responsibility also presupposes that a person has certain normal
capacities, including freedom of choice. Last, capacity-responsibility can be
understood from the expression ‘A is responsible for his/her actions’ if he or she
possesses a normal (e.g. psychological) capacity of understanding and control
(Hart 1968, 227). In international justice, capacity is an important precondi-
tion for judging a state’s responsibilities. If a state has no capacity to act
appropriately, then how can it be held responsible?
Many scholars distinguish legal from moral responsibility. At first glance,
both types presumably refer to the same sort of responsibility, at least in an
ideal world. However, mostly for practical reasons, they are not always iden-
tical. The greatest difference between them is that legal responsibility is
always judged by a jurisdiction, whereas moral responsibility is assessed by
morals, a ‘kind of internal law, governing those inner thoughts and volitions
which are completely subject to the agent’s control, and administered before
the tribunal of conscience’ (Feinberg 1970, 33). Another distinguishing fea-
ture of legal compared to moral responsibility is their temporal orientation.
The focus of legal responsibility is always retrospective; for instance, a court
asks whether A is guilty of doing harm to X. Accordingly, a person cannot be
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held legally responsible for something that he or she has not done (or failed to
do). Usually, assessing moral responsibility follows a similar logic; we cast
moral blame upon someone for something that he or she has done or failed to
do. Moral responsibility, however, can also be prospective, as the concept of
sustainable development demonstrates. Often, both legal responsibility and
moral responsibility contain a causal component; one is either legally or
morally at fault for the harm that one has committed.3 Thus, a person cannot
be held responsible for something that has not happened because of their
actions. With respect to climate change, however, it is exceptionally difficult, if
not impossible, to identify a single state or private enterprise as being at fault
for causing climate change. On its own, causality is not a justified factor of
responsibility; however, there are other conditions of moral and legal judge-
ment as well, including intentions, motives and choices, which are important
when determining responsibility. A person cannot be held responsible for an
event that occurs incidentally or due to factors beyond their control. To be
morally blameworthy, a person is usually expected to have had an opportu-
nity and the freedom to ‘have acted otherwise than he did’ (Ross 1975, 15).
Thus, free will and the absence of coercion is an important condition; a
person has to have acted voluntarily in order to be held responsible for an
event (May 1992, 16). However, that dynamic does not necessarily mean that
people are held responsible for their actions only: omissions matter as well.
Consequentialist theorists, who emphasise the significance of beneficial
outcomes, claim that a person can also be held morally responsible for his or
her omissions. In fact, they make no distinction between consequences
resulting from acts or omissions. That view opposes deontologism, whose
proponents seek to determine why agents do what they do and thus ask what
the real motives are behind their actions. ‘What matters much more to them
[deontologists]’, Goodin (1995, 47) writes, ‘are individuals’ [or states’] motives
and intentions. They also insist that it be done, and be seen to be done, for the
right reasons’. Because deontologists pay less attention to the consequences of
acts, they do not hold persons responsible for their omissions. The distinction
between positive and negative responsibility is often demonstrated in terms of
the difference between killing (i.e. in which an agent plays an active role) and
letting die (i.e. in which an agent plays a passive role), which have the same
consequence (Vanderheiden 2008, 151–152). However, in climate politics, it
does not matter what an agent’s motives are in taking action; climate miti-
gation does not have to be performed for humanitarian, environmental or
other altruistic reasons but could be a side-effect of energy security projects or
the development of so-called ‘green jobs’.4 What counts is that states shoulder
their responsibility to mitigate climate change and cut their greenhouse gas
emissions, to which end they can choose the most suitable and cost-efficient
mitigating actions. Although some states prefer to rely upon market-oriented
economic mechanisms, some choose to establish new regulations and taxes
and some pursue new technologies, all such means seek to achieve the goal of
climate protection.
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Feinberg (1970, 31–32) points out that moral responsibility ‘cannot be a
matter of luck’, as it often is in the law, but ‘must be something one can nei-
ther escape by good luck nor tumble into through bad luck’. Feinberg illus-
trates that concept – what Thomas Nagel (1979, 24–38) calls ‘moral luck’ –
with the following example:
One man shoots another and kills him, and the law holds him responsible
for the death and hangs him. Another man, with exactly the same
motives and intentions, takes careful aim and shoots at his enemy but
misses because of a last-minute movement of his prey or because of his
own bad eyesight. The law cannot hold him responsible for a death
because he has not caused one; but, from the moral point of view, he is
only luckier than the hanged murderer.
(Feinberg 1970, 31–32)
When it comes to international climate politics, Russia has benefitted from
the decision that the benchmark year of the Kyoto Protocol is 1990, a year
prior to the collapse of the Soviet Union and, in turn, the closure of many
inefficient factories. Because post-Soviet Russia’s emissions are therefore
compared to the emissions of all 15 former Soviet republics, the country does
not need to not do anything in order to comply with targets for reducing
international emissions. In that case, Feinberg’s example, when applied ana-
logously, suggests that international climate law cannot hold Russia irre-
sponsible even if it does nothing to mitigate climate change; however, from a
moral standpoint, Russia is simply luckier than other polluting states. By
contrast, Iceland is one of the few states operating entirely on renewable
energy, which, though outstanding, is not the result of political decision
making. More accurately, Iceland, as a small volcanic island blessed with
geothermal energy sources, is simply a very lucky country in terms of renew-
able energy resources. To some extent, both Russia’s and Iceland’s fulfilment
of climate responsibility is a matter of luck; however, in moral terms, they
could be urged to make additional efforts to mitigate climate change, espe-
cially if we assume that being responsible involves making sacrifices.
In addition to the division between legal liability and moral responsibility,
there are other ways to conceptualise responsibility. For example, David
Miller (2007, 81–109) provides an interesting alternative by distinguishing two
senses of responsibility. On the one hand, outcome responsibility is the
responsibility that people shoulder for their own actions and decisions; on the
other, remedial responsibility acknowledges that people have responsibility to
aid others in need of help. Another useful conceptualisation is Iris Marion
Young’s division between the liability model of responsibility and the social
connection model of responsibility. ‘Under this liability model’, Young (2006,
116) writes, ‘one assigns responsibility to a particular agent (or agents) whose
actions can be shown to be causally connected to the circumstances for which
responsibility is sought’. By contrast, the social connection model recognises
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that ‘[o]ur responsibility derives from belonging together with others in a
system of interdependent processes of cooperation and competition through
which we seek benefits and aim to realize projects’ (ibid., 119).
Both Miller and Young argue that the concepts of legal and moral
responsibility focus too much on causality and past actions by asking who is
to blame for specific harms. In doing so, the concepts fail to identify the for-
ward-looking responsibility of agents to seek beneficial outcomes and prevent
harmful ones from happening. After all, asserting responsibility involves more
than pinpointing the chief culprit in a specific crisis. As Young (2006, 122)
hypothesises, the point of responsibility is ‘not to blame, punish, or seek
redress from those who did it [committed an act], but rather to enjoin those
who participate by their actions in the process of collective action to change
it’. As the principle of the responsibility to protect maintains, states have a
forward-looking responsibility to prevent humanitarian crises whether or not
they can be legally or morally held at fault for the course of events that have
resulted in the current state of affairs. If states do not contribute to resolving
the problems for which they are not to blame, then harmful practices will
persist and could negatively affect other international practices in the process.
Adhering to that system would contradict the ultimate purpose of assigning
responsibilities – that is, ‘not for duty-bearers to suffer more but for right-
bearers to enjoy more of what they are entitled to’ (Shue 1988, 697).
Responsibility is therefore not only retrospective, although it largely consists
of elements derived from legal and moral ethics.
Yet another conceptualisation is Robert Jackson’s situational ethics, which
emphasises that, in the end, taking or assigning responsibility involves
making responsible choices. Responsible choices should not, as Jackson
(2000, 22) notes, be ‘confused with perfect choices’: ‘Human decisions, espe-
cially political decisions, cannot be expected to be perfect’ but ‘only be
expected to be justified’. Accordingly, ‘Responsible choices are the best choi-
ces in circumstances, or at least most defensible choices’ (ibid.), meaning that
when we assess state responsibility, we can at least expect states to make
responsible choices in restrictive circumstances. Responsible choices are diffi-
cult decisions made between ‘conflicting but equally compelling’ interests and
values; sometimes such choices are ‘between greater and lesser evil’, and
sometimes they involve sacrifice (ibid., 142). Because making responsible
choices is highly difficult decision making, Jackson suggests that we char-
acterise a responsible state leader as ‘somebody who can make the best of a
bad situation’ (ibid., 148).
Responsibilisation
As demonstrated in the previous section, responsibility is a social conception.
There is no single moral compendium that applies to everybody in all cir-
cumstances or any ‘final authority’, comparable to God, which would have
the highest moral authority. Life is far too complex to formulate a single,
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universal moral ethics, but statements about responsibility always derive from
human practices. The only way to evaluate an actor’s responsibilities is to
situate them in the context of the social practice or practices in which he, she
or it operates as a moral actor. By extension, the responsibilities of states
are not given or known facts of life, but defining and allocating them are
matters of ethics. Legal ethics makes no exception, either; viewing any legal
text as a given is unnecessary because legal texts are generally reflections and
products of social practices. Legal responsibility is thus always relative and
cannot simply be ‘read off the facts’ or ‘discovered’ because it is ‘something to
be decided’ (Feinberg 1970, 27).
Inspired by William Clapton (2011), who has theorised processes of ris-
kisation, meaning social processes in which certain issues are identified,
assessed and managed as risks and their constitutive effects on international
society, I apply the concept of responsibilisation to scrutinise processes in
which (international) responsibilities are constructed. As much as issues
become risks or security threats by way of riskisation or securitisation, some
issues are responsibilised via discursive practices in order to promote their
normative importance, for instance, or to oblige agents to take certain
measures. My conceptualisation of responsibilisation differs significantly
from the sort of responsibilisation that appears in studies of neoliberal
governmentality and criminology in reference to a state’s disavowal of
responsibility or shunting of responsibility to its citizens.5 By contrast, my
notion of responsibilisation stresses that responsibilities are not given but
socially conceived; consequently, the only way to study them is to investi-
gate processes of how and by whom they are discursively shaped in (inter-
national) social interactions as well as how and by whom they are
performed in specific settings. Understanding why someone is considered to
be responsible to another for an event in a specific context requires sys-
tematically analysing numerous aspects of responsibility, especially agency,
subject and object (i.e. who should be deemed responsible for what and to
whom or what), normative context (i.e. which values underpin notions of
responsibility), institutional organisation (i.e. whether notions of responsi-
bility are institutionalised and, if so, then how) and the social and political
effects of responsibilisation (i.e. whose notions of responsibility work to
empower or marginalise others), for instance (cf. Clapton 2011).
Responsibilisation suggests that though responsibility is impossible to see
or measure, it can be discussed, hence my close attention to discourses in
studying processes of responsibilisation. Interviews, for example, can afford
insights into what is understood to be responsible behaviour in specific con-
texts and why. My understanding of responsibilisation assumes that secondary
institutions are key venues of the international politics of responsibility
because they offer states and non-state actors a forum in which to negotiate
definitions, discuss the distribution and implementation of rights and respon-
sibilities in international society and monitor the fulfilment of those agree-
ments. In contrast to primary institutions, secondary ones are empirically
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observable bodies, meaning that their decision-making procedures, rules and
other organisational structures can be investigated. It is also possible to
examine the power relations among members of secondary institutions and
analyse the contributions of specific participants to processes of responsibili-
sation. Moreover, secondary institutions and their constitutive documents are
principal sources for collecting empirical research material about how pri-
mary institutions have sustained and organised international society in the
modern era (Kopra 2018, Kopra forthcoming).
Resolutions of the UN General Assembly provide a good starting point
from which to consider the emergence and evolution of processes of respon-
sibilisation in international society. At first glance, such abstract declarations
may seem insignificant and irrelevant to actual political practices. After
all, they do not necessarily create legally binding obligations but instead
express what states hope to achieve. From a legal perspective, however,
they are important ‘acts from which views about customary law can be
inferred’ (Perrez 2000, 278). ‘What matters’, Falkner (2012, 514) observes,
‘is that they represent an explicit manifestation of an implicitly assumed
and broadly accepted fundamental norm’. The more often the UN reiter-
ates the environmental responsibility of states, for instance, the more likely
the UN is to affect both international law and state practices. At the same
time, though changes in political discourses are integral to the process of
changing political practices, focusing on discourse is not entirely sufficient
for studying state responsibility. It is worthless to merely discuss responsi-
bility because responsibility has to materialise in responsible actions both
at home and abroad. When studying climate responsibility in particular, it
is therefore necessary to look beyond statements expressing responsibilities,
for how such words are institutionalised and acted upon requires scrutiny.
Ultimately, we need to consider the broader ramifications of those pro-
cesses as well.
Drivers of responsibility
Ian Hurd (1999) identifies three general reasons why states participate in
international practices: coercion, calculations as well as identity and belief
(cf. Buzan 2004a, 103, 130–133, 253–261; Hurd 2007, 30–40; Hurrell 2007,
67–77; Wendt 1999, 247–250). I argue that all three drivers are active pro-
cesses and that, contrary to the constructivist tendency, it is unnecessary and
impossible to assess the extent to which a state has internalised the rules of
international practice. First, coercion, which Hurd identifies from a realist
perspective, is the weakest reason of the three because social practices force-
fully imposed by outsiders are not internalised whatsoever by actors them-
selves. Second, calculations, identified from a liberalist perspective, rests upon
rational self-interest comparisons of the costs and benefits of participating in
international practices. Third, identity and belief, identified from a con-
structivist perspective, is the most profound and stable of the three reasons;
28 Responsibility in international society
states participate in and follow the rules of a given international practice
because they believe in the moral legitimacy of the rule or the legitimacy of
the international organisation that formulated it (Hurd 1999, 387). In reality,
the relationship of the three drivers of internalising practices is complex, and
none of them is likely to exist in a ‘pure, isolated form’ (ibid., 389). On the
contrary, because all social practices are held together by a mélange of all
three drivers, it is the ‘necessity of mixture, and how to deal with it, [that] …
defines politics’ (Buzan 2004a, 130). Of course, states’ identities and pre-
ferences change over time; the world changes, political leaders change and
values change. Even if a state participates in an international practice for
egoistic or other less-than-magnanimous reasons at one time, it does not
mean that those interests alone will motivate the same practice in the future.
At the same time, international practices can also influence participants’
beliefs and identities by shaping their values and preferences. Participation in
international climate practices, for example, can change a state’s ideas of
human wellbeing; though a state might have previously prioritised economic
factors of wellbeing, it could begin to give greater value to cultivating a clean
environment and a stable climate system. Over time, initially groundbreaking
ideas can even become established practices taken for granted in social
relations.
In the following sections I only briefly introduce Hurd’s first two reasons
why states participate in international practices – coercion and calculations –
for the former is not a widely meaningful factor in the context of climate
responsibility, whereas the latter has already been extensively studied by
rationalists. By contrast, because Hurd’s third reason, legitimacy and belief, is
of interest to the study of state responsibility, I explore it in greater detail and
from a broader perspective of identity politics. In particular, I argue the links
among identity, participation in social practices and responsibility are espe-
cially strong.
Coercion and regulations
‘Coercion’, Hurd (2007, 35) writes, ‘refers to a relation of asymmetrical phy-
sical power among agents, where this asymmetry is applied to changing the
behavior of the weaker agent’. Amid the circumstance of coercion, a state
participates in an international practice because it is physically or psycholo-
gically forced to. In other words, a state’s participation in the practice is
motivated by the fear of retribution or of physical compulsion. Coercion has
been an important means of the expansion of European international society;
many non-Western states, including China, were coerced into participating in
international practices by way of colonisation and other oppressive means
prior to the twentieth century. However, practices of solidarity, including
human rights, can also be spread via coercion. For instance, in response to
climate change, an eco-intervention could be made to coerce reluctant states
to adopt environmentally beneficial laws.
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Economic sanctions are a typical example of a non-violent form of coer-
cion in contemporary international politics. International law can also be
viewed as a more restrained and prudent form of coercion; when an interna-
tional norm is given the status of law, states become legally bound to adhere
to the norm. The status of law thus ‘constitutes an independent reason for
action’ (Bodansky 2010, 91). To a similar extent, international treaties can set
directives and specific responsibilities in order to guide the conduct of parti-
cipants, who might be permitted, encouraged, or even required to take a cer-
tain action or not. At times, states might also be socially coerced to follow the
formal rules of a practice – for example, majority decision making – because
they are ‘adopted in a manner that the actor accepts as legitimate’ even if the
states themselves resist such rules (ibid., 90). Once a state has ratified a treaty,
it is obliged to follow the treaty’s rules and fulfil its stipulated responsibility
not because it has internalised the responsibility but because it is bound by
the treaty and acting otherwise could warrant sanctions. In that case, a state’s
compliance is not only coerced by international regulations but also moti-
vated by calculations. Last, international regulations additionally influence
state behaviour, whether or not the state has ratified a specific international
treaty concerning the issue. Even if the political leaders of a state do not place
a premium on solidarist practices such as human rights and animal welfare,
international practices and regulations might nevertheless constrain and
influence domestic policies. In that case, the agency of non-state actors is
essential to creating social pressure put upon states.
Power politics is an important incentive for states’ participation in interna-
tional practices. States can use international institutions to promote their values
and policies globally, which is naturally considered to constitute a more legit-
imate means than coercion. As Franz Xaver Perrez (2000, 340) observes:
efforts to ensure international cooperation may be conceived sometimes
rather as attempts to coerce less powerful states to bring their behaviour
into conformity with the interests of the most powerful states than as
efforts to solve common problems cooperatively.
Although negotiations of responsibilities within secondary institutions are
bound by power, the most powerful participants cannot dictate what sort of
responsibilities participants ought to shoulder. All of the participants can
usually participate in negotiations regarding what sort of responsibilities they
are assumed to bear; in that sense, they are not coerced into taking responsi-
bility, for such responsibilities are voluntary and not subject to coercion. It is
therefore unlikely that real normative change results from coercion.
Calculations
Liberalists maintain that states cooperate with each other because it is in their
interest to do so. Above all, they argue, the costs of warfare have increased,
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and states cannot solve global problems without international cooperation.
Moreover, international norms and organisations are available to help states
to solve common problems and organise cooperative efforts. From that per-
spective, states participate in international practices and make commitments
in order to promote and maintain their national interests for the same reason
that they comply with international treaties that they have signed. Because
most of the goals and interests of a state are domestic, a state’s participation
in international practices is thus motivated by domestic interests; the needs
and desires of the state guide the practices in which it participates, how it
attempts to shape the goals and rules of the practice and which sorts of
responsibilities it is willing to shoulder. In response to climate change, each
state makes calculations regarding whether and, if so, then to what extent it is
willing bear the costs of mitigating climate change and what the costs of non-
participation should be in terms of lost credibility and financial consequences.
Such calculations necessarily involve normative evaluations of the value that
a state places upon cultivating a healthy environment. For example, does a
state regard environmental protection only in terms of costs, or does nature
have some intrinsic value in the calculations?
Self-interest can be an influential incentive for states to participate in
international practices. Cost–benefit calculations can motivate a state to
change its behaviour and assign responsibility for practices because non-
participation would harm its interests and image on an international scale.
However, interests do not entirely explain state behaviour. As constructivists
maintain, interests are not given, and different individuals, as well as states,
have different sorts of interest. ‘[I]nterests presuppose identities’, Wendt
(1999, 231) writes, ‘because an actor cannot know what it wants until it
knows who it is’. Ringmar (1996, 13) similarly observes, ‘It is only as some-
one that we can want some-thing, and it is only once we know who we are
that we can know what we want.’ Cost–benefit calculations are therefore
unlikely to cause profound changes in an actor’s preferences and values, and
consequently, their influence can be brief or limited, if not both. Long-term
relations among participants motivated by self-interest are thus difficult to
maintain because such participants do not value those relations or sorts of
cooperation. Social practices that rely heavily on self-interest necessarily
have weak foundations and can easily disintegrate if power relations shift
(Hurd 1999, 387). Therefore, we have to examine a state’s identity in order
to understand why it assumes responsibilities that can even involve under-
mining its interests.
Identity, practices and responsibility
Cosmopolitans believe that globalisation and increased interdependence
among states and populations have fostered the emergence of a global society
characterised by solidarist notions of morality. In accordance with the argu-
ably fragile global ‘we-feeling’, Hurd’s third reason why states participate in
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international practices indicates that states take part because they believe they
have to. That belief relates closely to identity, which is both a subjective and
an objective discourse of the self; it concerns how a person, society or state as
well as others perceive and establish distinctiveness in social interactions. At
the personal level, questions to that end include ‘Who am I?’, ‘What am I?’
and ‘What do others think I am?’ Identity is also always linked to others, the
common question about which is ‘What am I not?’. Furthermore, identity is
material as well as ideational. Although based on the material site of a body
or the territory of a state, ideas – values, beliefs, knowledge, attitudes and
memories – make it special. Identity is ‘what allows us to define what is
important to us and what is not’ (Taylor 1989, 30). ‘My identity’, Charles
Taylor (1989, 27) explains, ‘is defined by the commitments and identifications
which provide the frame or horizon within which I can try to determine from
case to case what is good, or valuable, or what ought to be done, or what I
endorse or oppose.’ Such ‘commitments and identifications’ are constructed
within social practices – for example, religious, political, educational and
family practices in which a person, society or state participates – that allocate
certain responsibilities to participants. Identity is therefore a ‘lived experience
of participation in specific communities’ (Wenger 1998, 151), and practices
shape participants’ identities, notions of morality and senses of appropriate
courses of action. Because practices anchor identities ‘in each other and what
we do together’, it is challenging to transform identity in isolation from other
participants involved in the practice (Wenger 1998, 89). If a person is exclu-
ded from a practice important to his or her identity, he or she might face a so-
called ‘identity crisis’. By extension, large communities such as states need to
have normative and organisational ideas that ‘signify to their members what
they stand for’ and ‘guide them in their interactions in the international
arena’ (Legro 2005, 6). Ideologies, for instance, are beliefs that define what is
deemed right and wrong in a society (Watson 1982, 68). They are incorpo-
rated in identities and embedded in various social practices related to gov-
ernmental procedures, education systems and the rhetoric of the political elite
(Legro 2005, 6; cf. Haas 2005).
Again, an identity is not an exclusive, inherent asset of a person, society or
state because others shape that identity as well. As Ringmar (1996, 13)
explains, ‘We need recognition for the persons we take ourselves to be, and
only as recognised can we conclusively come to establish an identity’. Status
or social identity is therefore an important element of identity, and the pursuit
of a favourable one can be a significant driver for a state’s participation in
international practices. That idea relates to questions of self-interest and cal-
culations discussed above; it can be quite difficult to distinguish legitimacy
from interests, for states may accept international norms because doing so
serves their interests. Conversely, the concept of legitimacy clarifies why states
sometimes participate in practices against their own interests. According to
Mark Suchman (1995, 574), legitimacy is ‘a generalised perception or
assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate
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within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and defini-
tions’. If states accept the rules of an international practice as legitimate and
justified, then they participate in the practice not only due to fear of retribu-
tion or calculations of self-interest but because of their ‘internal sense of
rightness and obligation’ (Hurd 2007, 30). The perception of legitimacy ‘may
come from the substance of the rule or from the procedure or source by which
it was constituted’ (ibid., 381). In that case, a state internalises the rules of a
practice and incorporates them into its identity and interests, and, as a result,
it assumes responsibility for the practice because it is the fairest course of
action to take.
Consequently, there are fundamental links among practices, identity and
responsibility. The first link, between identity and responsibility in particular, is
historical. To some extent, any current self-understanding is a product of past
choices and commitments. For example, China’s contemporary identity and
approach to responsibility has been shaped strongly by its past imperial and
Maoist practices. The second link concerns the here and now and, at a personal
level, asks the question ‘Who am I?’Usually, the answer is a name (‘I’mMary’)
or a statement related to practices in which a person currently takes part (‘I’m
the mother of Mary’, ‘I’m a Catholic’ or ‘I’m a professor’). The latter sort of
answer thus refers to what Hart (1968, 212) would call role-responsibility, what
Wendt (1999, 227) would call role identity and what role theorists would call
role conceptions (e.g. Harnisch 2011). The third link is social; the commitments
and identifications of others also shape self-understandings and the responsi-
bilities that people assume. To quote Buzan (2004b, 68):
At the end of the day, it is not what states are, or what they say about
themselves and others, that determines status, but how they calculate
their own behaviour and, most importantly, how they respond to the
behaviour of others.
Regarding China’s climate responsibility, the commitments of developed
countries form an essential precondition of China’s motivation to assume
greater global responsibility. At the same time, there is no causal relationship
between identity and responsibility, and identities alone cannot explain
action. To understand why and what sort of responsibilities a person assumes
in practice, we have to explore their interests. By extension, when it comes to
states, national interests and goals are important when assigning responsi-
bilities because each state – more accurately, its government – has certain
goals that it seeks to accomplish. Those goals reflect a state’s identity and
values and motivate it to take certain actions. Accordingly, a state’s identity
and interests influence the sort of practices in which it might participate and
what sorts of responsibilities it is willing to or capable of assuming in relation
to the practice. Free-riding and the failure to fulfil those responsibilities would
harm its international image and self-conception – its identity – as a respon-
sible member of the international society.
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Climate change and practices of state responsibility
Within the English School, pluralists take a highly state-centric approach to
responsibility. They emphasise the values of states and pay less attention to
other ethical aspects of state practices. Because pluralists regard international
order as the most valuable common good of international society, they stress
the duty to uphold international order as a state’s primary responsibility to
other states. In practice, however, a state’s policies and actions, especially
those of a great power, affect the lives of all people as well as non-human
species worldwide. Conversely, the solidarist camp of the English School
underscores human values in international relations. They maintain that a
state’s chief responsibility is to promote human justice at home and abroad.
Since both pluralists and solidarists make important observations of and
contributions to international ethics, I do not confine my theorisation of state
responsibility to either one but employ Buzan’s highly useful conception of
state-centric solidarism. According to my state-centric solidarist reading, both
pluralists and solidarists essentially agree that the ultimate referent object of
state responsibility is humans; both consider peace and security to be crucial
to human wellbeing. From a pluralist perspective, states should uphold inter-
national order because it is a precondition of international security and, in
turn, of human wellbeing. By contrast, solidarists conceive international jus-
tice to be an important condition of human wellbeing as well. Whereas soli-
darists regard the entire community of humans as the referent object of state
responsibility, pluralists focus on the wellbeing of citizens of individual states
and scrutinise the ways in which states can fulfil their domestic responsibilities
to their citizens. From the perspective of state-centric solidarism, the ultimate
aim of international society is therefore to promote human wellbeing.
Although pluralism has a so-called ‘ought-side’, solidarism has been more
purposeful in campaigning for situations that ought to be pursued in order to
cultivate a fairer world. However, Buzan’s (2014a, 113) conception of state-
centric solidarism argues that solidarism and pluralism are not necessarily
opposite poles but ‘interlinked sides in an ongoing debate about the moral
construction of international order’. Although Jackson can doubtlessly be
categorised in the pluralist camp of the English School, he also offers excep-
tionally useful conceptual tools for analysing state responsibility from the
perspective of state-centric solidarism. According to Jackson (2000, 170–178),
governments have plural, multi-dimensional responsibilities: national ones
based on realism and the promotion of national interests, international ones
based on rationalism and the state’s membership in international society,
humanitarian ones based on revolutionism or cosmopolitanism and member-
ship in the human race and other responsibilities to the global commons
based on the idea of global trusteeship and humankind’s responsibility for
Earth’s health.
Inspired by Buzan and Jackson, I locate practices of state responsibility on
a broad spectrum of differing orientations towards moral referent objects.
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Such a conceptualisation is not a matter of value judgement because I do not
mean that one category is somehow more important than the others. By
contrast, I intend to demonstrate that different notions of responsibility are
based on different ideas about the referent objects of responsibility. At one
end of the spectrum is pluralism, which focuses on states as moral referent
objects. Environmental issues, apart from national environmental security, are
thus largely ignored from the pluralist end, and the creation and enforcement
of international norms is therefore difficult and rare. At the other end of the
spectrum is ecocentrism, which gives nature moral priority, and between
those two ends are state-centric solidarism and cosmopolitan solidarism.
Because the two ends of the spectrum are unlikely pursuits in reality, I dismiss
the pluralist end of the spectrum, at which a state is responsible only for its
own survival. Instead, I argue that, at a bare minimum, states have national
responsibilities and are always responsible for the wellbeing of their citizens.
If not, then why would states exist at all? Instead, I discuss the other end of
the spectrum – ecocentrism – which I consider to be the ultimate ought-side
of the responsibility of states. An important, albeit unanswerable, question
thus concerns the relationship between cosmopolitanism and ecocentrism. If
viewed as the very end of the spectrum, does ecocentrism presuppose a cos-
mopolitan world society, or can international society be ecocentric?
State responsibilities are doubtlessly very complex. Although I distinguish
four categories of general responsibilities, I do not by any means argue that
the categorisation is exhaustive. A state’s responsibilities can overlap and
conflict; they can also shift when circumstances change. Different types of
international societies have different sorts of primary institutions and prac-
tices because the ‘institutions of international society are according to its
nature’ (Wight 1999 [1946], 111). Likewise, distinct sorts of practices have
distinct ethics; even if it is accepted that environmental trusteeship has
emerged as a primary institution of international society (Buzan 2004a, 186;
Buzan 2014a, 161–163; Falkner 2012; Falkner & Buzan 2018; Kopra forth-
coming; Palmujoki 2013), the nature of the institution depends, for instance,
upon where international society falls on the spectra of pluralism–solidarism
and anthropocentrism–ecocentrism. In the system of states or in a highly
pluralist international society, a state is interested only in the environment
within its national territory. States conceive nature as a stock of resources and
thus focus on environmental concerns such as pollution, waste and the insuf-
ficiency of natural resources from a local perspective. In a more solidarist
international society, by contrast, states cooperate to respond to global
environmental concerns because they recognise that they cause as well as
suffer from environmental harm beyond their borders. At the ultimate end of
the pluralist-solidarist spectrum, states may follow ecocentric principles.
Altogether, the primary institution of environmental trusteeship can be highly
pluralist, yet its existence does not necessarily mean that a shared norm of
climate responsibility exists. Although climate change is often viewed as a
subcategory of environmental problems, it differs starkly from traditional
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environmental problems. Climate change is truly a global problem, and all
attempts to counteract it presuppose the existence of an international society.
Similarly to Jackson, I distinguish national and humanitarian responsi-
bilities even though they can be merged into the single category of human-
centric responsibility. Because I am slightly pessimistic about the potential of
states to act for reasons above and beyond pluralism, I assume that states
tend to pay greater attention to the wellbeing of their citizens than to the
wellbeing of other humans. The term national responsibility also implies that
states have state-centric responsibilities, including their own survival as
sovereign states. In a cosmopolitan international society, both the categories
of national and international responsibility can be abandoned because
nationality becomes irrelevant to assessing the nature, scope and depth of
responsibility. At the same time, environmental responsibility becomes parti-
cularly difficult to demarcate. If nature is viewed as having only instrumental
value for humans, then differentiating it as an independent category becomes
unnecessary and only the sort of environmental aspects that pertain to a
state’s national, international and humanitarian responsibilities need to be
discussed. In that case, the focus would fall upon the environmental security
of each category. However, such a view would be too limited and would not
acknowledge the intrinsic value of nature. To emphasise nature as a referent
object of state responsibility, I choose to distinguish it as the ultimate end of
state responsibility.
National responsibility
Although many realists have averred that a state’s responsibility stops at the
national border, some have begun to question that assumption by introducing
ethical questions into realist research agenda (cf. Chang 2011) and maintain-
ing that states should respect the views and interests of other nations.
Although Jackson’s conceptualisation of national responsibility derives sig-
nificantly from classical realism it does not necessarily dismiss ethics. On the
contrary, it presents an enlightened version of realism holding that a state’s
‘first obligation’ and ‘chief duty’ is to preserve its national interests (Wight
1999 [1946], 95; Watson 1982, 206). For Jackson (2000, 170), national
responsibility is par excellence a ‘moral relation between a state and its citi-
zens’ as he sees the moral obligation of national interest as the ‘fundamental
standard of conduct’ and national security as a foundational value. In other
words, Jackson suggests that national interest is a ‘moral idea governing the
conduct of statespeople: the idea that the nation and its population are a
treasure which they have the responsibility to safeguard’ (ibid., 21). Therefore,
states have a moral obligation to defend national interests driven by a ‘moral
concern for the flourishing of the national population, for their good life’
(ibid.,171). Clearly, however, national interest can be viewed as a moral
guideline only if defined more broadly than in narrow, self-interested terms
that focus on state security.6
36 Responsibility in international society
From another angle, literature on happiness suggests that governments face
strong incentives to assume the happiness of citizens as their ultimate
responsibility (e.g. Duncan 2010; Bok 2010). However, thus far, Bhutan is the
only nation to have adopted ‘gross-national happiness’ as the central aim of
its national policy.7 A pluralist approach to national responsibility would
suggest that the happiness of the state – or more broadly, the wellbeing of
citizens – should be the only legitimate goal of national policies. However,
solidarists would disagree for both moral and practical reasons. They would
argue, for example, that even if a government’s moral duty is to promote the
wellbeing of its citizens, it should not do so by infringing upon the wellbeing
of citizens of other states because it has responsibilities beyond its own bor-
ders. Moreover, they would add, responsible governments should not exclu-
sively promote the short-term wellbeing of their present populations and not
avoid making difficult decisions that promote the long-term wellbeing of their
citizens but conflict with their short-term (e.g. economic) interests.8
Because the concept of national responsibility emphasises the significance
of the domestic responsibilities of states, it identifies international law and
secondary institutions as ‘instrumental arrangements which are justified by
how well they serve the national interest of states’ (Jackson 2000, 170).
Accordingly, the concept maintains that states are foremost responsible for
the wellbeing of their own citizens, not that of foreign countries and their
populations (ibid., 171). As for foreign affairs, that sort of normative standard
supports Machiavellian principles of self-interest because it holds that a state
needs to put its own nation and citizens first and cooperate with other states
only when necessary to promote national interests and, among other things,
to avoid putting their citizens and military at risk of harm. Linklater and
Suganami (2006, 235) rightly criticise Jackson’s (2000) argument for its
incomparable normative basis for national responsibility. According to Jack-
son, the ‘“first duty of a government is to protect its own people. After that it
can try to help whoever else it can”’ (quoted in Linklater & Suganami 2006,
235). Taken literally, Jackson’s argument means that states have to first do
whatever they can to assist their own citizens and only afterwards may they
pay attention to the needs and interests of citizens of other states. However,
Linklater and Suganami admit that such an idea is not necessarily the inten-
tion of Jackson’s argument, for it would mean that, during a war, a state
could ignore the international codification of humanitarian law and do
whatever it pleased to secure the interests of its people and only later, if at all,
think about the human suffering of the soldiers and civilians of opposing
states (ibid.). Because Machiavellian principles were defined amid a system of
separate and often rival states, it is understandable that they consider state
responsibilities in purely national terms. International society did not exist at
the time, and there were no responsibilities beyond a state’s national borders;
if there were, then they derived from the national interest of securing peaceful
international order. In today’s global era, however, such principles are inevi-
tably outdated and do not provide a normative basis for international ethics.
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Sovereign states, at least liberal democratic ones, define and allocate their
national responsibilities according to their constitutions and other laws.
However, such practices do not mean that states are responsible for every-
thing that occurs within their borders; after all, states are not protectors of
property and life, nor are they responsible for their citizens’ actions. Entering
into international agreements does not decrease a state’s sovereignty; it may
even preserve that sovereignty when international cooperation is needed to
diffuse transnational threats that risk its sovereignty. The concept of national
responsibility does not necessarily ignore the environment, either. Unlike tra-
ditional approaches to security that focus on a state’s national security, a
broader approach is concerned with human and environmental security and
emphasises the idea that states bear a responsibility to protect their citizens
from threats of environmental origin. It is becoming increasingly more certain
that causal links therefore exist between environmental degradation and inter-
and intra-state conflicts.
International responsibility
Based on liberalism, Jackson’s conceptualisation of international responsi-
bility suggests that, unlike the Hobbesian ‘war of all against all’, states form
an international society. Such an international society is constitutional in
nature, for its members’ duties and rights are written into international law,
among which the UN Charter (1945) is the most fundamental. When inter-
national society recognises a state’s sovereignty and membership in such a
society, the state presumably accepts and becomes capable of exercising its
rights and responsibilities in that society. It is, to quote Eagleton (1928, 5),
‘upon this agreement to observe the rules of the community that international
responsibility is founded’. Given the constitutional relationship, states are not
only accountable to their own citizens but also ‘responsible for upholding
international law and the society of states as a whole’ (Jackson 2000, 172).
They have a general responsibility to preserve international society and
maintain its functioning, and they are obliged to pursue their national
responsibilities without infringing upon the rights of other states. Due to the
state-centric basis of international society, the most essential international
right listed in the UN Charter is non-intervention, meaning a responsibility to
not intervene unless in lawfully recognised circumstances. States also have a
right and responsibility to participate in diplomatic practices, meaning that,
at a minimum, every state should respect the UN Charter, prevent harm to
others and refrain from unnecessary military action. However, if a state fails
to uphold its responsibilities, methods of sanctioning states in the absence of a
supranational body remain unavailable.
From the perspective of the English School, international law provides an
important normative framework no less binding than domestic law within
which and with reference to which states make choices about what actions to
perform in international society. Apart from the Responsibility of States for
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Internationally Wrongful Acts drafted and compiled by the International Law
Commission in 2001, however, there is no international law regarding state
responsibility. From the perspective of international law, states can be held
responsible for pollution only if such pollution is wrongful under interna-
tional law. Because carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gas emissions are
legal forms of pollution caused primarily by the activities of individuals and
private corporations, states cannot be held legally responsible for the damage
caused. Conversely, the idea of a state’s international responsibility usually
refers to its political responsibilities as the most authoritative within interna-
tional society.
As members of international society, all states have equal, general respon-
sibilities derived from the UN Charter. They have a responsibility to safe-
guard international peace and security, prosperity and the wellbeing of people
of present and future generations both locally and globally. They are also
obliged to not cause harm to others. In practical terms, however, the circum-
stances and capacities of states vary considerably, as does their power and
capability to shoulder international responsibilities. Henry Shue’s (1993)
dichotomy between the general responsibilities of all states and the special
responsibilities of states with greater capabilities elucidates the practices of
global responsibility, including those related to the climate. Regarding climate
responsibility, Shue’s distinction between subsistence emissions and luxury
emissions clarifies that not all greenhouse gas emissions are equally detri-
mental. In short, developing countries’ subsistence emissions, or survival
emissions, are unavoidable because they are produced in order to guarantee a
basic minimum standard of living for the poor. Whereas general responsi-
bilities relate to so-called ‘arithmetical justice’, meaning that states have equal
rights and responsibilities, the distribution of special responsibilities is a poli-
tical decision made by international society as a whole in the ‘consideration
of its common good or interest’ (Bull 2002 [1977], 77). Although states gen-
erally agree that the distribution of responsibilities is a matter of fairness and
some states have special responsibilities, political debate about the ethical
underpinnings of ways to define and distribute responsibilities equitably
remains heated. From another perspective, moral philosophers have elaborated
upon the fairness of the allocation of climate responsibilities (e.g. Caney 2010;
Gardiner 2011; Gardiner, Caney, Jamieson & Shue 2010; Vanderheiden 2008).
From a legal and moral perspective, a significant causal link joins con-
tribution and responsibility. If a person, society or state is guilty of an action,
then it has a responsibility to remedy that action’s effects. In international
environmental politics, that notion has been best captured by the so-called
‘polluter pays’ principle, which is nevertheless problematic at least for three
reasons. Many polluters cannot pay because they are dead, many simply
cannot afford to pay and many refuse to pay (Caney 2010, 134). Although it
is impossible to pinpoint who is guilty of causing climate change, which is
caused by countless people participating in morally and legally accepted
practices, they can be collectively held responsible for it.9 However, would it
Responsibility in international society 39
be fair to ask all states or people to shoulder similar responsibility to mitigate
climate change?
Humanitarian responsibility
Jackson’s (2000) idea of humanitarian responsibility derives from cosmopoli-
tanism and the notion of world society. Cosmopolitanism maintains that
people have universal negative responsibilities not to dispossess other people’s
rights (Shue 1988, 690). Due to their specific positions and capacity to
improve or harm the wellbeing of fellow humans around the world, state
leaders are responsible for the good life of all people, not only the citizens of
their respective countries (Jackson 2000, 174–175). Therefore, states have a
fundamental positive responsibility to ‘respect the dignity and freedom of
human beings’ and need to do their utmost to defend human rights all over
the world. From a humanitarian standpoint, ‘respect for human beings –
whoever they are and whatever they happen to be living – is a fundamental
normative consideration in foreign policy’ (ibid., 174). At the same time, the
humanitarian approach is also deeply rooted in Western traditions, including
Christianity. From the Chinese perspective, conversely, it is entirely Euro-
centric to justify the humanitarian responsibilities of states by invoking nat-
ural law and the universal valuation of human rights.
International practices emphasising human rights began to evolve after the
atrocities committed during World War II, when liberal-democratic states
agreed upon new humanitarian principles for international society. Procedu-
rally, the humanitarian approach is now written into international humani-
tarian law. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) recognises
that all humans are born free and have an equal right to life, liberty and
security. In practical terms, the humanitarian approach is recognisable in the
strong human rights doctrines of Western countries. Linklater and Suganami
(2006, 243) regard Article 5 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
which states that all humans have the right to be free from ‘torture, cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment’, as the ‘grundnorm of the
solidarist position on good international citizenship’. During the Cold War,
questions of human right norms were muted in practice. In more recent dec-
ades, however, interest in international humanitarian ethics has rapidly risen
as globalisation has introduced new sorts of political concerns, including
global inequality and justice, sustainable development and non-state actors’
increased role in world politics. Although those global developments indicate
that states ‘cannot advance significantly beyond a pluralist conception of
good citizenship’, there is nevertheless room for solidarist ethics (ibid., 229).
In particular, the concept of sovereignty as responsibility developed by
Francis M. Deng et al. (1996) has stimulated extensive political and academic
discussions about state responsibility that have prompted a shift from the right
to interfere to the responsibility to protect (e.g. Wheeler 2000). In 2001, the
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (2001, XI)
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introduced the ‘responsibility to protect’, for which it highlighted two basic
principles: that ‘state sovereignty implies responsibility, and the primary
responsibility for the protection of its people lies with the state itself ’ and that
‘where a population is suffering serious harm, as a result of internal war,
insurgency, repression or state failure, and the state in question is unwilling or
unable to halt or avert it, the principle of non-intervention yields to the
international responsibility to protect’. The UN General Assembly (2005)
adopted the ‘responsibility to protect’ as follows:
Each individual State has the responsibility to protect its populations
from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.
This responsibility entails the prevention of such crimes, including their
incitement, through appropriate and necessary means. We accept that
responsibility and will act in accordance with it. The international com-
munity should, as appropriate, encourage and help States to exercise this
responsibility and support the United Nations in establishing an early
warning capability.
The UN General Assembly (2005) has defined the responsibility to protect to
consist of three pillars: a state’s responsibilities to its citizens, international
society’s responsibility to assist states to fulfil their responsibilities and inter-
national society’s responsibility to take collective action if a state manifestly
fails to protect its citizens. That definition reveals two important aspects of
state responsibility. On the one hand, sovereignty remains the fundamental
principle of international society. Indeed, the definition confirms that sover-
eignty is an essential precondition of state responsibility, for without indepen-
dence from external control and full authority over a territory, a state cannot
exercise full responsibility. Therefore, the ‘exclusive territorial jurisdiction of
the state’, as Eagleton (1928, 7) writes, ‘is the chief source of its responsibility’.
On the other, the definition indicates that state responsibility presupposes the
existence of international society and is therefore constructed in social interac-
tion. After all, if there were only one state, then the concepts of external
sovereignty and the responsibility to protect would not make much sense.
Climate change violates basic human rights, including the right to life, the
right to health and the right to subsistence (Caney 2009, 230–231). The
Human Rights Council of the UN acknowledged that dilemma in 2008 when
it passed its first resolution related to climate change, according to which
‘climate change poses an immediate and far-reaching threat to people and
communities around the world and has implications for the full enjoyment of
human right’ (Human Rights Council 2008). Because climate change endan-
gers the traditional practices of indigenous people and the very existence of
island nations, legal cases against developed countries for violating indigen-
ous communities’ human rights by causing climate change have already
begun to emerge.10 An important breakthrough in state climate responsibility
occurred in 2015, when a court in the Hague ordered the Dutch government
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to cut emissions at least by 25 per cent within five years in order to protect its
citizens from climate change.
Since carbon dioxide, the chief human cause of climate change, is a so-
called ‘stock pollutant’, meaning that today’s emissions might not harm us
today but could cause problems for future generations, humanitarian respon-
sibility can be extended to include future generations as well. Although the
idea that people are concerned with the lives of future generations is nothing
new, the capacity of the present generation to negatively affect the wellbeing
of future generations is relatively novel. Although we cannot know with any
certainty what the interests of future generations will be, we can assume that
some basic needs, including access to clean water and air, are common to all
humans and other animals regardless of time and place. Furthermore, if we
agree that future generations have corresponding rights, then the present
generation has responsibilities to them. After all, if contemporary practices
harm the basic interests of future generations, then they violate their rights,
and no optimism about the future’s advanced technologies to clean today’s
pollution can reduce the responsibility of the present generation. The princi-
ple of sustainable development clearly acknowledges that fact, at least in
principle. In reality, however, intergenerational responsibilities are often not
discussed in terms of humanitarian responsibility (cf. Weiss 1989).
Environmental responsibility
According to Jackson (2000, 175–178), people have a conservationist respon-
sibility because the health of Earth is vital to humans. Because people can live
without nation-states but not without the planet, we are bound to shoulder
responsibility for the global environment. That norm has been best captured
by the idea of global trusteeship, which holds that because humans have the
industrial power to shape the balance of nature, they also have a responsi-
bility to conserve it. The greatest ‘responsibility for the global commons’ falls
to governments, which are the ‘chief trustees or stewards of the planet’
because they have juridical power to regulate activities and control potential
harm to the environment (ibid). From Jackson’s pluralist perspective, states
are expected to protect nature within their jurisdictions and take international
action to preserve the global environment.
Although I do not disagree with Jackson’s idea of responsibility for the
global commons in general, it needs to be revisited for two reasons. First, the
definition of global commons is not clear enough. Often, the global commons
refers to the oceans, the atmosphere, the ozone layer, global biodiversity,
outer space, the North Pole and Antarctica, of which global biodiversity is
the least clear, particularly in respect to its location. Apart from ecosystems in
the oceans, Antarctica and the North Pole, biodiversity is not global in a
physical sense but always exists in the territory of specific countries. For
example, the Amazon rainforest is typically described as a global commons
despite its location in the territory of several sovereign states. People who
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happen to live in those countries have the privilege to decide what to do with
the rainforest, how to use its biodiversity as natural resources and how to
treat specific species. Consequently, as a local resource, biodiversity is gov-
erned according to a sovereign state’s political, cultural and social values,
principles and norms. Second, it seems that Jackson’s conceptualisation of
global trusteeship is highly anthropocentric. Because it suggests that humans,
particularly state leaders, are responsible for the health of the planet as the
only home we ultimately have, humans are the sole objects of moral respon-
sibilities, whereas nature has no intrinsic value (i.e. the value of ends, or
nature for its own sake) but only instrumental value (i.e. the value of means,
or nature in terms of resources). From that perspective, states have to
shoulder responsibility for the global commons only because it is in the
interest of humans. By contrast, considering the intrinsic value of nature
would indicate that nature must be respected and preserved for its own sake
and that states have responsibilities to the natural world as such. Nevertheless,
the instrumental value judgement of nature does not necessarily mean that
humans have no responsibility to nature but face a strong instrumental
incentive to protect nature because it provides ecosystems vital to humans.
Ecocentrism recognises that humans and therefore states have a moral
standing vis-à-vis Earth and not only for anthropocentric and instrumental
reasons. Ecocentrism recognises various human interests related to the envir-
onment and thus national interests as well. It does not overlook the role of
anthropocentric interests such as economic needs for natural resources and
human welfare, but it does provide a more encompassing approach by also
recognising the interests of non-human species, ecological communities and
future generations of both humans and non-humans. At a fundamental level,
the conservation of biodiversity is a moral recognition that all species have
rights and should not be treated as lifeless or valueless objects (Eckersley 1992).
The ecocentric conceptualisation of state responsibility is not merely a
utopian idea. Practices of environmental constitutionalism, which regard the
environment as a ‘proper subject for protection in constitutional texts and for
vindication by constitutional courts’, are now evolving worldwide (May &
Daly 2015, 1–2), and a growing number of states explicitly recognise the
substantive environmental rights of citizens and the government’s environ-
mental responsibilities (ibid., Appendices A and C). Although such environ-
mental rights and duties are largely motivated by anthropocentric reasons, a
more ecocentric constitutionalism ‘advancing the right of nature’ is not
uncommon (ibid., 255).11 Plus, contemporary international law ‘already car-
ries the seeds of possibility for non-anthropocentric conceptions’ of responsi-
bility (Bosselmann 2015, 40), as I demonstrate in the following chapters.
Currently, however, international environmental law is highly fragmented and
largely ill equipped to fulfil climate responsibility (cf. Voigt 2008), and no
independent international treaty on environmental rights exists. In fact, the
UN International Law Commission’s State Responsibility Project in the
1980s and 1990s abandoned the idea that state criminal responsibility includes
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the widespread pollution of the seas and atmosphere (Koivurova 2014, 174–
175). At present, the most prominent articulation of ecocentric responsibility
appears in the Earth Charter (2000), a civil society initiative launched in
2000, whose first principle urges humans to ‘Respect Earth and life in all its
diversity’, based on an ontological assumption that ‘all beings are inter-
dependent and every form of life has value regardless of its worth to human
beings’. However, because the Earth Charter is not endorsed by states, its
legal status remains a document of soft law and is not legally binding for
governments. Nevertheless, because it is a statement expressed by the world
over civil society, it is, to use Klaus Bosselmann’s (2015, 110–111) words,
‘arguably one of the most legitimate international statements of principle ever
to be made’. As such, it should be morally binding to states.
Conclusion
Both the legal and moral conceptualisations of responsibility are pivotal for
analysing the scope of state responsibility, especially from a historical per-
spective. However, they do not pay attention to the fact that international
responsibilities are not static but produced and reproduced in social interac-
tion. Because they do not recognise that states can fulfil their forward-looking
responsibilities only by joining with others in the practices of international
society, legal and moral approaches to responsibility are insufficient views for
studying state responsibility (cf. Young 2006, 123). This chapter has demon-
strated that responsibility not only looks retrospectively at the past even if it
largely consists of elements derived from legal and moral ethics. In that
regard, the English School’s theorisation of responsibility has proven to be
valuable. This chapter has also demonstrated that state-centric solidarism
offers an enlightened approach for conceiving state responsibility by
acknowledging that, in addition to inter-state responsibilities, governments
are always responsible for the wellbeing of individuals. From a thinner, plur-
alist perspective, they are chiefly responsible for the citizens of their own
states, whereas from a thicker, solidarist perspective, they have responsibilities
for the wellbeing of all humans worldwide. The thickest perspective acknowl-
edges that states also have responsibilities for the wellbeing of planet Earth.
Notes
1 See Shue (1980) for a detailed study of basic rights and Alfredsson (2010), Anton
and Shelton (2011) and Weiss (1989, 95–117), for example, for comprehensive
analyses with numerous examples of how the environment has been treated in the
field of human rights and how international environmental regimes incorporate
human rights.
2 For a detailed analysis of legal responsibility in the context of civil and criminal
law, see Fletcher (1998), Ross (1975), Hart (1968) and Morris (1961).
3 For a detailed elaboration on causation and responsibility, see Hart and Honoré
(1985).
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4 By contrast, China’s climate policies are sometimes criticised because they are not
implemented for the so-called ‘right’ reasons. For example, Richerzhagen and
Scholz (2008, 311) complain that though renewable energy has been priortised in
China’s energy strategy since 2006, related measures may not have been imple-
mented for the climate’s sake but to cut energy costs and increase energy security,
which are essential measures to maintain economic growth.
5 According to Alison Wakefield and Jenny Fleming in the Sage Dictionary of
Policing, responsibilization is a ‘term developed in the governmentality literature to
refer to the process whereby subjects are rendered individually responsible for a
task which previously would have been the duty of another – usually a state
agency – or would not have been recognized as a responsibility at all. The process
is strongly associated with neoliberal political discourses, where it takes on the
implication that the subject being responsibilized has avoided this duty or the
responsibility has been taken away from them in the welfare state era and managed
by an expert or government agency’.
6 Public opinion is not synonymous with national responsibility; at times, the fulfil-
ment of the latter requires difficult decisions and policies that conflict with the
former. In democratic societies, politicians might fail to shoulder their national
responsibilities because they have to consider voters’ opinions and preferences in
order make a case for their re-election.
7 According to Bok (2010), Bhutan’s four pillars of gross national happiness are
good governance and democratization, stable and equitable socioeconomic devel-
opment, environmental protection and the preservation of culture.
8 Environmental protection is an excellent example, for it sometimes conflicts with
people’s short-term interests, especially those measured in economic terms. Simi-
larly, banning cigarettes would promote people’s health and thus their happiness.
In the short term, however, people would probably not be pleased with the ban,
and their happiness might even diminish.
9 Larry May’s (1992, 38) distinction between shared and collective responsibility
holds that ‘[w]hen a group of people shares responsibility for a harm, responsibility
distributes to each member of the group. When a group is collectively responsible
for a harm, the group as such is responsible; but this does not necessarily mean
that all, or even any, of the members are individually responsible for the harm.’
10 See, for example, the Petition to the Inter American Commission on Human Rights
Seeking Relief from Violations Resulting from Global Warming Caused by Acts and
Omissions of the United States (2005) and the Petition to the Inter American
Commission on Human Rights Seeking Relief from Violations of the Rights of
Arctic Athabaskan Peoples Resulting from Rapid Arctic Warming and Melting
Caused by the Emission of Black Carbon by Canada (2013).
11 For example, Ecuador’s constitution includes a chapter on nature’s rights.
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3 Practices of state responsibility in
China
We cannot understand the present without understanding history. Therefore,
in this chapter I briefly introduce China’s political history from the perspec-
tive of state responsibility. Although I examine China’s identity, values, inter-
ests and policies within a historical continuum, I do not pretend to give a
comprehensive or even overall view of China’s long history. On the contrary, I
seek to succinctly review how China’s central government has constructed
notions of responsibility over time and to analyse how those notions have
guided political practices in China. I base my understanding on a selective
reading of practices of Chinese political leadership and developments that
might influence current notions of climate responsibility in China. A histor-
ical background can elucidate what sort of responsibilities China’s govern-
ment is willing to or can assign to international climate politics today.
Legacy of China’s imperial and Maoist eras
In ancient times, the sovereign territory now known as China was not called
‘China’ by people living there but Tianxia (天下), meaning ‘all under heaven’.
The Chinese emperor, regarded as the centre of the universe and the son of
heaven, was considered to rule everything that mattered and was responsible
for maintaining unity and stability in the empire. As the most powerful state
and most advanced civilisation of the period, China was the political, eco-
nomic and cultural model for other societies in the region. It formed the
Chinese world order – the Pax Sinica – and defined norms of international
order regionally and well before the birth of European international society
(Zhang 2014, 56). Although European state and non-state actors participated
in the practices of the Pax Sinica in the sixteenth century, they did not
attempt to impose European practices upon China (ibid., 72). Indeed, they
did not ‘challenge, if ever they did question, the assumptions, worldviews, the
legitimacy and predominance of the Chinese world order they encountered’
(ibid., 73). The era of the Pax Sinica ended with the beginning of so-called
‘Century of Shame’ or ‘Century of Humiliation’ (1839–1949), which encom-
passed several lopsided treaties and losses of sovereignty, including the cession
of Hong Kong to Britain. At that time, China’s international responsibility
was ‘largely to make sacrifice as a colony’, and the failed state could not fulfil
the ‘fundamental responsibility of maintaining its people’s living standards,
safeguarding basic human rights and developing economy’ (Jin 2011, 7). The
Century of Shame concluded with the communist revolution and establish-
ment of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949.
Before the globalisation of Western ideas of human–nature relationships in
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the Chinese language did not include
any word equivalent to nature (Weller 2006, 13). In ancient China, nature
itself did not exist, although human–nature relationships were ‘reflected and
disputed’ in the terms tian (天), xing (性), sheng (生) and others (Schmidt-
Glintzer 2010, 526), and only in the early twentieth century did ziran (自然)
become the accepted translation for the Western concept of nature (Weller
2006, 13). In contrast to the Western belief that God created nature – that is,
natura naturata – the ancient Chinese conceived nature as the ‘ever-produc-
tive and self-renewing forces of nature’, or natura naturans (Kubin 2010,
517). As agricultural economies, both the Ming (1368–1644) and Qing
(1644–1911) dynasties followed the principles of Confucianism and highly
valued a balanced relationship between humans and land or humans and
nature (天人关系, 人地关系, 人大自然关系, 天人合一). When rapid environ-
mental change commenced in China during the late seventeenth century as
the country’s population burgeoned, the growing population increasingly used
natural resources (Sit 2010, 241–242). By 1800, China faced a ‘pre-modern
energy crisis’ caused largely by heavy deforestation (Marks 2012, 6), and the
modernisation of agriculture and industry, population growth and commer-
cialisation during the late Qing dynasty and the Republic of China (1912–
1949) caused serious environmental degradation and social problems, includ-
ing deforestation, energy shortages, droughts, famines and conflicts over water
and land control (ibid., ch. 6). In particular, the mid-nineteenth century
marked the ‘watershed between traditional China and the modern age,
between the pre-industrial and post-industrial age, and between the choice of
neo-Confucianism and a reformed way of managing man–land relationship
with regard to new technology and other factors in the modern era’ (Sit 2010,
241–242). Due to social and environmental changes during the mid-nine-
teenth century, the PRC ‘inherited a seriously degraded natural environment’
when it emerged in 1949 (Marks 2012, 263).
Although the establishment of the PRC marked the beginning of a new era
in China’s history, events in China’s past instilled in Mao Zedong, the first
chair of the PRC, an obsession with sovereignty, a fear of invention and a
suspicion of foreigners. Maoist China (1949–1978) resisted both formal and
informal international organisations, which it regarded as ‘the creations of
either the superpowers or the Western capitalist camp’ (Deng 2008, 4).
According to Zhao Suizheng (2000, 4), all Chinese leaders in the twentieth
century shared ‘a deep bitterness at China’s humiliation’ and resolved to
‘restore China to its rightful place as a great power’. Inspired by Karl Marx,
Mao applauded technological progress, economic growth and the conquest of
50 Practices of state responsibility in China
nature.1 He collectivised most of China’s land and forests in an effort to
maximise industrial output without paying attention to environmental
impacts. Factories had no incentives to protect the environment because they
were evaluated in terms of industrial output and economic growth. Due to
inefficient production technologies and heavily subsidised energy prices,
energy efficiency in China was and remains poor, and natural resources have
been systematically wasted (cf. Shapiro 2001). Because the volume of workers
was considered to be vital to maximising industrial input, population policy
was an integral part of Maoist China’s national economic development, and
rapid population growth was therefore heavily promoted.
In rejecting longstanding ideas of human–nature relationships based on
traditional neo-Confucianism, Maoist society pursued social modernisation
focused on heavy industry, forced industrialisation and central planning. In
contrast to the Western view of nature as ‘common heritage’ or ‘private
property that needed to be preserved’, the environment in China was regarded
as a ‘common good that could be put to positive use’ (Kobayashi 2005, 90).
Indeed, Maoist China believed that the ‘utilization of natural resources is in
principle inexhaustible, or at least, constantly extending’ (Greenfield 1979,
217). With the militarisation of other sectors of life and the state’s fight
against capitalism, individualism, imperialism, feudalism and revisionism,
Mao declared a ‘war against nature’ and promoted the slogan ‘Man must
conquer nature’ (人定胜天). As Judith Shapiro (2001, 3–4) describes, official
Maoist discourse was filled with military metaphors: ‘Nature was to be
“conquered”. Wheat was to be sown by “shock attack”. “Shock troops”
reclaimed the grasslands. “Victories” were won against flood and drought.
Insects, rodents, and sparrows were “wiped out”’.
Although Maoist China did not participate in practices of international
society, it was not entirely isolated from the international community. Jin
Canrong (2011, 8) describes the PRC’s alliance with the Soviet Union as the
fulfilment of China’s ‘important limited responsibility’ and, to some extent, its
‘leadership responsibility’. Accordingly, in its ‘responsibility of maintaining
the survival, unity and development of socialist countries in the world’, China
supported the socialist bloc during the Korean War, the First Indochina War
and the Vietnam War. Once China and the Soviet Union abandoned their
alliance, however, China began to expand its relations with former colonial
states around the world. In its ‘third-World’ relations, China promoted inter-
national norms and values that were ‘anti-America, anti-Soviet Union, [and]
anti-colonialism’ (ibid., 9). Despite Maoist China’s impoverished state, it was
‘somehow too generous’ in providing its fellow communist countries with
foreign aid, which prevented the party-state from fulfilling its national
responsibility to raise the standard of living of its generally poor citizenry.2 In
return for China’s diplomatic and economic assistance, many developing
countries supported the PRC’s bid to become China’s legal representative at
the UN. The PRC’s membership in the UN and particularly its permanent
seat on the UN Security Council re-oriented the state’s international
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responsibilities, at least in principle, in the early 1970s. In reality, however,
China remained unwilling to engage in all practices of international society,
including those related to international trade, until the reform era. Never-
theless, because the UN Conference on the Human Environment (1972) was
the first international conference in which the PRC ever participated, ideas of
environmental responsibility have informed the PRC’s formulation of its
international responsibilities since remarkably early stages.
Despite substantial ideological and economic changes in China since the
beginning of the post-Maoist era, Mao’s views on foreign affairs and human–
nature relationships continue to heavily influence China’s contemporary
environmental practices, and many of its current environmental problems can
be traced to the Maoist era. Not only do China’s development policies con-
tinue to focus on economic growth and largely neglect the environment, but
the rule of law is weak, and public awareness of environmental problems
remains low. In contrast to the Western focus on protecting nature
and restoring native ecosystems, Chinese environmental projects, which aim
to construct and improve nature by planting trees and implementing engi-
neering innovations, have not managed to halt environmental degradation
(Jiang 2010).
Reforming responsibilities
China’s reform era began after Mao’s death in the late 1970s. In their efforts
to cultivate a moderately well-off society, Chinese leaders conceived eco-
nomic growth primarily in terms of increased gross domestic product and
income per capita. At the beginning of the reform period, the Chinese gov-
ernment concentrated on domestic economic growth and remained quite
passive in the global arena. The chief motive of Chinese foreign policy was
to channel foreign investments and technology into China in order to boost
the state’s economic growth. Amid reforms and open-door policies, however,
China’s national identity gradually changed during the 1980s and 1990s.
Although that shift was mostly motivated by economic interests, it never-
theless transformed China’s membership in international society. Since the
late 1990s, the Chinese government has been more active in the interna-
tional arena and adopted a ‘going out’ (走出去) strategy as a guideline for
Chinese foreign policy. Recognising that the material focus on economic
development was causing enormous environmental degradation and social
problems, Chinese leaders began to acknowledge the importance of envir-
onmental protection, and in the late 1980s, China developed numerous
organisational, educational and scientific programmes focused on the envir-
onment (cf. Harrington 2005, 108).
In 1997, the 15th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party
(CCP) set the construction of an ‘all-around well-off society’ (小康社会) as
the party’s top priority (Jiang 1997). To secure a favourable international
environment for economic development, China abandoned ideologist
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campaigns and adopted a more pragmatic approach to foreign policy.
Advised by Premier Deng Xiaoping, the Chinese government kept a low
international profile, developed a concept of international responsibility
‘somewhat strange to foreigners’ and ranked raising its citizens’ living stan-
dards as the ‘fundamental national responsibility’ and the ‘main way of
defending the superiority of the socialist approach’ (Jin 2011, 9). Accordingly,
CCP leaders argued that fulfilling China’s domestic responsibilities was a
measure of taking international responsibility because the collapse of China
would undoubtedly cause instability around the world. That perspective
remains central to China’s understanding of its global responsibility. In Jin’s
words, because ‘it is a great responsibility for China to get its own things
done’, the ‘internal requirement for China’s international responsibility is to
develop and enhance its own power’ (ibid., 8). In light of China’s status as a
developing country, Zhao Qizheng (2012, 197), a former minister of the State
Council Information Office of China, even maintained that the Chinese state’s
‘first and foremost responsibility is to develop its economy to give the Chinese
people a better life’. A 2011 white paper on China’s peaceful development
echoed a similar idea: ‘For China, the most populous developing country, to
run itself well is the most important fulfillment of its international responsi-
bility’ (Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of
China 2011).
National responsibility
International relations theory tends to assume that states have universally
generalised national interests. For example, realists regard physical survival
and security as the chief, if not sole, national interest of all states, which
leaves little room for international responsibility. By some contrast, rational-
ists stress economic interests, which also rarely support international respon-
sibility. The constructivist perspective, however, stresses that national interests
are ultimately only ideas. Similarly, the English School suggests that each
state has nation-specific interests that are precisely what the nation considers
them to be (cf. Bull 2002 [1977], 63–64). That approach underscores that each
state is not merely an actor but ‘foremost a space of positions’ (Pouliot &
Mérand 2013, 36). As any state, China is not a unitary agent but a set of
complex social relations with multiple competing interests. For instance, the
ideas and interests promoted by the Environmental Ministry might differ sig-
nificantly from those of, say, the Ministry of Commerce. Thus, China’s
national interests are not givens but reflect the outcomes of contingent poli-
tical struggles over values and preferences among various factions of the CCP
and state organs, which are somewhat influenced by non-state actors such as
corporations, non-governmental organisations and the general public.
In today’s global era, states have increasingly more interests in common,
and the promotion of a state’s national interests therefore does not auto-
matically threaten or undermine the interests and needs of other states. Some
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national interests are quite stable, some change over time and some are
merely matters of choice. At the same time, some interests reflect a state’s
social circumstances: its identity, culture, traditions, history and political
system, among other factors. Because national interests are social construc-
tions, they shift over time; therefore, interests that imperial or Maoist China
considered to be vital do not necessarily comprise the national interests of
China’s current leadership. Although China’s contemporary political practices
are largely determined by the objectives of the CCP, they are also shaped by
the nation’s long cultural history. In general, the geopolitical conditions of
states vary as well and exert permanent influence on their interests and goals
regardless of the state’s political and social practices. Consequently, each
government of China, whether socialist or democratic, has been or will be
concerned with how to feed its enormous population, whereas each govern-
ment of a small island state will be concerned about rising sea levels caused
by climate change. Inevitably, other goals are simply determined by human
choices. To respond to external and internal events (e.g. crises), decision
makers have to choose from among multiple courses of action, which natu-
rally involves an ethical comparison of appropriate options available. In 1989,
China’s leaders decided to respond with guns and tanks to student demon-
strations at Tiananmen Square, whereas the government opted to react to
protests addressing sovereignty in Hong Kong in 2014 in a more tolerant way.
In China, the influence of individual decision makers is also considerable,
because the state’s leadership is embodied in the chairperson of the CCP,
whose personal experiences, values, ideologies and goals exert a distinct
influence on China’s overall objectives.
Unity and stability have always been the major responsibilities of Chinese
rulers. Since the beginning of the reform era, economic growth has been the
principle means of maintaining stability and has thus been an overriding
priority of the Chinese party-state. As part of that priority, China’s growing
demand for energy and other natural resources has played a decisive role in
the state’s diplomacy. Not only has China begun to entrench its cooperation
with resource-laden developing countries, but Chinese companies have also
started to invest overseas. Among China’s other core interests today are state
sovereignty, the safeguarding of its basic systems and national security, terri-
torial integrity and national reunification, overall social stability and sustain-
able economic and social development.3 The country’s foreign policy has
therefore had to support and advance all of those interests. In the early 2000s,
energy security emerged as a central national concern, for China requires
increasingly vast quantities of energy to maintain its rapid economic growth
largely based on fuel-intensive heavy industry. To sustain economic growth in
today’s globalised world, China uses diplomatic tools to gain access to mar-
kets, foreign investment, advanced technology and energy and other natural
resources.4
Since President Xi Jinping took office in March 2013, China has defended its
national interests more vociferously in international politics. In his inauguration
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speech, Xi also introduced his vision of the China Dream (中国梦): ‘Realizing
the great renewal of the Chinese nation is the greatest dream for the Chinese
nation in modern history’ (quoted in Xinhua 2012a). In contrast to the Amer-
ican dream, which prizes individual success, the China dream seems to value
national glory. Immediately after the speech, scholars and internet users began to
discuss the definition and content of the concept. For example, Zheng Bijian,
former executive vice president of the Party School of the CPC Central Com-
mittee and founding father of the concept of peaceful rise, suggested, ‘Funda-
mentally, the Chinese dream is about using a peaceful, civilized way to realize
national development and the modernization of a socialist country.’ Similarly,
Chinese scholar Yi Zhongtia explained that the Chinese dream prioritises
‘national prosperity, social progress and people’s happiness’, as quotations in
Xinhua (2012a) demonstrate. The China dream quickly emerged as the corner-
stone of the Xi administration and can now be interpreted as the state’s ‘grand
strategy’. In particular, the strategy draws from two ‘centenary goals’ to be
achieved by the centennial of the PRC’s founding in 2049: ‘doubling the 2010
GDP and per capita income of urban and rural residents and finishing the
building of a society of initial prosperity in all respects’ and ‘turning China into a
modern socialist country that is prosperous, strong, democratic, culturally
advanced and harmonious’ (Xinhua 2014a). Although both goals had already
been introduced in 1997 by then-President Jiang Zemin at the 15th National
Congress, Xi Jinping’s China dream has elevated the goals to the status of stra-
tegic national priorities for China. In practice, such elevation has positioned
economic development and building a harmonious society as China’s key prio-
rities, even if the official ultimate goal of the government continues to be the
realisation of communism.
Compared to Western legal systems, the Chinese system demonstrates
significantly different ideas about responsibility. For one, whereas Western
systems, generally based upon democracy and the rule of law, emphasise that
the government is ‘responsible to the people’, the Chinese paradigm conceives
the government to be ‘responsible for the people’ (Dobson 2013, 63). As Jiang
Zemin (1997) puts it, the CCP ‘shoulders a lofty historical responsibility for
the destiny of the Chinese nation’. By putting development as a top priority,
the CCP’s constitution articulates the party’s responsibilities for the people as
follows:
The general starting point and criterion for judging all the Party’s work
should be how it benefits development of the productive forces in China’s
socialist society, adds to the overall strength of socialist China and
improves the people’s living standards.
(Xinhua 2012b)
By extension, in his inaugural press conference, President Xi (2012) similarly
defined his responsibilities as a leader for the party, the nation and the Chi-
nese people, partly in response to events from China’s recent past. Following
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China’s economic reform and the CCP’s legitimacy crisis after the Tianan-
men Square incident in 1989, the Maoist moral basis of the CCP gradually
crumbled. To legitimate its authority, the CCP has therefore been forced to
rewrite its moral guidelines and, in doing so, has increasingly appropriated
ideas from traditional Chinese schools of thought, especially Confucianism.5
That shift has transformed not only the party itself but also its identity.
Since 2012, Xi has accordingly led a national campaign to establish an all-
pervasive ‘moral and ideological foundation’ for the country. According to
Xi, socialist core values, including ‘prosperity, democracy, civility, harmony,
freedom, equality, justice, the rule of law, patriotism, dedication, integrity
and friendship’, should guide all public and private life in ‘socialist China’
(Xinhua 2014b).
International responsibility
China’s rising economic wealth and gradual shift in identity have spawned
debate over the state’s international responsibilities since the 1990s (Xia
2001). As China’s leaders began to consider that international organisations
could benefit their nation’s development, they did not want to portray China
as a threat and thus started to present a global image of China as a respon-
sible major power (Deng 2008; Gries 2004; Johnston 1998). Since then, two
overarching beliefs have shaped China’s political practices.6 On the one hand,
it is widely believed that China’s future is increasingly linked to international
society (Medeiros 2009, 20). The Chinese government recognises that China
cannot develop in isolation and that its economic growth and national revi-
talisation depend heavily upon globalisation and other international practices.
A stable internal and external security environment is similarly important for
China’s continued economic growth. The government has thus abandoned
Maoist scepticism of international cooperation, and to date, China has signed
more than 400 multilateral and more than 23,000 bilateral treaties as well as
secured membership in nearly all international organisations (Liu 2015). It
has even established new regional multilateral groups such as ASEAN Plus
Three and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Without a doubt, China
therefore seeks to fulfil its international responsibility to cooperate. On the
other hand, perceptions of various internal and external threats, largely
informed by communism, continue to guide China’s political practices
(Medeiros 2009, 20). Among the most pervasive beliefs in China is that the
United States seeks to constrain China’s development (ibid., 30). Younger
Chinese scholars of international relations explain that belief with reference to
a realist paradigm, whereas older ones often emphasise the Maoist class
struggle against the United States, which they consider to be ‘bellicose,
unpredictable, and determined to hem China in’ (Dobson 2013, 94). In either
case, the belief partly explains why China has not accepted the US discourse
of great power responsibility and, somewhat consequently, why China oppo-
ses legally binding greenhouse gas emission reductions.
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Although formulated in 1954, the five principles of peaceful coexistence –
mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggres-
sion, non-interference in the internal affairs of other states, equality and
mutual benefit and peaceful coexistence – persist as the cornerstone of
China’s practices of international responsibility (Xi 2014). All five principles
are highly pluralist and state-centric in nature. Since 2004, the official foreign
policy of China as derived from the concept of peaceful development (和平发
展), which assures observers that a rising China does not seek hegemony and
does not intend to challenge the current world order. The concept also stres-
ses that the government’s primary interest is promoting economic develop-
ment and that China remains uninterested in interfering in conflicts as well as
supports a stable international order. Instead of the traditional thinking of
zero-sum security informed by the Cold War and based upon military force,
the Chinese government now emphasises the importance of win–win security
and progress in international politics. It moreover believes that international
cooperation needs to be based on mutual trust and mutual benefit so that all
involved parties win. That win–win rhetoric also suggests that China’s eco-
nomic growth will not threaten other states but instead offer them out-
standing business opportunities. Extended to climate policy, it also assures the
world that the Chinese government does not pose an economic, political or
environmental threat to other states but instead unremittingly works to
achieve harmony and welfare around the world.
When the Chinese government launched the concept of a ‘harmonious
world’ (和谐世界) at the 2005 UN Summit, it was likely no coincidence that
then-president Hu Jintao chose to do so at what was the UN’s 60th anniver-
sary summit. In traditional Chinese culture, 60 years marks the natural cycle
of the end of one era and the birth of another. The concept of harmonious
world stressed three diplomatic strategic viewpoints, all of which emphasise
the maintenance of friendly relations with all countries, mutual respect and
mutual understanding in China, ‘non-enemy diplomacy’, the construction of
stable regional cooperation and global inter-regional cooperation (Su 2009,
54–55). Theoretically, the concept of harmonious world has attracted con-
siderable attention among observers of China, who view it as a ‘result of the
rise of China’s international position’ or as a ‘change of Chinese attitudes
towards the outside world’ and an ‘intention to be a “responsible power”’
(Masuda 2009, 58–59). In world politics, however, the concept has remained
blurred and uninfluential. Consequently, Pang Zhongying (2006, 10) proposes
that the lexicon of harmonious world should be ‘translated from the realm of
“good wishes” into formulating policy recommendations, identifying the
challenges requiring China to assume a greater leadership role and developing
the norms, rules and institutions that will define the international order of the
21st century’.
After Robert Zoellick (2005) famously urged China to become a respon-
sible stakeholder, the global financial crisis of 2007/8 also elevated China’s
international status, whether or not the Chinese government desired or was
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ready for such a status. By extension, when C. Fred Bergsten (2008) com-
plained that ‘China’s international mindset has not kept pace with its breath-
taking economic ascent’, he recommended the formulation of the G2, a ‘true
partnership’ between China and the United States to ‘provide joint leader-
ship’ for global economic practices. Similar written observations characterised
China as the ‘pioneer’ of a new international order, which frightened most
Chinese citizens (Jin 2011, 13). All of those instances aptly illustrate how
participants in international practices assign roles and responsibilities to other
participants, who in turn may feel pressured to assume more responsibilities
than they are willing to or can shoulder. From China’s perspective, its global
responsibilities need to suit its level of development, and for now, China needs
to primarily focus on promoting its development.
Nevertheless, the Chinese government is aware that its permanent seat at the
UN Security Council comes with a special responsibility to maintain interna-
tional peace and security (Wang 2013). Furthermore, the Chinese generally
agree that China’s rise indeed comes with farther-reaching responsibilities, and
they currently debate ‘about what responsibilities to assume, how to fulfil them,
and how to balance between China’s own abilities and other’s expectations’
(Jin 2011, 253). At the same time, they ask what sort of ‘corresponding rights’
China can attain, if any, should it assume greater international responsibilities
(ibid., 18). According to Zhao (2013, 53), the debate among Chinese academics
and policymakers has culminated in three major viewpoints on China’s
responsibility. The first recommends abandoning such a low-profile policy and
victimised identity and instead assuming ‘great power responsibility’ in a bid to
‘ensure a “just” world order’ (ibid.). Conversely, the second viewpoint
encourages China to take a ‘more active, or even a leadership role’ in order to
promote China’s core interests. Last, the third viewpoint supports China’s
continuation of a low-profile policy and thus advises avoiding more global
responsibilities (ibid.). Meanwhile, the Chinese government has not remarked
upon what sort of global power it should be but remains concerned about
‘whether and how China can rise peacefully’ (Tang 2006, 130).
Humanitarian responsibility
Although China’s initial priority following its reform in 1978 was to ‘get rich
first’, the Hu Jintao–Wen Jiabao administration (2003–2013) observed that
such rapid economic growth had caused various environmental and social
problems. Consequently, China’s leaders began to pay more attention to cul-
tivating social justice and reducing poverty as well as introduced ‘putting
people first’ (以人为本) as the core principle of the social contract between
the Chinese people and their political leaders. The principle maintains that
China’s leaders have to implement policies that benefit people and should not
seek their own interests. As President Hu (2007) explained: ‘We must always
put people first. Serving the people wholeheartedly is the fundamental pur-
pose of the Party, and its every endeavor is for the well-being of the people.’
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The Hu-Wen administration coined two ideological concepts, both of which
operationalise the principle of putting people first. The first one, the ‘scientific
outlook on development’ (科学发展观) ‘takes development as its essence, put-
ting people first as its core, comprehensive, balanced and sustainable develop-
ment as its basic requirement, and overall consideration as its fundamental
approach’ (Hu 2007). The concept also ‘provides new scientific answers to the
major questions of what sort of development China should achieve in a new
environment and how the country should achieve it’ (Hu 2012a). According to
Hu, the concept was the ‘most important achievement’ of his leadership
because it introduced a ‘new realm in the development of Marxism in con-
temporary China’ by ‘integrating Marxism with the reality of contemporary
China and with the underlying features of our times’ (ibid.). At the 18th CCP
National Congress in 2012, the scientific outlook on development was added to
the revised Constitution of the CCP, which calls the concept ‘a scientific theory’
that ‘puts people first and calls for comprehensive, balanced and sustainable
development’ (Xinhua 2012b). In addition, the 18th CCP National Congress
affirmed the concept of ‘protecting nationals abroad’ (海外公民保护) as its
priority, thereby reflecting the state’s gradual acceptance of its national
responsibility to defend its citizens overseas (Parello-Plesner & Duchâtel 2015).
That responsibility was not, however, accepted in light of China’s identity as a
great power but due to its economic interests in unstable states.
The second ideological concept of the Hu-Wen administration was that of the
harmonious society (和谐社会), which emphasises that ‘[s]ocial harmony is an
essential attribute of socialism with Chinese characteristics’ (Hu 2007). The
Sixth Plenum of the 16th CCP Central Committee declared in 2006 that ‘social
harmony is the intrinsic nature of the socialism with Chinese characteristics and
an important guarantee of the country’s prosperity, the nation’s rejuvenation and
the people’s happiness’ (People’s Daily 2006a). At the 17th Party Congress in
2007, the concept of a harmonious society was institutionalised and added to the
CCP’s constitution, thereby signalling that the CCP was ‘formally giving up
Maoist “class struggle”’ (Brady 2012, 66). Likewise, Hu’s report to the Party
Congress abandoned calls for ‘establishing a “new international political and
economic order”, a phrase that Deng started using in these reports as far back as
1988’ (Medeiros 2009, 49). Instead of challenging the practices of international
society, contemporary China has played a ‘constructive role’ and worked to
‘make the international order fairer and more equitable’ (Hu 2007).
In essence, the concepts of scientific development and social harmony are ‘two
sides of the same coin: a harmonious society is the objective and scientific
development is the method to reach it’ (Fan 2006, 709). According to Hu (2007),
‘scientific development and social harmony are integral to each other and neither
is possible without the other’. Both concepts can be understood as means to and
incentives for sustainable development, while putting people first does not
necessarily mean that the Chinese government will ignore the environment. On
the contrary, the government recognises that environmental degradation
obstructs sustainable economic growth and that pollution harms the wellbeing of
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people. Scientific development and social harmony therefore provide China’s
government with strong anthropocentric incentives for environmental protec-
tion. Recently, China has begun to heed citizens’ environmental rights as well. A
white paper addressing ‘Progress in China’s Human Rights in 2014’ dedicated
more than an entire chapter to environmental protection for the first time. The
chapter reviews China’s governmental policies and actions for safeguarding citi-
zens’ environmental rights to live in clean, healthy environment and have a good
eco-environment, as well as their interests in achieving those goals (Information
Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China 2013). Environ-
mental protection has indeed become an important part of China’s national
policy, as I discuss at length in the next section.
Although China has ratified numerous humanitarian treaties, including all
four Geneva Conventions and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
its approach to human rights differs from that of Western nations. In short,
the Chinese regard human rights as a domestic affair, and such rights are
therefore a state’s national responsibility, not a humanitarian one. However,
such thinking does not necessarily exclude the concept of humanitarian
responsibility from the Chinese context. Indeed, China has increasingly sup-
ported international humanitarian assistance (cf. Chan 2006, 37), no longer
believes that UN peacekeeping operations are ‘interference in countries’
internal affairs’ and the ‘undesirable result of US–Soviet hegemonic power
competition’ (Wang 1999, 75) and has more actively engaged in UN peace-
keeping operations since 1990. However, developed countries often complain
that China’s growing presence in Africa, for instance, negatively affects
democratisation, human rights, good governance and environmental protec-
tion there. Of course, China denies those claims and assures that though it
emphasises ‘both morality and interests’ in its exchanges with other develop-
ing countries, it prioritises ‘morality before interests’ (Wang 2013).
Environmental responsibility
Although environmental protection lacked its own chapter in China’s five-
year plans before the sixth Five-Year Plan (1981–1985), China established its
first environmental regulations in 1973 (Ross 1999, 298–299). That same year,
China also held the first national conference on environmental protection,
where a ‘firm decision was taken on the need for environmental safekeeping’
(Palmer 1998, 790). A year later, China established the small Environmental
Protection Office under the State Council (Ross 1999, 298), and in 1978, it
added environmental protection to the PRC’s constitution. According to
Article 11 of that constitution, ‘The state protects the environment and nat-
ural resources, and prevents and eliminates pollution and other hazards to the
public’ (Palmer 1998, 791). China also passed the Environmental Protection
Law for trial use in 1979. Political and economic reforms catalysed environ-
mental policies, and during the 1980s, many new environmental laws were
enacted.7 The constitutional promise of environmental responsibility was
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expanded in Article 26 of the 1982 constitution, which declares, ‘The State
protects and improves the environment in which people live and the ecologi-
cal environment. It prevents and controls pollution and other public hazards
(Database for Laws and Regulations)’. Interestingly, the article differentiates
‘the environment in which people live’ and ‘the ecological environment’,
which suggests that humans are not an integral part of the latter.
President Jiang Zemin’s report to the 15th Party Congress held in 1997 was
the first-ever report of the National Congress to mention the environment.
According to Jiang (1997), ‘While exploiting our [China’s] natural resources
and making economical use of them, we lay emphasis on the latter so as to
raise the efficiency of their utilization.’ Jiang particularly acknowledged that
‘population growth and economic development have caused great strains on
resources and the environment’ and that environmental problems could
hinder China’s development in the future (ibid.). Given previous beliefs that
only capitalism caused environmental degradation, the acknowledgement
marked a major shift in the PRC’s discourse.
At the 16th Party Congress, President Jiang (2002) pointed out that the ‘con-
tradiction between the ecological environment and natural resources on the one
hand and economic and social development on the other is becoming increas-
ingly conspicuous’. In 2004, China launched a highly publicised campaign on
so-called ‘green GDP’ in order to integrate environmental protection into eco-
nomic practices (Economy 2007, 27–30). It pursued the development of an index
that ‘quantifies and measures the monetary costs of environmental damage
caused by a country’s economic growth’ (Zheng 2015). Due to technical difficul-
ties, however, the world’s first green GDP report, published in 2006, calculated
only environmental pollution’s economic costs (People’s Daily 2006b). Subse-
quently, the green GDP campaign was quickly abandoned due to methodological
problems and the overriding priority of economic goals at the regional level.
Both before and especially after the introduction of the harmonious society
concept, many Chinese intellectuals began to call for ecological civilization as
a new model for achieving harmony between nature and humanity (Dynon
2008). As Ma Jun (2007) puts it, ‘If the aim of development is really to ben-
efit the people, we cannot destroy the very resources on which people rely for
survival.’ Similarly, Pan Yue (2006), vice-minister of the State Environmental
Protection Administration, stated in his two influential articles ‘Harmonious
Society and Environment-Friendly Society’ and ‘On Socialist Ecological
Civilization’ that harmonious society cannot be achieved without environ-
mental protection. He proposed that harmonious society should be
based on industry consuming less resources, people’s livelihoods based on
moderate-level consumption, greater recycling of resources, a highly effi-
cient economic infrastructure, greater innovation, an orderly and open
financial set-up, a distribution system emphasizing social justice and a
democratic political system.
(Pan 2006)
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President Hu responded to such calls by presenting new requirements for
developing a moderately well-off society in his report to the 17th CCP
National Congress in 2007, as well as by officially proposing the development
of an ecological civilisation (生态文明) for the first time.8 According to Hu
(2007), China should pursue ecological civilisation ‘by basically forming an
energy- and resource-efficient and environment-friendly structure of indus-
tries, pattern of growth and mode of consumption’. Although Hu did not
clearly define ecological civilisation, his report indicated that the government
had redefined its development model by increasing emphasis on sustainable
development. The concept of ecological civilisation was quickly incorporated
into the government’s overall policy plans and added to the CCP’s constitu-
tion in 2012 (cf. Xinhua 2012b). At the 18th National Congress of the CCP in
2012, the concept received its own chapter in the conference report for the
first time, and Hu mentioned the concept of ecological civilisation 15 times in
the report, up from only twice in the 2007 report. In the more recent report,
Hu (2012b) acknowledged that promoting an ecological civilisation ‘is a long-
term task of vital importance to the people’s wellbeing and China’s future’
and thus deserving of ‘high priority’. He declared that the CCP would incor-
porate the concept ‘into all aspects and the whole process of advancing eco-
nomic, political, cultural, and social progress, work hard to build a beautiful
country, and achieve the lasting and sustainable development of the Chinese
nation’ (ibid.). Moreover, delegates to the 18th Party Congress noted that
China had entered a ‘new stage of development’, meaning that it should no
longer focus exclusively on rapid economic growth but also integrate envir-
onmental protection, emissions reduction and energy conservation into its
overall development targets. However, economic growth has persisted as a
precondition of environmental protection. As China’s minister of environ-
mental protection, Zhou Shengxian, puts it: ‘We [China] must make sure that
environmental protection is an essential part of the efforts to promote eco-
nomic growth. It is impossible to achieve environmental protection without
economic growth, because this would be like catching fish on a tree’ (quoted
in CCTV 2012).
Since the outset of the Xi Jinping–Li Keqiang administration in 2013, the
development of an ecological civilisation has received wide attention from
CCP elites. In the spring of 2015, the State Council effectively elevated the
concept to the status of a prominent strategic guideline to be integrated into
China’s economic, political, cultural and societal plans. In addition to the
transformation of economic development, ‘Opinion on Acceleration for the
Promotion of Ecological Civilisation’ explained ‘accelerating the promotion
of ecological civilisation’ to mean
improving internal requirements regarding the quality and efficiency of
development, promoting the ‘putting people first’ principle and the
inevitable choice of social harmony, fostering a moderately well-off
society, realising the great rejuvenation of the Chinese dream,
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responding actively to climate change and safeguarding global envir-
onmental security.
(Xinhua 2015, my translation)
Xi’s (2017, 47) report to the 19th CCP Congress in October 2017 placed
great stress on environmental issues by not only promoting green devel-
opment and the construction of ecological civilisation but also urging
China to ‘do our generation’s share to protect the environment’. Surpris-
ingly, he also expressly advocated the importance of environmental
conservation:
Man and nature form a community of life … . Only by observing the
laws of nature can mankind avoid costly blunders in its exploitation. Any
harm we inflict on nature will eventually return to haunt us. This is a
reality we have to face.
(Ibid.)
Ample literature has elaborated upon the concept of ecological civilisation in
China.9 Whereas Western scholars tend to understand the concept to be more
or less synonymous with sustainable development and to focus on greener
economic development and environmental protection, Chinese ones under-
stand ecological civilisation as the ‘level of harmony that exists between
human progress and natural existence in human civilization’ (Ma 2013). They
thus emphasise the cultural and socialist dimensions of the concept and
regard it as the stage of social progress following ‘the primitive civilization,
the agricultural civilization and the industrial civilization’ (Pan 2006). More-
over, they posit, the concept addresses the weaknesses of the most recent stage
of (Western) industrial civilisation and aims to strike a better balance between
the environment and development. The label civilisation affords environ-
mental protection a higher position in the CCP’s hierarchy of values, thereby
indicating environmental protection is, at least in principle, evolving into a
moral or ideological imperative (Dynon 2008, 107). Ecological civilisation
can be thus grouped with other post-Maoist morality campaigns that seek to
formulate what it means to be civilized. The three other concepts of the
CCP’s civilisation narrative – material, spiritual and political civilisation –
have played important roles in establishing and maintaining the party’s moral
legitimacy (ibid.).
Many Chinese intellectuals have encouraged the CCP to develop the
concept of ecological civilisation by adding ideas from Marxist ecology and
traditional Chinese religion and philosophy (cf. Wang 2012; Wang, He &
Fan 2014; Pan 2006). In particular, some Chinese Marxist theorists have
suggested that Chinese scholars develop their own Chinese ecological
Marxist theory and not ‘treat ecological Marxism as a foreign dogma to be
worshipped but a living method with which to analyze and solve the serious
[environmental] problems facing China’ (Wang 2012). Unlike previous
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civilisations, which were largely motivated by domestic development and
targeted a domestic audience,10 an ecological civilisation could have far-
reaching global impacts both in theory and practice. Given the short-
comings of the concept of sustainable development, the concept of ecologi-
cal civilisation could also provide food for thought for more solidarist
international practices, particularly in representing a new, holistic worldview
unlike anthropocentrism by viewing humans as the core but not the masters
of nature. Moreover, it is a concept that ‘knows no boundaries’ but
acknowledges that the ‘balance between humans and nature must be
approached on a global basis’ (Ma 2013). However, other Chinese scholars
doubt the global possibilities of the concept because they regard socialism
as a precondition of ecological civilisation. Because the Western world has
failed to develop an ecological civilisation, Pan (2006) believes that China
should spearhead the development of a new ecological model of life. For
the time being, however, the idea of ecological civilisation has not been
translated into an ecocentric policy practice. For example, China’s nation-
ally determined contribution to the United Nations Framework Convention
on Climate Change in June 2015, which I discuss in chapter 6, announced
that China would ‘work together with all Parties to build a beautiful
homeland for all human beings’ (National Development and Reform Com-
mission 2015, 16, italics added) but ignores the intrinsic value of the
environment.
Conclusion
In this chapter I have investigated historical notions of responsibility in
China. In focusing exclusively on official historical narratives that China’s
political elite has pursued to legitimate, maintain and strengthen its position
in the one-party system, I have dismissed alternative approaches to state
responsibility despite their potential to provide more solidarist ideas of
responsibility. Had I studied social processes in which definitions of responsi-
bility and its allocation – processes that I refer to collectively as responsibili-
sation – in greater detail, I would have paid more attention to questions such
as who has been able to participate in processes of defining notions of
responsibility in China and who has been marginalised from those processes
at different times. I would have also sought to identify what sort of social,
political and economic ramifications such inclusion and exclusion have caused
domestically and how they have guided China’s international role. At the
same time, it would have been important to study notions of responsibility in
Chinese philosophy and political schools of thought in order to pinpoint
which philosophical ideas of responsibility have shaped Chinese notions of
responsibility and whether they could provide the world with a more solidarist
basis for organising international society. For the purposes of this book,
however, a more elaborate study would be excessive to maintaining a state-
centric focus.
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Notes
1 That view comes close to what Dryzek (2005) calls Promethean or cornucopian
discourse.
2 According to Chen Z. (2009, 25), foreign aid expenditure accounted for 6.9% of
the PRC’s state budget in 1973.
3 According to China News Agency (2009), then-State Councillor Dai Bingguo
identified China’s core interests at the first China–US Strategic and Economic
Dialogue.
4 For more detailed accounts and analyses of Chinese foreign policy, see Lanteigne
(2013) and Liu (2004).
5 See Brady (2012) for the evolution of Chinese state Confucianism, from so-called
Maoist ‘smash Confucianism’ via Chinese studies fever in the 1990s to the
sophisticated use of Confucian terms in CCP ideology in the 2000s.
6 Although Medeiros’s (2009) argument of the two beliefs refers only to China’s
views of international security, I argue that they also influence China’s role in
international society in general.
7 About the development of Chinese environmental law, see Chen G. (2009) and
Palmer (1998).
8 Although the concept of ecological civilisation was initially translated as ‘con-
servation culture’ or ‘ecological progress’ in official documents, the term ecological
civilisation was quickly standardised as the official translation.
9 Western observers of China, however, have only recently become interested in
ecological civilisation. Even the 2013 China Story Yearbook, titled ‘Civilising
China’, mentioned ecological civilisation in only one brief sentence, which indi-
cates that Western scholars do not consider that the concept has found its ultimate
place in the CCP toolbox.
10 However, see Nyiri (2006) for an elaboration upon the so-called ‘yellow man’s
burden’ to civilise developing countries.
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4 China’s rise, climate change and great
power responsibility
The English School assumes that great powers have special responsibilities in
international society. Those responsibilities, however, are not givens but
socially constructed expectations, developed both implicitly and explicitly, in
the so-called ‘great power club’. Since the end of World War II, respect for
human rights and the principle of the responsibility to protect have con-
stituted essential attributes of the responsibility of states in the great power
club, or what I call great power responsibility. In the twenty-first century,
however, China’s rise to the status of great power may in turn transform the
conceptualisation of great power responsibility. Among the situations that
China and other great powers have to address today and in the future is cli-
mate change, which has become an increasingly alarming threat to interna-
tional security and the wellbeing of humankind. In this chapter, I therefore
ask to what extent we can assume that great powers should shoulder more
responsibility than smaller powers for mitigating climate change. In pursuing
a normative discussion about great power climate responsibility from the
perspective of the English School and other modes of thinking, I first intro-
duce the concept of the great power club, after which I discuss normative
dimensions of great power responsibility from the perspective of the pluralist–
solidarist debate within the English School. Empirical parts of the chapter
study the practices of great power responsibility and elaborate upon whether
those practices have paid sufficient attention to environmental stewardship
and, if so, then how. Last, I examine the sort of requirements that the United
States, as an established great power, has set for China’s membership in the
great power club and how China has responded to those expectations.
The great power club
The concept of great power is exceptionally vague. From the perspective of
the English School, however, a clear definition of great power is not necessary
to understand and study their role in international society. On the contrary,
what matters is how a state is constituted in international practices (cf. Frost
2003, 86). For a state to be a great power, it needs to have certain material
capabilities and, more importantly, be recognised as a member of the great
power club. In emphasising social participation and mutual engagement,
Étienne Wenger’s (1998, 76–77) concept of community of practice elucidates
what the English School means by great power club. Although the term
community often connotes positive interactions and peaceful co-existence,
Wenger’s concept of community of practice does not offer an ‘idealized view
of what a community should be’ but stresses that a community of practice
nevertheless exists because its participants remain ‘engaged in actions whose
meanings they negotiate with one another’ (ibid., 73). However, a shared
practice does not require consensus regarding all the rules of practice but
practices can involve competition, tensions and even violent conflicts among
the participants. Such disagreements connect and engage the participants in
complex ways and can even generate changes in the practices themselves.
For classic English School theorists such as Bull and Wight, great power
management inevitably stands as one of the primary institutions of interna-
tional society. Holsti (2009), however, disagrees with that standpoint because
great power management, with the exception of the Concert of Europe, does
not fulfil his criteria for patterned practices. For Holsti (2009, 137), great
power is a status, not an institution. Today, it remains difficult, if not
impossible, to pinpoint the geopolitical centre of the great power club. Apart
from the UN Security Council, in which not all emerging powers are mem-
bers, no secondary institution of great powers exists, although the Group of
8 is a candidate to some extent.
The great power club is an exclusive social community; whereas some states
are members, others remain outsiders. Of course, the club has no membership
card, so to speak, and the qualifications for being an accepted member
change over time; the conditions of membership are not written into interna-
tional treaties but based on the social order continuously shaped by the social
interactions of states. Such interactions generate informal criteria for a state’s
achieving and maintaining status as a member of the club, as well as define
perceptions of what behaviour is appropriate for great powers. Newcomers to
the club such as China have to learn to follow the club’s rules or can attempt
to alter them with their words and actions (Kopra 2016; Kopra 2018).
Although any set of social rules has to be upheld to some degree in order to
be effective, their occasional violation is not unusual. Indeed, if the violation
of rules from time to time was impossible, then having them at all would be
pointless.1 According to Suzuki (2014, 637), states today need to fulfil two
conditions if they wish to join the great power club. First, they have to enjoy
substantial institutional privileges in international decision making, as China
clearly does. Second, they have to ‘be treated as a social equal’ with other
members of club. China’s questionable fulfilment of the latter condition has
cast the greatest doubt over its bid for membership in the great power club,
which has frustrated China’s leaders and motivated their efforts to persistently
improve the state’s image in the international society (Suzuki 2008).
From the standpoint of the English School, international norms and prac-
tices constrain international society because they establish social guidelines
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for and barriers to what behaviour is conceived to be acceptable and legit-
imate for states (Wheeler 2000, 4–5). Nevertheless, societal legitimacy remains
an important, if not the most important, condition of membership in the
great power club. According to Bull (2002 [1977], 221), ‘Great powers can
fulfil their managerial functions in international society only if these functions
are accepted clearly enough by a large enough proportion of the society of
states to command legitimacy.’ Such legitimacy relates closely to the rights
and responsibilities of great powers, which are ‘recognised by others to have, and
conceived by their own leaders and peoples to have, certain special rights and
duties’ (ibid., 196). At the same time, those rights and responsibilities cannot
be formalised, much less articulated, by writing out the hegemonial rights of
great powers, because anarchical international society rejects the idea of any
hierarchical ordering of states whatsoever (ibid., 221). Consequently, the great
power club is too indefinite and vague a community of practice to set formal
rules about how great powers should act. As all virtues, the virtues of the great
power club have resulted from historical practices and may change in the
future. Because it therefore falls to the great powers to negotiate which cir-
cumstances and demands transform the rules of membership in the great
power club, China’s rise could significantly shape the rules of great power
management in time.
At present, although great powers are generally thought to have an infor-
mal responsibility to cooperate and take other states’ interests into account,
they have no concrete, formal obligation to act in certain ways. Consequently,
though the practices of great power management specify what great powers
ought to do, they do not prescribe means of performing such actions. Instead,
they condone several ways to take action provided that such actions do not
meet with international criticism. To be seen as legitimate, great powers are
bound to promote, or at least take into account, international justice and
other international demands. Although other states do not expect perfect
performance, legitimate great powers have to avoid behaviour that could
cause international disorder and injustice; they have the right to mould inter-
national practices, but their freedom of action is limited by their responsibility
(Bull 2002 [1977]). At the same time, though smaller states and non-state actors
can lobby great powers and remind them of their global responsibilities, ulti-
mately the great powers themselves collectively define the rules of practice
befitting great powers.
The very concept of great power at the international level implies a balance of
power as well as the existence of a great power club. After all, if there were only
one dominant state, then that state would not be a great power, for it would be
impossible to compare and rank the statuses of other states and to construct
social identities. Nevertheless, many observers have characterised the post-Cold
War international system as unipolar due to the hegemonic dominance of the
United States.2 In the English School, Ian Clark (2009a, 205) also asks, ‘What
then happens to international order if there is only one predominant state?’ (cf.
Bukovansky et al. 2012, 42–45). In contrast to the anti-hegemonic English
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School tradition,3 Clark (2009a, 2009b) suggests that, by analogy to the role of
great powers, hegemony is a potential institution of international society. From
that perspective, a hegemon can have responsibilities; in the absence of other
powers, the lone superpower can, at least in principle, define and exercise its
responsibilities alone. In discussions about the global responsibilities of the
hegemonic post-Cold War United States, Chris Brown (2004, 11–12) distin-
guishes unilateralists from multilateralists. Although both camps maintain that
hegemonic status burdens the United States with great responsibilities, he
observes, they differ significantly in their views on the nature of those responsi-
bilities. On the one hand, multilateralists argue that any sole superpower is urged
to cooperate with smaller states because it cannot resolve global problems sin-
glehandedly and that the United States, for example, thus has a responsibility to
direct the promotion of the public good (ibid., 11–12). On the other, uni-
lateralists argue that the United States has to exploit its power to promote its
own values and concepts of what is good to the world. For unilateralists, the
outcomes of US policies have been critical, and stability and order have had no
value per se (ibid., 12–13). The debate between unilateralists and multi-
lateralists informs understandings of US expectations of China’s global
responsibility as China’s influence blossoms on the international stage.
Because permanent membership in the UN Security Council has been
unable to entrench more profound consensus regarding the collective
responsibilities of great powers, the ways in which single great powers or
sole superpowers define their own responsibilities to other states, other
(potential) great powers and even world society matter. It is therefore
crucial to elucidate the ways in which China defines and interprets its
emerging great power responsibility.
Pluralism, solidarism and great power climate responsibility
A basic tenet of the English School is that responsibility for managing inter-
national society rests largely on great powers. In general, both pluralists and
solidarists agree that great powers have a special responsibility to ensure the
achievement of international society’s ultimate goals given their special role in
that society. However, because pluralists and solidarists maintain divergent
views on what those ultimate goals are, as well as how they should be pro-
moted and accomplished, their stances regarding how and why great powers
ought to shoulder their responsibilities also diverge. Given their focus on
international order as a key value and means to promote the common good
of international society, pluralists stress the functional responsibilities of great
powers in that society, whereas solidarists, in underscoring the social attri-
butes of power and responsibility, hold that great powers have a special
responsibility to promote international justice and universal human values.
The pluralist camp of the English School emphasises that great powers
have a special collective responsibility to ‘ensure that the conditions of inter-
national peace and security are upheld’ (Jackson 2000, 203). Slightly sceptical
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of the solidarist motives of great powers, Wight (1999 [1946], 42), for exam-
ple, encourages observers to ‘ask whose security is in question, and at whose
expense it is purchased’. Since international order constitutes a key means to
facilitate peaceful co-existence and international society’s other ultimate
goals, maintaining that order is the primary functional responsibility of great
powers. On the one hand, such responsibility means that great powers need to
pursue their interests prudently; they have to manage their relationship with
one another and avoid harming other states and the functioning of interna-
tional society (Bull 2002 [1977], 200; Watson 1982, 201). It therefore also
means that great powers have to act in compliance with international law
(Aslam 2013, 13). On the other, great power responsibility additionally means
mediating international conflicts and preserving the general balance of inter-
national society. In suddenly intense conflicts, chief responsibility for peace
negotiations falls to great powers, which have to ‘agree at least tacitly on a
form of crisis management’ (Watson 1982, 201). When confrontation between
great powers on opposing sides of a conflict is unavoidable, the powers
themselves, not ‘smaller and more immediate protagonists’, are responsible
for avoiding the use of force (ibid.). Of course, peace management can some-
times involve using force; great powers may, or even sense a moral duty to,
use punitive measures to defend international peace and order if necessary.
From a pluralist perspective, the US bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in
1945, for example, can thus be interpreted as the materialisation of the US
responsibility to promote the survival of international society, even if soli-
darists would argue that using nuclear weapons is anything but responsible
behaviour. By the same token, China’s reluctance to commit to engaging in
coercive measures as part of the UN Security Council can also be viewed as
an important reason for its incomplete acceptance as a responsible member of
the great power club.
Because the solidarist camp of the English School espouses a so-called
‘thicker’ morality in international society, they demand that humans as well
as states be viewed as members of that society. In other words, solidarists
argue that individual humans around the world should be considered as
moral referent objects of state responsibility, including great power responsi-
bility. In practice, that view implies that great powers have great diplomatic
responsibilities; they should advance international justice by using diplomatic
tools to reach consensus about human values globally. Solidarists promote
universal ideas such as human rights, the rule of law and good governance as
‘new standards of civilization’ that great powers ought to advance in their
diplomacy. To some extent, that humanitarian responsibility of states has
been recognised by contemporary international law (Knudsen 2016), in which
a pivotal development was the adoption of the principle of the responsibility
to protect during the 2000s. According to that principle, if rogue states violate
the human rights of their citizens, great powers are expected to bear the
greatest responsibility to interfere. Nevertheless, the extent to which certain
universal values exist remains an important question. Normative theories of
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international relations, including that of the English’s School’s solidarist
camp, tend to be very Eurocentric, which has sparked criticism among non-
Western scholars and practitioners (Hurrell 2016). In discussions regarding
China’s rise, it indeed seems that the ‘features of the New Standard of Civili-
zation’ (Fidler 2001, 150) form a normative basis for Western criticism of
contemporary China. In short, because China is not a democratic country, it
is not part of ‘us’ but other (Zhang 2011 ) and thus cannot be fully accepted
in the great power club. To cope with the rise of China and other non-Wes-
tern emerging powers, international society may need to adjust its rules and
conceptualisations of justice, which could also gradually alter ideas about
international rights and responsibilities.
Compared to the Eurocentric bias of solidarism, state-centric solidarism
takes a rather culturally sensitive approach to international ethics. It main-
tains that the ultimate goal of international society is to promote human
wellbeing but does not set preconditions for how, and by whom, such well-
being should be defined. On the contrary, it stresses the importance of pro-
cesses of responsibilisation in social life – that what human wellbeing means in
practice in different settings is specific to context. Via processes of responsi-
bilisation, participants of social practices, including great powers, negotiate
what value they place upon certain aspects of certain actors’ wellbeing. In
international politics, development has been the key term in shaping processes
of responsibilisation since the inauguration speech of US president Harry
Truman in 1949. Truman’s speech was based on an idea that ‘all the peoples
of the world were moving along the same track, some faster, some slower, but
all in the same direction’ (Sachs 1993, 4). Truman characterised Western
models of socioeconomic development as universal norms and resonated with
Western beliefs of progress and improvement that the future will, or at least
should, be better than the present (Barry 1999). However, such ideas of pro-
gress did not specify for whom and in what terms the future would be better:
for (Western) political elites, all humans or all living creatures? Truman’s
conceptualisation also lumped diverse African, Asian and Latin American
countries into ‘one single category – the underdeveloped’ (Sachs 1993, 4).
Despite those criticisms, human wellbeing largely continues to be measured in
economic terms, including gross domestic product, and states tend to treat
economic growth as their principal responsibility. By extension, international
practices focusing on economic growth have also dictated international cli-
mate practices. The negative impacts of climate change are often discussed in
economic terms, whereas other, qualitative aspects of human wellbeing are
dismissed. Because real human suffering caused by climate change cannot be
estimated in economic costs, however, Roberts and Parks (2007) propose
more appropriate measures of climate-related risks, including the number of
people killed, made homeless or otherwise harmed by climate-related dis-
asters such as floods, heatwaves, droughts and windstorms in individual states.
Within the English School, surprisingly little attention has been paid to
climate ethics. Arguably, the pluralist perspective on climate change would
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focus on state-centric harms and risks to international order. Several studies
and reports have indeed highlighted that climate change poses national
security risks in every country worldwide (e.g. Mazo 2010). For some states,
such as small island nations in the Asia–Pacific, climate change even poses an
existential threat, for when sea levels rise due to the melting of ice in polar
areas, they will literally disappear from the world map – a phenomenon that
Milla Vaha (2015) calls state-extinction. Given growing consensus that cli-
mate change is a potential source of international conflict, it is reasonable to
assume that climate change risks the maintenance of international order.
Moreover, given their managerial role in international society, great powers
can be assumed to have a functional responsibility to lead efforts to mitigate
climate change as a means to maintain international peace and security. By
some contrast, solidarists would add human suffering to the list of harms
caused by the adverse effects of climate change. Climate change is indeed
inherently an issue of international justice, for especially vulnerable to climate
change are the poorest people living in developing countries that lack suffi-
cient resources to adapt to such change and, often located in tropical and
sub-tropical areas, are most likely to be affected by it.
For many scholars in the English School, international law ranks among
the most important primary institutions of international society. Because
international law captures the shared rules of co-existence accepted by mem-
bers of international society, it plays a critical role in the construction of that
society. By specifying what constitutes acceptable and unacceptable conduct
therein, international law enables and constrains the actions of states, includ-
ing great powers. Upholding international law is an important attribute of
great power responsibility; great powers must follow its principles in order to
maintain international order and legalise their hegemonic status (Simpson
2004). However, maintaining international order sometimes requires the vio-
lation of international law. As Bull (2002 [1977], 138) points out, the United
Kingdom and France did not criticise Russia for attacking Finland in 1939,
despite the action’s clear violation of international law, because the attack
stabilised the European balance of power. According to pluralist ethics, great
powers thus have a responsibility to act against international law if necessary
to maintain international order. By comparison, solidarists observe that, as
all laws, international law is a human construction and thus reflects power
relations. International law can therefore be imperfect and unfair and under-
mine fundamental human values. If the justice of legal rules were challenged
for humanitarian reasons, for example, solidarists would consider a great
power’s illegal actions to be legitimate. However, because an illegal action by
a great power can be legitimate only if based on a consensus in international
society that the action is indeed necessary, ‘consensus is the benchmark of
legitimacy’ (Clark 2005, 164). Since great powers tend to play an influential
role in law-making processes in international society and incorporate special
rights into those processes, they are usually content with and eager to enforce
them (Simpson 2004, 70). Among other incentives for great powers to commit
76 China and great power responsibility
to international law, they typically prefer to maintain their hegemonic role by
means of law instead of force (Onuma 2003, 117).
Although the violation of international law does not warrant legal sanc-
tions for great powers, it is incorrect to assume that great powers would
readily commit such violations. Breaking international rules can seriously
damage the image of a great power and, in turn, hinder its pursuit of national
interests and jeopardise its international leadership role in the long term.
Moreover, at least in liberal-democratic great power states, domestic pressure
to respect international norms and rules is quite high (Onuma 2003, 119).
Even though US president Donald Trump clarified in June 2017 that his
administration would not commit to international climate norms, he did not
simply abandon the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change but chose to implement the withdrawal in accordance to the Paris
Agreement itself. In effect, the United States will be part of the accord until
2020 and continue to implement national climate mitigation plans compiled
by the Obama administration. Accordingly, the United States sent a small
delegation to the UN climate negotiations in Bonn in November 2017. If the
Trump administration at least attempts to meet US domestic climate targets
and reports its actions, it will not violate international law. In that case,
pluralists would maintain that the Trump administration will have fulfilled its
functional great power responsibility to pursue the common good of interna-
tional society by ensuring that it has met the rules of international law and
not jeopardised international order. At the same time, it remains questionable
whether Trump’s decision to dismiss efforts to allay climate change increases
the risk of international conflict and harms humanitarian security around the
world. Given strong evidence of the relationship between climate change and
conflicts, some pluralists would likely advocate the functional responsibility of
great powers to mitigate climate change and thus criticise Trump’s decision.
Solidarists, by contrast, would undoubtedly condemn Trump’s decision as
irresponsible because it dismisses the common good of humans worldwide.
International law articulates only a minimum standard of conduct, and
responsible states do more. In particular, solidarists expect responsible great
powers to willingly uphold more than international law by promoting human
wellbeing globally. International law is thus not the only metric of interna-
tional responsibility. To some extent, the Obama administration fulfilled its
diplomatic responsibility to promote human values by supporting the mitiga-
tion of climate change; although the United States had not ratified the Kyoto
Protocol, Obama’s climate diplomacy worked to achieve consensus on climate
responsibility and the adoption of the Paris Agreement. By contrast, Trump’s
decision to withdraw the United States from the Paris Agreement has faced
wide international criticism although the decision did not violate interna-
tional law, and the global leadership of the United States has been increas-
ingly questioned as a result. Trump’s climate scepticism has also generated
widespread discontent in the United States, and in response, many sub-
national and civil society actors have become more active advocators of
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climate responsibility than ever before. Indeed, the coalition of non-state
actors that issued America’s Pledge in 2017 represented more than half of the
US economy and even argued that they should represent the United States in
international climate negotiations (Neslen 2017). From the perspective of the
English School, that proposition raises the question of whether the expanding
role of non-state actors in international society can induce structural changes
therein.
To reiterate, legitimacy is an important aspect of great power responsibility
for both pluralists and solidarists. As Ian Clark (2005) points out, principles
of legitimacy determine which actors are considered to have the right to par-
ticipate in international practices and what is viewed as appropriate standards
of conduct in international society. The English School has thus tended to
underscore the importance of a great power’s legitimate international conduct
when assessing its rightful membership in the great power club. By contrast,
Gareth Evans’s conceptualisation of responsible international citizenship,
introduced in a serious of foreign policy speeches the late 1980s and early
1990s, maintains that states cannot fulfil their international responsibilities if
they do not fulfil those responsibilities at home as well. That dynamic
becomes especially clear in the context of international climate politics, for
although a state may play a constructive role in international climate nego-
tiations by endorsing international cooperation and committing to interna-
tional agreements, it cannot be deemed a responsible international actor if it
does not meet its responsibilities by taking domestic actions. At the same
time, even if not a signatory to an international climate agreement, a state
may nevertheless prove to be a responsible international actor by undertaking
ambitious domestic measures to mitigate climate change. In that case,
addressing climate change presumably aligns with a state’s national interests,
which is an adequate justification for pluralist ethics. Indeed, politicians often
highlight the domestic economic benefits of their climate policies. President
Obama, for example, despite having declared climate change a top priority for
his administration, did not emphasise the international responsibilities of the
United States when addressing US audiences (Bukovansky et al. 2012, 153).
From a solidarist perspective, however, economic interests are not an appro-
priate or legitimate basis for great power responsibility, which has to be
bound to human values and international justice.
Clearly, both domestic and international legitimacy are important factors
of great power responsibility. Whereas Bull and other pluralists would high-
light the functional importance of the legitimate conduct of responsible
international citizens both at home and abroad, solidarists would call for
more robust definitions of responsible international citizenship that stress
attention to the social elements of legitimacy at the domestic and interna-
tional levels. That observation can be articulated in Weberian terms as well.
Max Weber conceives a ‘co-constitutive relationship between the domestic
and international realms’ (Hobson & Seabrooke 2001, 240), and his approach
captures the state-centric solidarist conception of responsibility; the ‘domestic
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norms of impartiality and fairness entwined with the ethic of responsibility,
coupled with the domestic – and international – social balance of power’ all
unite in his theory of the state in particular and of international society in
general (ibid., 269). Given Weber’s sophisticated analysis of state–society
relations emphasising a strong civil society, however, his approach does not
may not fully explain China’s membership in the great power club.
Practices of great power responsibility
For as long as it has existed, international society has doubtlessly always had
great powers. In the terms of the English School, however, such powers have
constituted an international club of ‘legalized hegemony’ only since the early
nineteenth century (Reus-Smit 1999, 109; Simpson 2004, 73). At the Congress
of Vienna (1814/15), Austria, Great Britain, France, Prussia and Russia – the
four major powers that had defeated Napoleon – plus the restored King of
France each obtained the recognised status of great power and established the
Holy Alliance as an ideological basis for the rule of their great power club
(Simpson 2004, 96–115; Brown 2004, 7). To quote Brown (2004, 7), the five
great powers were ‘conscious of themselves as constituting an institution
which was separate from other states and in possession of special responsi-
bilities as well as rights vis-à-vis international society’. According to F. R.
Bridge and R. Bullen, such status formed an implicit social contract between
great powers and smaller states; ‘just as the great powers claimed special
rights for themselves, so the small states claimed that the great had special
responsibilities for their well-being’ (quoted in Bukovansky et al. 2012, 27).
Because the contract was not written in international law, however, great
power responsibility was an informal norm at the time. Later, the League of
Nations also granted special status to great powers but did not form an
‘institutional/ideological unity’ similar to the Concert of Europe (Brown 2004,
8).4 Not until 1933, when Great Britain, France, Germany and Italy signed
the Four Power Pact that declared them to be ‘conscious of the[ir] special
responsibilities’ (Bukovansky et al. 2012, 29), was great power responsibility
formalised.
In the 1940s, great power responsibility experienced several influential
developments. In 1943, then British foreign secretary Anthony Eden declared
that ‘special responsibilities do rest on our three powers’, meaning the United
Kingdom, the Soviet Union and the United States (quoted in Bukovansky
et al. 2012, 29). The following year, he called for the formalisation of the
special responsibilities of great powers by establishing a new world organisa-
tion that would ‘make it possible for them [the Four Powers] to carry out the
responsibilities which they will have agreed to undertake’ and that ‘they must
be given … a special position in the organisation’ in the process (quoted in
Bukovansky et al. 2012, 30). As a result, ‘everyone’ was talking about
responsibility by 1945 (cf. Bukovansky et al. 2012, 29–30). For example, a
night before his death, President Franklin D. Roosevelt (1945) responded to
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the events of World War II by stating, ‘Today, we have learned in the agony of
war that great power involves great responsibility’. Similarly, his successor,
President Truman told the US Congress – and reiterated it at the UN General
Assembly in San Francisco in April 1945 – that ‘While these great states have
a special responsibility to enforce the peace … . The responsibility of
the great states is to serve, and not dominate the peoples of the world’
(Truman 1945).
In its contemporary form, the great power club was institutionalised by the
establishment of the UN Security Council in 1945. Under the UN Charter
(1945, ch. 5, Article 24), great powers were formally appointed to have special
responsibilities, including ‘primary responsibility for the maintenance of
international peace and security’. Interestingly, the formalisation of such
responsibility was not actively sought by great powers, as their seemingly
genuine belief that international society had imposed a burden upon them
suggested (Simpson 2004, 170). At the time, great power responsibility was
largely based on great powers’ material capabilities because, according to
Eden, ‘the more power and responsibility can be made corresponding, the
more likely it is that the machinery will be able to fulfil its functions’ (quoted
in Bukovansky et al. 2012, 31). The permanent membership of the United
States, the Soviet Union or Russia, Great Britain, France and the Republic of
China (P5) at the UN Security Council – and especially their veto rights –
made them ‘morally superior’ to international doctrines such as equality and
unanimity and placed them ‘above the law they are to impose on others’
(Wight 1999 [1946], 45). Such privilege made the great powers special, which,
in turn, was viewed as the source of their responsibility (Brown 2004, 9).
When the Cold War broke out soon after the establishment of the UN, the
institutionalisation of the P5 did not realise a collective understanding of
the responsibilities of great powers in practice. During the Cold War, being in
the P5 carried symbolic status only and indicated neither power nor respon-
sibility, as illustrated by the Republic of China’s (i.e. Taiwan’s) maintenance
of its status as a permanent member of the UN Security Council for 20 years
after its regime’s collapse in mainland China (Brown 2004, 9). In Western
international society, the United States assumed a ‘new position of world
responsibility’ and became the ‘principal protector of the free world’ (Truman
1948). That responsibility, however, was not bound to the collective responsi-
bility of the P5 but the global capabilities of the United States as a singular
hegemonic power (Bukovansky et al. 2012, 34; Brown 2004, 11–13; Clark
2011, ch. 6; Ikenberry 2009, 76–79). Later, the dismantling of the Soviet
Union and the end of the Cold War afforded new possibilities to the P5 to
fulfil their responsibilities in promoting international peace and security ori-
ginally articulated in 1945. Many new concepts, including Gareth Evans’s
idea of good international citizenship and Francis M. Deng and his collea-
gues’ notion of sovereignty as responsibility, gave rise to wider debate over
ethics and foreign policy in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Consequently,
human rights emerged as a new ‘standard of civilization’ (Donnelly 1998) that
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conceptualised the responsibility to protect and the willingness to undertake
humanitarian intervention as key attributes of great power responsibility (e.g.
Wheeler 2000).
Ideas about environmental security as an approach to international security
first surfaced in the early post-Cold War era.5 Although scholars initially
focused on environmentally induced conflicts, by the end of the Cold War the
UN Security Council began to pursue a more expansive approach to inter-
national security. In 1992, it noted that ‘non-military sources of instability in
the economic, social, humanitarian and ecological fields have become threats
to peace and security’ (UN Security Council 1992). Since the mid-2000s,
when many ‘securitizing moves’ to promote climate change mitigation were
made (Trombetta 2008, 594–595), the relationship between climate change
and violent conflict has been widely studied (e.g. Lee 2009; Mazo 2010;
Welzer 2012). In effect, those developments have generated debate about the
UN Security Council’s role in mitigating climate change, which, if viewed as a
threat to international peace and security, arguably can and should be added
to the organisation’s agenda.
In 2007, with the British presiding, the UN Security Council held the first-
ever debate on the relationships among climate change, energy and security,
although some members, including China, doubted whether the occasion was
the appropriate forum for the discussion (United Nations 2007). Nevertheless,
British foreign secretary and president of the Council Margaret Beckett
insisted that the members discuss the security-related impacts of climate
change, because the ‘Council’s responsibility was [is] the maintenance of
international peace and security, and climate change [has] exacerbated many
threats, including conflict and access to energy and food’ (ibid.). The UN
General Assembly (2009a) encouraged relevant UN organisations to intensify
their efforts to allay climate change, ‘including its possible security implica-
tions’, and asked the UN Secretary-General to submit a comprehensive
report addressing the potential security-related impacts of climate change. In
response to the UN General Assembly, the UN Secretary-General’s report
defined climate change as a threat multiplier that could affect security by
increasing vulnerability, hindering development, necessitating increased
coping and security, promoting statelessness and engendering international
conflict (UN General Assembly 2009b). In 2011, the UN Security Council,
with Germany presiding, also discussed the potential security-related impacts
of climate change and consequently adopted its first-ever statement on the
issue (UN Security Council 2011). However, the body made no decision
regarding whether new environmental peacekeeping forces, so-called ‘green
helmets’, could be used to manage conflicts caused by resource scarcity
(United Nations 2011). In 2013, the UN Security Council held informal talks
addressing the issue but failed to define climate change as an international
security threat due to resistance from China and Russia (Krause-Jackson
2013). The following year, however, President Obama (2014) explicitly
acknowledged the link between great power responsibility and climate
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change. Altogether, though the UN Security Council has not made any con-
crete decisions about climate change, that it has discussed climate security has
upgraded the status of climate change on the global political agenda. As an
environmental issue, climate change is now a matter of soft politics, while its
potential securitisation makes it a part of hard politics as well. That devel-
opment could signal that climate responsibility is emerging an attribute of
great power responsibility.
Expectations of China’s responsibility
For the time being, China has no salient identity as a great power. On the one
hand, China’s increasing wealth generates expectations of greater interna-
tional respect, and it no longer accepts being left on the periphery of inter-
national society but it struggles to be recognised as a great power. On the
other, its status as a developing country continues to be central to its identity,
especially in international climate politics. Similarly to individuals, states
construct their identities in social interaction by engaging in various interna-
tional practices; when newcomers join, as China gradually has into the great
power club, they learn new ideas and ways of operating in that world, which
consequently transforms their identity.6 Other participants in a practice who
have a ‘stake in making up certain social categories and in trying to make
people [states] conform to them’ (Zalewski & Enloe 1995, 282) play an
important role in shaping state identity. In general, both China and the
United States agree that world peace is an essential value of international
society and that great powers have a responsibility to maintain global peace.
However, the two states seemingly have different views on the other global
responsibilities of great powers. When a rising China asks itself ‘Who am I?’7,
the United States tries to influence the answer by (re)defining what it means
to be a great power in the twenty-first century and what sorts of responsi-
bilities accompany that status. Although not all US contributions have expli-
citly defined responsibility as a rule of membership in the great power club,
there is a clear tendency, as I later demonstrate, that responsibility is a central
requirement for states that seek recognition as great powers. As Buzan (2004,
67) points out, the ‘key here is not just what states say about themselves and
others’ but ‘how they behave in a wider sense, and how that behaviour is
treated by others’. As a result of that learning process, ‘relative newcomers
become relative old-timers’ over the course of time (Wenger 1998, 90). Such
advancement is usually unmarked and implicit; suddenly, a state finds that it
has risen to a position at which it can educate new newcomers, and other
participants have begun to expect the state to know and do more than it is
already certain it does. That development is exactly what seems to have hap-
pened amid China’s rise during recent decades; the West has expected China
to shoulder greater global responsibilities, whereas China continues to regard
itself as a developing country unable to respond to those new demands
(Kopra 2016). Before exploring the discursive clash between the United States
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and China over China’s global responsibility, I briefly outline China’s
entrance into the great power club.
At the founding of the UN Security Council, the Republic of China was
given a permanent seat, although not without dispute about whether it mer-
ited such a status (Simpson 2004, 173). The position did not result in China’s
self-perception as a great power because the People’s Republic of China
(PRC) had neither international rights nor legitimate representation at the
UN until October 1971. In 1972, US president Richard Nixon’s visit to the
PRC re-established US relations with China, largely based on their ‘mutual
antipathy towards Moscow’ (Lanteigne 2013, 105). Initially, US leadership
was optimistic about China’s reforms and assumed that ‘China would learn to
be more like us’. However, the Tiananmen Square incident in 1989 pro-
foundly altered the US policy towards China, and a ‘containment policy’ was
applied until 1993, when it was replaced with an ‘engagement policy’ (Zheng
1999, 126). After the Taiwan Strait crisis (1995–1996), the Clinton adminis-
tration announced that its long-term objective for China was to integrate the
country into international society ‘with all the privileges and responsibilities
of a major power’ (ibid., 128). In 1995, then US secretary of defense William
Perry noted that the engagement strategy would ensure that China would
become a responsible member of that society (Jin 2011, 11). In effect, the
strategy meant that the United States would commit to helping China to join
the great power club and that China would respect established international
rules and act accordingly. Despite Chinese scepticism over US motivations
concerning China, the engagement policy afforded the Chinese state a way to
emerge as a real great power (Zheng 1999, 128–129). Chinese president Jiang
Zemin’s visit to Washington, DC, in 1997 and US president Bill Clinton’s visit
to Beijing in 1998 restored the official dialogue between the countries’ leaders
that had been abandoned since the Tiananmen Square incident in 1989
(Harding 1999, 7–8). In that dialogue, the leaders decided to strive for a
‘constructive strategic partnership’, which they characterised as a ‘goal to
be pursued, not an accomplishment that could be celebrated’ (ibid., 21).
The two summits marked the end of a ‘decade of flux in great power rela-
tions’ and catalysed the development of China’s great power identity
(Rozman 1999, 383).
During his presidential campaign and early in his presidency, US president
George W. Bush took a more hard-line policy towards China and redefined
what was once a US–Chinese partnership as a competition with a power that
should be ‘treated without ill will but without illusions’ at the same time
(Federation of American Scientists 1999; cf. Yu 2009, 84). Nevertheless, Bush
supported China’s accession to the World Trade Organization and its bid to
host the 2008 Olympic Games in Beijing, which relieved tensions after a naval
aircraft collision between the militaries of the two countries in the South
China Sea in April 2001. Immediately after the incident was resolved, Bush
committed to establishing ‘constructive relations’ with China (Yu 2009, 87),
and in return, China supported Bush’s post-September 11 ‘war on terror’.
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Although the mutual cooperation improved China’s relations with the United
States, it did not award China the status of strategic partner with the United
States (Roy 2002; Shambaugh 2002). Bush, however, seemed determined to
further improve US–Chinese relations and promote multilateralism. For
instance, he attended the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation in Shanghai in
October 2001, despite debate over the importance of the meeting when the
United States was at war. Bush also celebrated the thirtieth anniversary of
President Nixon’s visit to China by visiting China again and took a ‘symbolic
step forward in the place where Nixon stopped’ while touring the Great Wall
(Yu 2009, 87–88). A more concrete step in US–Chinese relations was taken
when China’s government approved applications of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to enter China
and begin operating in Beijing in 2002 (Zhang & Zheng 2012, 628).
In 2005, then US deputy secretary of state Robert B. Zoellick introduced
the concept of responsible stakeholder to international politics. According to
Zoellick (2005), ‘All nations conduct diplomacy to promote their national
interests. Responsible stakeholders go further: They recognize that the inter-
national system sustains their peaceful prosperity, so they work to sustain that
system.’ Although Zoellick’s speech did not clearly define responsible stake-
holder, it nevertheless spurred international debate over expectations of
China’s global responsibilities. Arguably, the primary goal of introducing the
concept was to describe China’s international responsibilities in the context of
US interests and expectations, as well as to urge China to fulfil those respon-
sibilities (Gill 2007). In any case, Zoellick’s (2005) concept was based on
pluralist ethics, for it stressed that, as a member of international society,
China has a responsibility to strengthen the international system that has
made its rise possible. At the same time, the concept suggested, China should
not challenge the existing rules of international society or promote competing
norms or another type of international order. In general, Zoellick was opti-
mistic about China’s potential to become a responsible stakeholder and
encouraged the United States to cooperate with China in that regard.
The following year, the concept of responsible stakeholder was written into
the US National Security Strategy 2006, which demanded that ‘As China
becomes a global player, it must act as a responsible stakeholder that fulfils its
obligations and works with the United States and others to advance the
international system that has enabled its success’ (White House 2006). The
first Obama administration adopted similar views, and Zoellick’s successor as
US deputy secretary of state, James Steinberg, formulated his own China
paradigm, dubbed ‘strategic reassurance’, in 2009. Steinberg (2009) empha-
sised China’s negative responsibility not to harm other states:
Just as … we are prepared to welcome China’s ‘arrival’ … as a prosper-
ous and successful power, China must reassure the rest of the world that
its development and growing global role will not come at the expense of
security and well-being of others.
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Steinberg (2009) urged China to reassure other states that it poses no inter-
national threat: ‘When it comes to the international system, we must ensure
that new powers like China – and there are others as well, of course – can
take their rightful place at the table without generating fear or mistrust’.
Although he confirmed that the United States was ‘ready to accept a growing
role for China on the international stage’, he stressed that it ‘will also be
looking for signs and signals of reassurance from China’ and if ‘China is
going to take its rightful place, it must make those signals clear’ (ibid.). In
contrast to Zoellick, who made no reference to climate change or environ-
mental issues in his speech,8Steinberg (2009) mentioned that US–Chinese
cooperation towards mitigating climate change was necessary due to their
statuses as the world’s largest carbon emitters. The Obama administration
also underscored that China’s increasing capacity should be accompanied
with broader positive responsibilities. For example, President Barack Obama
welcomed China’s greater global role, ‘in which a growing economy is joined
by growing responsibilities’ (White House 2009). After China became the
world’s largest carbon dioxide emitter in 2006, the United States began to
urge China to shoulder more responsibility in curbing climate change as well.
During the second Obama administration, constructing a ‘productive and
constructive relationship’ with China was a major strategic goal for the United
States. In a speech delivered a week after President Obama’s re-election in
November 2012, then US national security adviser Thomas Donilon (2012)
urged ‘Beijing to define its national interest more in terms of common global
concerns and to take responsibility for helping the international community
address global problems’. He also asked China to become a responsible inter-
national citizen: ‘Now, we’ve been clear that as China takes a seat at a growing
number of international tables, it needs to assume responsibilities commensu-
rate with its growing global economic impact and its national capabilities’
(ibid.). In March 2013, Donilon reiterated that demand and encouraged
US–Chinese cooperation ‘to build a new model of relations between an exist-
ing power and an emerging one’. He stressed that no natural law exists that
could determine that ‘a rising power and an established power are somehow
destined for conflict’ (Donilon 2013).
In November 2016, when Donald J. Trump was elected as US president,
the US began to play a starkly different role in international society and in its
relations with China. It had become clear during his presidential campaign
that Trump would pay less attention to great power responsibility and focus
on national politics instead. In particular, he had called climate change ‘a
Chinese hoax’ on Twitter in 2012, which fuelled international fears for the
continuance of the US leadership in international climate politics. Although I
discuss Trump’s hostile attitude towards climate politics in greater detail later,
here it is necessary to emphasise how Trump’s unwillingness to shoulder cli-
mate responsibility and sign an international trade agreement called the
Trans-Pacific Partnership consequently elevated China’s global status. In the
light of Trump’s irresponsible international policy actions, China has begun to
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be viewed by the world as a more responsible international player than ever
before. Although Trump’s election thus altered the international expectations
of China’s great power responsibility, it remains unclear whether or not China
is willing or able to live up to those expectations and shoulder more respon-
sibility in international politics. Chinese leaders, for example, have already
stated that the West needs to stop invoking ‘China responsibility theories’ that
exaggerate the country’s duty to diffuse the nuclear threat on the Korean
Peninsula (Reuters 2017). Regarding international climate politics, the world
could receive a similar message, one backed with practical evidence, for
China’s national circumstances have not changed to suddenly afford it more
resources, know-how or political willingness to lead the charge against climate
change. An important factor in those policy decisions is how China con-
structs its identity as an emerging great power and perceives its corresponding
great power responsibility.
China’s emerging notions of great power responsibility
In the years following the PRC’s establishment in 1949, the Chinese govern-
ment was keener to develop alternative international practices than join the
great power club (cf. Foot 2001, 24–28). To join the UN in 1971 and the
Bretton Woods institutions in 1980, however, the PRC had to normalise its
relations with the United States. Early during China’s reform era in the late
1970s, the Chinese admired the United States as a ‘symbol of a comfortable
material life’ and for its ‘rational institutional arrangements, and advanced
technologies’ (Zheng, 1999, 51–52). During the 1980s, however, when the
Chinese discovered that the West was ‘far from their original high expecta-
tions’ and that its practices towards China were unfair, a new sort of nation-
alism began to emerge in China (ibid.). Evan S. Medeiros (2009, 95) claims
that, since the early 1990s, three tenets have guided China’s relations with
major powers – ‘non-alliance, non-confrontation, and not directed against
any third party’ (不结盟, 不对抗, 不针对第三方) – all naturally undergirded
by economic interests. In accordance with those tenets, China has not formed
alliances but partnerships around the world since the end of Cold War.9 At
present, China maintains a strategic partnership with the European Union,
Russia and the United States. Efforts to constrain US global influence as well
as Japan’s regional influence, however, remain central to China’s foreign
policy. In particular, contemporary Chinese leaders have promoted an Asia
for Asians policy and introduced new concepts such as the Asia-Pacific
Dream (亚太梦) that can be conceived as countermoves to the so-called ‘Asia
Pivot’ of the United States. Articulated by Deng Xiaoping in the early 1990s,
China’s strategic guidelines for US–Chinese relations continue to be to
‘increase trust, reduce problems, strengthen cooperation, and avoid con-
frontation’ (增加信任, 减少麻烦, 加强合作,不搞对 抗) (Medeiros 2009, 98).
Since the late 1990s, Chinese intellectuals have debated at length the inter-
national role and expectations of China.10 In his speech to the Russian State
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Duma in 1997, Chinese president Jiang Zemin acknowledged that great
powers have great responsibilities by declaring that ‘being major powers of
influence and permanent members of the UN Security Council, China and
Russia shoulder an important responsibility for safeguarding world peace and
stability’ (quoted in Yeophantong 2013, 331). Since then, Chinese intellectuals
have proposed that China, as a nuclear power and permanent member of the
UN Security Council, should redefine its national interests to meet interna-
tional expectations regarding its responsibility (Yeophantong 2013, 348).
Moreover, following his analysis of internal and external factors influencing
whether China will become a ‘responsible great power’ in the twenty-first
century,11 Xia Liping (2001, 17) identified ‘some conditions necessary to
make China a responsible great power’, including that China ‘should: (1) play
its role in international society not only according to its national interests, but
also in order to benefit regional and world peace, development, stability, and
prosperity; (2) take its international obligations more seriously; and (3) parti-
cipate in the formulation of international rules’.
During his visit to the United States in 2002, Zheng Bijian, former execu-
tive vice-president of the Central Committee’s Central Party School, observed
that Americans had severe doubts about China’s rise to great power status,
something which would later impede Sino–American relations and China’s
pursuit of great power status (Glaser & Medeiros 2007, 294). Consequently, in
2003 Zheng introduced the concept of ‘peaceful rise’ (和平崛起) to dispel
fears about Chinese threat, and the following year, the concept was adopted
by the Hu-Wen administration as a new national strategy. However, the ‘rise’
part of the concept was quickly judged to be counterproductive and soon
replaced with ‘development’.12 Since 2004, the concept of ‘peaceful develop-
ment’ (和平发展), as the leading principle of Chinese foreign policy, has
assured the world that China’s rise will be peaceful and that no ‘hegemonic
war’ will occur. In general, both China’s government and Chinese scholars
embraced Zoellick’s conception of responsible stakeholder, although some
factions pondered whether it was an engagement policy or a containment
policy in nature (Jin 2006; Masuda 2009, 67). No official remarks on the
concept were issued, and no explicit commentary appeared in the People’s
Daily, the mouthpiece of the CCP (Masuda 2009, 67). At his meeting with
President Bush in 2006, President Hu commented that ‘China and the United
States are not only stakeholders, but they should also be constructive part-
ners’ (quoted in Yu 2009, 97). On the one hand, Hu seemed to accept the
characterisation of China as an ‘international stakeholder’ because it pro-
moted China’s international status. On the other, he did not relate it to
responsibility, likely given his incomplete approval of the US understanding
of China’s global role (Masuda 2009, 67).
Shortly after Zoellick’s speech, the State Council Information Office (2005)
issued a white paper titled ‘China’s Peaceful Development Road’ to elaborate
upon the country’s philosophy of peaceful development. The paper high-
lighted China’s development-related needs and declared that its ‘development
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will never pose a threat to anyone’ because ‘peaceful development is the
inevitable way for China’s modernization’. It also assured that, ‘Active in the
settlement of serious international and regional problems, China shoulders
broad international obligations, and plays a responsible and constructive
role’. Although the paper suggested that ‘China is certain to make more
contributions to the lofty cause of peace and the development of mankind’, it
shifted primary global responsibilities to developed countries, which, it stated,
‘should shoulder greater responsibility for a universal, coordinated and
balanced development of the world’, whereas ‘developing countries should
make full use of their own advantages to achieve development’. China’s
second white paper on peaceful development reminded the world that China
is ‘actively living up to international responsibility’ (Information Office of the
State Council of the People’s Republic of China 2011), underscored China’s
status as a developing country and suggested that China should not be
expected to shoulder greater global responsibilities until it meets domestic
challenges and achieves a higher level of development. However, the second
paper did not indicate what level of development China should achieve before
it assumes more global responsibility, nor when China’s government expected
that level to be reached.
As Jin Canrong (2011, 12) describes it, being a great power means setting
international agendas proactively and not allowing other states to control
agendas or define global responsibilities. Accordingly, the Chinese Commu-
nist Party (CCP) has begun to develop and promote its own concepts,
including the ‘harmonious world’ (和谐世界), the ‘China dream’ (中国梦),
the ‘Asia-Pacific dream’ (亚太梦), a ‘new type of major country relationship’
(新型大国关系) and a ‘new type of international relations’ (新型国际关系), as
means to organise international society. Of course, only time will tell whether
those concepts can reorganise international practices to become less Wester-
nised and accommodate Chinese values and interests more efficiently (Kopra
2016, 30). The purpose of the concepts seems to be to reform international
society in a ‘responsible manner’, not to replace existing practices from which
China has benefitted (cf. Buzan 2010, 29–33). In international finance, China
has introduced sources of global governance by establishing new multilateral
mechanisms such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the New
Development Bank, which are arguably alternatives to the International
Monetary Fund and the World Bank. Moreover, President Xi Jinping’s sig-
nature New Silk Road initiative ‘One Belt, One Road’ (一带一路) could have
far-reaching political impacts in the coming years.
From this book’s perspective, the concept of the ‘new type of great power
relationship’ first expressed by China’s then vice president Xi Jinping in Feb-
ruary 2012 is critical. Xi (2012) claimed that
We [the United States and China] should work hard to implement the
agreement between the two presidents, expand our shared interests and
mutually beneficial cooperation, strive for new progress in building our
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cooperative partnership and make it a new type of relationship between
major countries in the 21st century.
Xi identified four ways in which two countries should collaborate in order to
foster the described new type of relationship: increasing ‘mutual under-
standing and strategic trust’, respecting ‘each side’s core interests and major
concerns’, deepening ‘mutually beneficial cooperation’ and enhancing ‘coop-
eration and coordination in international affairs and on global issues’,
including climate change. Moreover, Xi (2012) declared:
Our world is undergoing complex and profound changes. China and the
United States should meet challenges together and share responsibilities
in international affairs. This is what China–US cooperative partnership
calls for and what the international community expects from us.
A couple of months later, then president Hu Jintao (2012a) reiterated the call
for a ‘new type of great power relationship’ and emphasised the importance
of mutual trust. He stated that the ‘world we live in is big enough for China,
the United States and all other countries to achieve common development’.
In his report to the 18th National Congress of the CCP in 2012, Hu (2012b)
asserted that China would continue to ‘play its due role of a major responsible
country’, and the new type of relationship was included as a goal in the 18th
Party Congress work report. After his nomination as China’s premier in 2013,
Li Keqiang confirmed that the fifth generation of Chinese leadership would
‘work with the Obama administration to work together to build a new type of
relationship between great countries’ (Jones & Lim 2013). That commitment
indeed emerged as a key element of the Xi–Li administration.
In 2013, Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi (2013) gave a rare comprehen-
sive statement of China’s foreign policy titled ‘Exploring the Path of Major-
Country Diplomacy with Chinese Characteristics’. The following year, Pre-
sident Xi introduced the concept of ‘major-country diplomacy with Chinese
characteristics‘ at a high-level international conference in Beijing (Xinhua
2014). Although the official translation was thus ‘major country diplomacy’,
the Chinese concept 大国外交 could be translated as ‘great power diplo-
macy’. Wang pledged that China’s fifth generation of leadership would take a
more proactive approach to diplomacy. According to Wang (2013), China
was ‘ready to respond to this expectation of the international community …
to undertake its due responsibilities and make greater contribution to world
peace and common development’. He added:
As a permanent member of the UN Security Council, China is always
conscious of its international responsibilities and obligations and stands
ready to offer more public goods and play its unique and positive role in
addressing various issues and challenges in the world.
(ibid.)
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After Zoellick’s speech in 2005, China has taken a more active part in UN
peacekeeping operations, which can be viewed to signal its increasing accep-
tance to shoulder great power responsibility (Foot 2001; Suzuki 2008).
Nevertheless, China has not fully accepted the Western concept of human
rights and other attributes of great power responsibility from the US per-
spective (Kopra 2018). Therefore, as Pang Zhongying (2006, 9) notes, Wang’s
statement does not necessarily mean that China is ‘fully prepared to embrace
the notion that it is a custodian of the current international system, with all of
the responsibilities that would entail’. In late 2014, Chinese Vice Premier
Wang Yang confirmed that assumption: ‘China and the US are global eco-
nomic partners, but the leader of the world is the United States. The United
States leads the system and rules; China is willing to join the system and to
respect the rules and hopes to play a constructive role’ (Chinaiiss 2014).
However, President Trump’s election in November 2016 dramatically
changed that characterisation. Trump had already clarified during his pre-
sidential campaign that his administration would no longer lead international
society or follow its rules, as China and other states had expected it would.
For China, that shift opened up a new opportunity to define and demonstrate
how it perceives great power responsibility. For instance, President Xi seized
an opportunity at the World Economic Forum in Davos in January 2017 to
praise positive aspects of globalisation and portray China as the champion of
free trade (World Economic Forum 2017). By October 2017, China had
become even more confident about its new global position. In particular, in his
speech to the 19th CCP Congress, Xi (2017) declared that China had entered a
new era of power in which it leads the world on political, economic, military
and environmental issues. Given his speech’s extraordinarily strong emphasis
on the development of military capabilities, it seems that Chinese leadership in
the heralded new era is based upon not only economic power but also more
traditional hard power. Xi also reminded the world that making ‘new and
greater contributions for mankind is our Party’s abiding mission’ but did not
comment upon how China would pursue that mission in practice.
From the perspective of great power responsibility, neither President Xi’s
plans for China’s new era nor his ideas about a new type of great power
relationship have marked any breakthroughs. The new type of great power
relationship focuses more or less on core interests, not common ones that
could be translated into new responsibilities for China and the United States.
Implicitly, the conceptualisation calls for hard power and an attempt to per-
suade the United States to respect China’s sphere of interest in East Asia
(Kopra 2016; Kopra 2018). In that light, international climate politics pro-
vides an interesting case in China’s emerging notions of great power respon-
sibility. Chinese leaders often refer to the massive size of the state when
discussing its global responsibilities, and though they dub China a ‘respon-
sible big country’ (负责任大国), the Chinese conception could also be trans-
lated as ‘responsible great power’. According to Xi (2015), for example,
‘Being a big country means shouldering greater responsibilities for regional
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and world peace and development, as opposed to seeking greater monopoly
over regional and world affairs.’ Moreover, it seems that China increasingly
identifies itself as a great power with great responsibilities in international
climate politics and has planned policy measures to meet those responsi-
bilities (cf. Kopra 2016; Kopra 2018). Due to its ‘international responsibilities
and obligations as a new type of major country’, China has not only issued
all of the important climate policies in joint statements with the United States
but also promised to give more financial and technological support to devel-
oping countries to assist them in fulfilling their climate objectives (China Daily
2016). At the same time, improving the country’s status and developing the first
principle continue to be important elements of China’s climate policy. While
China’s National Climate Change Plan (2014–2020) confirmed the state’s great
power responsibility in climate change mitigation, it also defended the coun-
try’s ‘legitimate development rights and interests’ (National Development and
Reform Commission 2014, 4–5). Most clearly, China’s Intended Nationally
Determined Contribution to the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change published in June 2015 described China as a developing
country but made no reference to great power responsibility.
Conclusion
As proponents of the English School have indicated, because climate change
risks the security and functions of international society, great powers bear
primary responsibility for mitigating it. While pluralists justify that responsi-
bility by citing great powers’ functional role in international society, solidar-
ists emphasise their diplomatic responsibility to advance human values and
international justice as well. Arguably, environmental stewardship is a human
value, and we can therefore expect great powers to shoulder primary respon-
sibility for mitigating climate change. Great powers should fulfil such
responsibility by assuming leadership roles in international climate politics
and by pursuing domestic measures to halt climate change. Due to its emer-
ging great power status, China has played an increasingly important role in
the social processes in which great power responsibilities are formulated.
Because it opposes Western views on the humanitarian attributes of great
power responsibility, China has been keen to position climate responsibility as
an important attribute of great power responsibility.
Notes
1 By analogy, Bull (2002 [1977], 53) observes the needlessness of formulating rules
requiring people to sleep or eat, ‘which they may be relied upon to do’, but that
most societies do formulate rules prohibiting killing and stealing, ‘which some of
them [citizens] are likely to do, whether there are rules prohibiting this kind of
behaviour or not’.
2 For examples, see Ikenberry, Mastanduno and Wohlforth (2009) and Mowle
(2007). Although such a characterisation is mostly advocated by the United States,
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it has also been popular in China, where politicians, academics and the general
public have called for multipolarity in world affairs, even if some now increasingly
advocate the democratisation of international relations.
3 According to Dunne (1998, 106), ‘balance of power is likened to the first article of
the “constitution” of international society’ in the papers of the British Committee.
4 For a detailed study on the League of Nations, see Zimmern (1945).
5 For a detailed overview of those developments, see Trombetta (2008).
6 By learning, I do not mean that new participants simply internalise existing rules
of practices but that they learn to use or seek to alter practices in ways that best
serve their interests and values.
7 In using that analogy, I do not literally mean that states should be treated as
thinking, feeling persons. We need not study psychology in order to understand
their behaviour.
8 However, Zoellick discussed energy security, which relates closely to climate
change.
9 For a detailed analysis of China’s partnership diplomacy, see Su (2009, 35–41).
10 For a review of the debate, see Shambaugh (2013).
11 According to Xia (2001), those conditions are fourfold. First, if China is confident
about the international security environment and international mechanisms, then it
will integrate itself into international society and international governmental insti-
tutions. Second, other countries have to help China to participate in international
institutions because they will benefit and doing so will generate mutual trust and
facilitate cooperation. Third, the strategic balance of US–Chinese–Japanese rela-
tions should be established and maintained so that no party moves to control
another. Fourth, the dispute over Taiwan should be resolved peacefully so that
‘China will be more willing to play as a responsible great power in the interna-
tional community’ (ibid., 24–25).
12 For an in-depth study of the evolution of the concept of peaceful development, see
Glaser and Medeiros (2007).
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5 Great power management and debate
over climate responsibility
In this chapter, I briefly introduce international climate negotiations from the
perspective of state environmental responsibility. In describing the evolution
of the international norm of climate responsibility, with particular attention
to China’s contribution to that evolution, I address key events and tensions
that have shaped the formation of climate responsibilities globally. As with all
sorts of politics, international climate politics is not only shaped by power
struggles and participants’ domestic as well as international agendas but also
‘about the negotiation of social identities, arguments about legitimate interests
and social purposes, the formulation and execution of strategic practices, and
struggles over the good and the just’ (Bukovansky et al. 2012, 64). Given the
complexity of both the globalised world’s social structures and the phenom-
enon of climate change, it is impossible to trace all the relationships and
processes that have prompted the emergence and formulation of international
climate practices. Accordingly, while paying particular attention to notions of
responsibility, I do not offer a Foucauldian genealogy of climate responsi-
bility, for a more selective story can be told: one regarding the role of parti-
cipants such as individual states, especially contributions from the European
Union, and non-state organisations. Last, I do not provide a detailed theore-
tical or empirical explanation of how the United Nations Framework Con-
vention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) or any other secondary institution
has emerged and developed, or how it functions. Instead, I focus on the
evolving notions of state environmental responsibility.1
China and the environmental awakening of international society
When the United Nations (UN) was founded, environmental issues were not
a major concern of international society. In fact, the UN Charter did not
mention the environment at all. When concern for the climate did surface at
the global level, it was not due to a sole factor but to multiple critical drivers
working at once, without which it would be difficult to imagine the new pla-
netary institution that emerged. For one, prior to the politicisation of climate
change, a process of environmental awakening occurred around the world,
especially in the United States, in which scientists played a prominent role by
identifying environmental changes, framing those changes as political pro-
blems and formulating (political) agendas both locally and globally. Conse-
quently, after the mid-nineteenth century, the scientific community began
organising international conferences devoted to addressing ways to protect
nature.2 By the late 1950s and early 1960s, evidence of increased environ-
mental degradation had accumulated, and several books and articles on pol-
lution, wasted resources, overstressed ecosystems and misused technology
were published, including Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring (1962), Garrett
Hardin’s The Tragedy of the Commons (1968) and the Club of Rome’s The
Limits to Growth (1972). Such texts raised public awareness and concern for
environmental changes, which in turn engendered the birth of new interna-
tional actors – namely, environmental non-governmental organisations
(NGOs) – that expanded the environmental awakening and influenced envir-
onmental agendas locally as well as globally. In that early phase of environ-
mental politics, the United States took the role of international leader
(Falkner 2005, 590).
Held in Stockholm on 5–16 June 1972, the first international conference on
environmental protection, the UN Conference on the Human Environment
(UNCHE), attracted delegates from 113 countries as well as representatives
from numerous NGOs, intergovernmental organisations and other specialised
agencies. Because the UNCHE was the first international conference that
allowed non-state actors to participate in interstate negotiations on any topic,
it significantly affected the workings of international society, perhaps most
notably by generating political recognition of the idea of the ‘collective
responsibility of nations for the quality and protection of the earth’ (Caldwell
1990, 55). Ultimately, the conference produced three non-binding instru-
ments – the Declaration of the UNCHE, an action plan and an action plan
for the human environment – the last of which included 109 sets of recom-
mendations for governments, intergovernmental agencies and NGOs. In
addition, the UNCHE played an important role in establishing the UN
Environmental Programme (UNEP) and generated momentum for the later
development of a wide range of international environmental agreements. As a
participant at the UNCHE, China, which had become a member of the UN
in 1971, established a leading small group for environmental protection under
the State Council earlier that year. Thus, China’s first environmental policy
body was formed ‘in direct and urgent response to an impending international
conference’ even before the People’s Republic of China had become a
member of UN (Ross 1999, 297–298).
Although its output was mostly rhetoric, the UNCHE played an important
role in the emergence of climate responsibility. It promoted environmental
awareness and knowledge globally and constructed the basis of the institu-
tional framework for the further development of international environmental
law. As Charlotte Epstein (2008, 111) posits, the conference ‘marked the
moment where environmental groups shifted from being social movement
outsiders to legitimate policy advisors’ and bona fide participants of
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international practices. According to Melinda L. Cain, it also marked a
‘major shift in the priority given to climatic issues by international organisa-
tions’ (quoted in Paterson 1996, 25), consequent to which the UN organised a
series of climate-related conferences.3 In contrast to traditional international
law, the Stockholm resolutions that resulted from the UNCHE articulated
several recommendations regarding states’ human-centric responsibilities that
guided ‘what governments should do in relation to their own people rather
than, as in traditional international law, what a nation-state should or should
not do in relation to other nation–states’ (Caldwell 1990, 65). Despite its
anthropocentric focus on economic and social concerns caused by environ-
mental change, a legacy of the UNCHE was, in Lynton Keith Caldwell’s
(1990, 67) words, ‘an enlarged and reinforced concept of environmental
responsibility that had prospective bearing upon the future of international
political, legal, and organizational relationships’.
Sovereignty was a major issue at the UNCHE. In the early 1970s, envir-
onmentalists began to express concerns over the clash between practices of
sovereignty and global environmental problems. Sceptical of the capacity and
willingness of nation-states to solve the environmental crisis, many scientists
and NGO representatives in the Stockholm Environment Forum, a parallel
meeting of the UNCHE, urged the establishment of supranational global
governance bodies that would be loyal to the ‘planet and to humanity as
species’ (Caldwell 1990, 62). By contrast, governments were unwilling to
compromise whatsoever on national interests for the sake of environmental
protection; sovereignty was especially non-negotiable for many developing
countries that had achieved independence not long before the UNCHE was
held. Consequently, sovereignty emerged as the foundation for the definition
of state environmental responsibility. According to Principle 21 of the Stock-
holm Declaration, states ‘have, in accordance with the Charter of the United
Nations and the principles of international law, the sovereign right to exploit
their own resources pursuant to their own environmental policies’. That right,
however, was constrained by a state-centric principle of no harm; Principle 21
also declared that states have ‘the responsibility to ensure that activities within
their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of other
States or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction’ (United Nations
1972).
The Stockholm Declaration was the first piece of international law to
articulate that both humans and states have environmental responsibilities. It
characterised a clean environment as a fundamental right of humans, which
thus bear a correlative, ‘solemn responsibility to protect and improve the
environment for present and future generations’. The Stockholm Declaration
thus directed the greatest environmental responsibility to states and expressed
that each national government is tasked with defining what it means to be
environmentally responsible under its own legislation: ‘Local and national
governments will bear the greatest burden for large-scale environmental policy
and action within their jurisdictions’. The document also emphasised the
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importance of international cooperation, which it maintained ‘is also needed
in order to raise resources to support the developing countries in carrying out
their responsibilities in this field’ (United Nations 1972).
At the UNCHE, developing countries insisted that the greatest environ-
mental problem was the lack of development and that poverty was caused
mostly by unjust practices performed by developed countries. For example,
then prime minister of India, Indira Gandhi, stated:
Many of the advanced countries of today have reached their present
affluence by their domination over other races and countries, the exploi-
tation of their own masses and own natural resources. They got a head
start through sheer ruthlessness, undisturbed by feelings of compassion or
by abstract theories of freedom, equality, or justice.
(Quoted in Caldwell 1990, 57)
China agreed with Gandhi’s assessment but went even further. From the
Chinese representative, the primary reason for environmental pollution was
‘the policy of plunder, aggression and war carried out by imperialist, coloni-
alist and neo-colonialist countries, especially by the super-Powers’ (UNEP
2015). Consequently, convinced that environmental degradation was a pro-
blem caused by capitalism, China suggested that communist countries did not
suffer from environmental problems. Despite the isolationism of Maoist
China, the nation played quite an important role at the UNCHE, which was
the first UN conference it attended. Participation in the conference benefitted
China by offering an opportunity for the country to re-establish ties with
other states, largely because environmental issues were not viewed to be
prohibitively controversial compared to, for example, nuclear testing and
arms control. Since the UNCHE was the first major international conference
to address environmental protection and since the field of environmental
protection had no established norms, China was able to contribute to the
evolution of international environmental practices from their inception. China
also became a willing representative of developing countries by advocating its
10-point statement, which encapsulated the interests of all developing coun-
tries in attendance (ECO 1972). To date, despite its rapidly growing economy,
China has persisted to represent itself as the leader of developing countries in
international climate negotiations.
Most notably, China significantly contributed to paragraphs 2, 4 and 5 of
the Stockholm Declaration (Greenfield 1979; Sohn 1973). In particular, it
advanced the establishment of the relationship between the environment and
economic development, albeit with emphasis on the latter: ‘Economic devel-
opment and social progress are necessary for the welfare of mankind and the
further improvement of the environment’ (ECO 1972). Among other con-
tributions, China also highlighted the development-related needs of develop-
ing countries. With only minor changes made, Paragraph 2 of the Stockholm
Declaration adopted China’s proposal, which suggested that
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The conservation and improvement of the human environment is a major
issue which affects the livelihood and economic development of the
people throughout the world, as well as an urgent wish of the peoples of
the whole world and the bounden duty of all governments.
(Greenfield 1979, 219)
In associating the quality of the environment with both human wellbeing and
economic development, Paragraph 2 laid the foundations for the construction
of the concept of sustainable development. Perhaps even more interestingly,
the paragraph indicated that each government had a general legal obligation
to protect the environment. As Louis B. Sohn (1973, 440) suggests, the
essence the paragraph could be rephrased to state, ‘The protection and
improvement of human environment is the duty of all governments’. In early
drafts of the Stockholm Declaration, similar solidarist suggestions for the
general responsibilities of governments were common; although states were
‘rather reluctant to accept such a broad obligation of an indeterminate scope’,
the Chinese delegation was ‘somehow able to persuade other members of the
Working Group not only to accept this duty but also to put it most appro-
priately in the forefront of the Declaration’. As Sohn highlights, such per-
suasion was a ‘striking accomplishment’ (ibid.). Despite its active role at the
UNCHE, the Chinese delegation nevertheless refused to sign the final docu-
ments because they excluded sufficiently strong socialist elements. Although it
recognised the importance of environmental protection, promoting socialism
was the overriding goal for Chinese diplomacy in the Maoist era (Shouqiut &
Voigtsi 1993, 22).
Regarding international justice, the Stockholm Declaration sketched new
ideas concerning the rights and responsibilities of developed compared to
developing countries. First, the Stockholm recommendations addressed the
need for additional financial resources and technology transfer from devel-
oped countries to developing countries in order to meet environmental chal-
lenges. Second, the issue of compensation was advocated as long as the
developed states, especially the United States, opposed the idea (Caldwell
1990, 66). For instance, China, which supported compensation, declared,
‘Each country has a right to safeguard its environment. The corporate states
are discharging pollutants and the victim states have a right for compensa-
tion’ (ECO 1972). Ultimately, the Stockholm Declaration introduced the idea
of compensation and encouraged states to develop rules addressing the liabi-
lity of states in causing environmental damage:
States shall cooperate to develop further the international law regarding
liability and compensation for the victims of pollution and other envir-
onmental damage caused by activities within the jurisdiction or control of
such States to areas beyond their jurisdiction.
(United Nations 1972)
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Consequently, in 1978, the International Law Commission began to formulate
rules regarding liability for environmental damage (Koivurova 2014, 175).
China and the UNFCCC climate negotiations
The UN Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), held in
Rio de Janeiro on 3–14 June 1992, was an enormous, unparalleled event. In
attendance were the representatives of 172 states, of whom 108 were state
leaders; approximately 2,400 representatives of NGOs and 17,000 participants
in the parallel NGO forum; and about 10,000 on-site journalists. In parti-
cular, the extraordinary and extensive participation of NGOs at UNCED
enhanced their role in later international forums as well (Porter, Welsh Brown
& Chasek 2000, 69). Given the massive number of participants, the outcomes
of the conference – Agenda 21, the Rio Declaration on Environment and
Development, the Statement of Forest Principles, the United Nations Fra-
mework Convention on Climate Change and the United Nations Convention
on Biological Diversity – can arguably be characterised as universal agree-
ments. All the documents were guided by the concept of sustainable develop-
ment, while the Rio Declaration in particular confirmed several emerging
environmental norms of international society, or what lawyers might call
‘principles of customary environmental law’: the principle of no harm (Prin-
ciple 2), the precautionary principle (Principle 15), the polluter pays principle
(Principle 16), the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities
(CBDR; Principle 7) and the principle of sustainable development (principles 1,
4–6 and 8). In addition, states agreed to formulate national climate pro-
grammes, establish national greenhouse gas (GHG) inventories and cooperate
in the fields of adaptation, technology, science and education in response to
climate change.
At UNCED, China portrayed itself as the unofficial leader of developing
countries, a position for which it had begun to campaign during the previous
year (Johnston 1998, 574). In June 1991, China held the Beijing Ministerial
Conference on Environment and Development that, as a result, issued the
Beijing Declaration, which called for international cooperation on environ-
mental protection and sustainable development, demanded financial assis-
tance for developing countries, asserted the right of developing countries to
economic development and opposed interference in the internal affairs of
developing countries (Ross 1999, 299). In essence, the Beijing Declaration
included all of the principles of China’s environmental diplomacy (Johnston
1998, 574). In September 1991, China and UNEP organised a Symposium on
Developing Countries and International Law, which addressed a wide range
of issues of interest to developing countries, including finance and technology
transfer, environmental protection and human rights (Shouqiu & Voigts 1993,
26). Presumably, the chief purpose of both meetings was to formalise the
collective bargaining position of developing countries in preparation for
UNCED, and, as host, China emerged as the leader of the group (Economy
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1998, 272). For China, the UNFCCC was a diplomatic success, for the
resulting agreement affirmed all of its demands, including the basic elements
of the Beijing Declaration, a strong doctrine of sovereignty, opposition to
interference in internal affairs, the historic responsibility of developed coun-
tries and the development-related rights of developing countries to receive
financial assistance and technology transfer. As a country excluded from
Annex I of the convention (i.e. non-Annex country), China was not subjected
to any emissions reduction targets and managed to fulfil its international
responsibility to cooperate simply by participating in the conference. Thus,
mere participation in the UNFCCC was China’s contribution, and it refused
to commit to making any sort of emissions cuts. Instead, it demanded that
developed countries, for historical reasons, should bear all responsibility for
mitigating climate change. However, non-Annex countries were nevertheless
urged to publish national GHG inventories, prepare national climate pro-
grammes and contribute to research on climate change. Ultimately, then
Chinese premier Li Peng ratified the UNFCCC in 1992.
The UNFCCC entered into force in 1994. At an international meeting on
climate change in 1995, however, the Chinese delegation interrogated scientific
findings on climate change and shared a position with the Global Climate
Coalition, an US oil and coal industry lobbying organisation that presumably
met with the Chinese during the meeting (Johnston 1998, 572). China con-
tinued to question the scientific findings of the Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change at the first Conference of Parties (COP1) held in Berlin in
1995. The Chinese delegation stated that:
Scientifically, as Article 4.1 (g) has stated, there still exist some ‘uncer-
tainties regarding the causes, effects, magnitude, and timing of climate
change’. This is common knowledge. Based on this knowledge, we should
be very prudent in future action.
(Chinese Delegation 1995, quoted in Johnston 1998, 572)
The United States, India and Brazil shared China’s stance on such rigid cri-
ticism of climate science, whereas the EU and small island states expressed
their deep concern for the consequences of climate change. Nevertheless,
parties managed to agree that developed countries should set quantified
emissions reduction requirements within specified timeframes (e.g. 2005, 2010
and 2020) and that the targets should be written into an international proto-
col. Known as the Berlin Mandate, the agreement facilitated a negotiation
process that resulted in the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol in 1998. At
Kyoto, climate negotiations focused on two issues: how much developed
countries should cut emissions and whether some sort of flexible mechanisms
should be established to support the implementation of emissions reduction
targets (Bodansky 2001, 36).
At Australia’s insistence, the Kyoto Protocol stipulates that each country in
Annex I of the protocol (i.e. developed countries) should agree on a legally
104 Debate over climate responsibility
binding, specific and differentiated emissions reduction target (Triggs 2001,
306). China naturally supported the differentiation between developed and
developing countries. Apart from Australia, Norway and Iceland, which were
allowed to increase their emissions above 1990 levels, all developed countries
were urged to decrease their GHG emissions by up to 8 per cent. In line with
CBDR, no emissions reduction targets were set for developing countries. The
Kyoto Protocol also established reporting and verification procedures, as well
as three market-based mechanisms – Clean Development Management
(CDM), emissions trade and joint implementation (i.e. the Kyoto mechan-
isms) – in order to facilitate and monitor emissions reduction. At first, China
opposed flexible mechanisms, which would have permitted developed coun-
tries to shirk their responsibility to cut GHG emissions at home while
‘disregarding the living environment of people in other countries’ (Harris &
Yu 2009, 59). In the early 2000s, however, China gave its ‘gradual if muted
acceptance’ of the mechanisms and began to show interest in small-scale
CDM projects (ibid.). In time, it established an institutional basis for CDM
projects and even became the largest beneficiary of CDM credits worldwide.
Indeed, the CDM seems like an auspicious way to reduce GHG emissions in
China (Heggelund, Andresen & Fritzen Buan 2010, 246–247), despite wide
criticism for the measure’s inability to boost emissions control and propensity
for creating incentives for reluctant countries to avoid effective emissions
reductions (e.g. Wara 2007; Streck & Lin 2008).
The UNFCCC defined the climate responsibility of states according to
Rio Principles 2 and 7 – sovereignty and CBDR – both of which were
crucial for reaching an international agreement with China and other
developing countries. CBDR acknowledges that developed (i.e. Annex I
countries) and developing countries (i.e. non-Annex I countries) cannot be
subjected to the same standards but that state responsibility for climate
change must be allocated according to national circumstances and capa-
cities. To those ends, the UNFCCC (1992) urged developed countries to
implement national climate policies ‘with the aim of returning individually
or jointly to their 1990 [anthropogenic emissions] levels’. However, the
UNFCCC did not ask developed countries to specify such policies and
thereby failed to set any legal objective or specific schedule for stabilisa-
tion. Instead, it stated that ‘such a level should be achieved within a time-
frame sufficient to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change,
to ensure that food production is not threatened and to enable economic
development to proceed in a sustainable manner’. Despite its relevance to
climate change, the polluter pays principle was excluded from the
UNFCCC; whereas developed countries worried about the costs of the
principle, developing countries wanted to highlight the historically based
responsibility of developed countries. Accordingly, CBDR was viewed
to be more attractive than the polluter pays principle because
the latter would have required poor polluters to pay as well (Bukovansky
et al. 2012, 128).
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When the United States ratified the UNFCCC in 1992, it accepted CBDR,
at least in principle. Later, in 1998, US President Bill Clinton also signed the
Kyoto Protocol. However, President George W. Bush refused to ratify the
protocol, which he believed would hamper economic growth. In his opinion,
the Kyoto Protocol was unjustified because it did impose emissions reduction
obligations upon major developing emitters, including China and India (Bush
2001; Bush 2002). With its withdrawal from the Kyoto process, the United
States ostensibly concluded its role as a leader of international climate poli-
tics, as well as diluted the scope of climate responsibility internationally.
Nevertheless, following Russia’s ratification in 2004, the Kyoto Protocol
entered into force in 2005.4 At the first Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto
Protocol in Montreal in 2005, attending states decided to establish an ad hoc
working group to facilitate the negotiations of the second phase of the Kyoto
Protocol (2012–2020).
China and post-Kyoto climate negotiations
The UN Conference on Climate Change in Bali (COP13) in 2007 raised
great – perhaps overly great – expectations for the results of the post-Kyoto
climate negotiations. States developed the Bali Action Plan, which proposed a
shared vision for long-term cooperative climate action, including a long-term
global goal for emissions reduction and action on mitigation, adaptation,
technology and financing for after 2012, to be adopted at COP15 in Copen-
hagen. Because some parties central to the conference, including the United
States, were not parties to the Kyoto Protocol, post-Kyoto negotiations were
organised with two tracks. Notably, at COP13, China and other developing
countries committed to implement nationally appropriate mitigation actions
(NAMAs) in the context of sustainable development supported and enabled
by measurable, reportable and verifiable (MRV) technology, financing and
capacity building. Although NAMAs were optional national climate policies,
not legally binding emissions reduction targets, their development marked a
significant step in the negotiation process, for it had become clear that climate
change mitigation would be difficult without the participation of major
developing countries whose emissions had grown rapidly.5
Although China was no longer typical of developing countries, it continued
to represent itself as one – a poor one – during post-Kyoto negotiations. It
aligned its climate politics with those of all developing countries (i.e. the G77)
and used rhetoric intended to entwine their interests with its own. China’s
government often stressed its friendship with developing countries and argued
that ‘China has never separated itself from other developing countries and
will never do so’ (Wang 2013). However, China was no longer a characteristic
poor country, and its enormous GHG emissions were also known to cause
significant losses and damage in poor developing countries. Its participation
in the G77 became increasingly questionable, and the least-developed coun-
tries began to criticise its unwillingness to shoulder its climate responsibility.
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Naturally, China’s government wanted to ensure that it would not be alie-
nated in international negotiations and thus began to expand its cooperation
with other emerging powers and major emitters (e.g. Hochstetler & Milkoreit
2014; Hallding et al. 2011). Prior to COP15 in Copenhagen, China formed
BASIC with Brazil, South Africa and India, which provided both a ‘platform
for both pushing a hard line as a collective rather than an individual’ and
‘cover for China by preventing it from being seen as the only recalcitrant
state’ (Hallding et al. 2011, 76).
China and other developing countries stated at the Copenhagen Conference
in 2009 that principle of MRV should apply to internationally supported cli-
mate actions only and not voluntary, independently financed national actions.
Unsurprisingly, China prioritised sovereignty by insisting that its NAMAs
should not be subject to external review because they were not internationally
supported (Bukovansky et al. 2012, 149). As a compromise, the Copenhagen
Accord stipulated that only internationally supported actions would be sub-
ject to MRV, whereas other mitigation actions would be communicated
nationally to the UNFCCC ‘with provisions for international consultations
and analysis under clearly defined guidelines that will ensure that national
sovereignty is respected’ (UNFCCC 2009). Moreover, developed countries
pledged to provide developing ones with new and additional resources worth
roughly USD 30 billion during 2010–2012 (i.e. fast-start finance) and to
mobilise USD 100 billion annually by 2020. However, no agreement on how
the funds should be mobilised in a public-to-private ratio was ever reached.
China was content with the Copenhagen Accord because it would not
infringe upon its sovereignty or compromise its short-term national interests
(Christoff 2010). On the international stage, however, China became a target
of harsh criticism from other states, who blamed it for being ‘irresponsible’
and ‘blocking progress’ by delaying negotiations and opposing to halve GHG
emissions globally by the mid-twenty-first century (Christoff 2010, 647; cf.
Lynas, 2009; Porter 2009; Vidal 2009). In diplomatic terms, ‘Premier Wen’s
absence from the larger final high-level negotiating sessions and the presence
of relatively junior officials in meetings with Obama and other heads of state
were read as insults’ (Christoff 2010, 647).
Before the Durban Conference in 2011, China’s government had opposed
binding climate obligations for developing countries at every turn, and its role
in efforts to mitigate climate change was largely perceived to be negative. At
the Durban Conference, however, China played a more constructive part, and
participating parties successfully agreed to enter another round of negotia-
tions to formulate a climate agreement that would oblige all major emitters
by 2015 and come into force by 2020. Moreover, the distinction between
Annex I and non-Annex I countries was dismantled, and the proactive cli-
mate policies of developing countries were viewed to be increasingly vital to
achieving the long-term goal of not raising global temperatures by more than
2°C. For its part, the European Union committed to the second commitment
period under the Kyoto Protocol. Later, the 2014 Lima Accord (COP20)
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obliged all parties to formulate intended nationally determined contributions
(INDCs) well in advance of COP21. As a result, 187 states – even excep-
tionally poor ones in regions of conflict (e.g. Afghanistan) – submitted
INDCs to the UNFCCC that together represented roughly 95 per cent of
all GHG emissions worldwide.6 That unusually inclusive – in fact, nearly
universal – participation of states demonstrated a fundamental paradigm shift
in international norms of climate responsibility: that developing countries
were now urged and willing to contribute to global efforts against climate
change, even if CBDR was not rescinded. In other words, in response to cli-
mate change, all parties became required to ‘undertake and communicate
ambitious efforts’ that should ‘represent a progression beyond the Party’s then
current nationally determined contribution and reflect its highest possible
ambition’ (UNFCCC 2015a). Notably, China, among other countries, agreed
to the paradigm change (Xi 2015).
During the Obama administration, the United States resumed its role as
leader in international climate politics. Because the engagement of major
emitters such as China and India was deemed crucial to agreeing upon a new
international climate agreement, Barack Obama’s climate diplomacy focused
on obtaining their buy-in before the UN Climate Change Conference in Paris
in 2015. US–Chinese cooperation in efforts towards mitigating climate change
indeed improved dramatically after the bilateral meeting of President Obama
and President Xi Jinping in 2013, as the U.S.–China Joint Announcement on
Climate Change (2014) and U.S.–China Joint Presidential Statement on
Climate Change (2015, 2016) demonstrate. A shared understanding of the
climate responsibility of great powers began to evolve, as Obama (2014)
explicitly acknowledged. Moreover, China’s special envoy Zhang Gaoli (2014)
declared at the UN Climate Summit that ‘responding to climate change is
what China needs to do to achieve sustainable development at home as well
as to fulfil its due international obligation as a responsible major country’. At
APEC in 2014, Xi (2014) also announced that as ‘its overall national strength
grows, China will be both capable and willing to provide more public goods
for the Asia-Pacific and the world’. Although Xi did not specify what he
meant by ‘public goods’, clean air is a typical example of goods that everyone
can consume without decreasing its availability to others. Indeed, a few days
later, Xi and Obama announced a historic joint climate statement in which
China pledged to stem the rise of its CO2 emissions by 2030 (White House
2014), meaning that China would no longer focus on reducing relative carbon
intensity but instead lower its absolute emissions. The joint statement sent a
strong signal to international society that both the United States and China
acknowledged their responsibility to lead international efforts against climate
change and that an international climate treaty was possible in Paris the
following year.
In preparation for the Paris conference, the UNFCCC Secretariat and
France worked tirelessly on the diplomatic front to ensure its success. To
manage the expectations of governments around the world, for instance,
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France stationed a climate change representative in all its embassies in major
countries worldwide. The role of non-state actors was also crucial to paving
the way for global agreement (Bailey & Tomlinson 2016, 2). The result of
years of diplomacy, the Paris Agreement, adopted at COP21 in Paris in 2015
and now in effect, declares that states ‘aim to reach global peaking of green-
house gas emissions as soon as possible … and to undertake rapid reductions
thereafter in accordance with best available science, so as to achieve a balance
between anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by sinks of green-
house gases in the second half of this century’ (UNFCCC 2015a). Although
ultimately agreeing to strive for a carbon-neutral world, states debated that
long-term goal of climate responsibility at considerable length. Eventually, the
Paris Agreement came to limit ‘the increase in the global average temperature
to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels and to pursue efforts to limit the
temperature increase to 1.5 °C above pre-industrial levels’ (ibid.), which
would significantly reduce the risks and impacts of climate change. Although
the goal of 1.5 °C was exalted, many analysts and NGOs did not believe that
it was realistic because the Paris Agreement would lack measures effective
enough to achieve it or even the 2°C goal. Since COP21 acknowledged that
INDCs were insufficiently ambitious to limit the rise of global temperatures
to 2°C, the Paris Agreement requires states to submit revised, increasingly
ambitious INDCs by 2020 and every five years afterwards. COP21 also
requested the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change to produce a
report in 2018 to map how a global temperature increase could be limited to
1.5°C above pre-industrial levels (ibid.).
Although the Paris Agreement no longer classifies states into Annex I and
non-Annex I countries, it is guided by CBDR and articulates that developed
countries ‘should continue taking the lead by undertaking economy-wide
absolute emission reduction targets’. Nevertheless, it also establishes a
common framework for universal climate responsibility, in which it maintains
that developing countries ‘should continue enhancing their mitigation efforts,
and are encouraged to move over time towards economy-wide emission
reduction or limitation targets in the light of different national circumstances’.
It adds moreover that developing countries need assistance to implement their
national climate action plans and that their emissions peaks may come later
than those of developed countries (UNFCCC 2015a, all italics added). China
vigorously supported the last clause and with other BASIC countries and the
Like-Minded Developing Countries on Climate Change (e.g. Argentina,
Bolivia, China, Cuba, El Salvador, Ecuador, Iran, Nicaragua, Venezuela,
Malaysia, Vietnam, Saudi Arabia and India) resisted legally binding emis-
sions reductions for developing countries. In particular, both groups con-
ceived no sub-categories between developed and developing countries, which
would weaken their position in international climate negotiations. Never-
theless, China currently no longer focuses solely on the historically informed
responsibility of developed countries, as Xi (2015) demonstrated in his speech
to COP21 by calling for all states to ‘assume more shared responsibilities for
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win–win outcomes’. Overall, China undoubtedly played a highly constructive
role at the Paris Conference, and for the first time, China’s head of state
instead of its premier not only participated in international climate negotia-
tions but also portrayed China as a determined facilitator of international
climate agreement. After the conference, China’s foreign ministry spokes-
person Hong Lei (2015) congratulated ‘China’s sense of responsibility as a
major country in tackling climate change’.
Despite some shortcomings – the greatest being its lack of additional miti-
gation contributions that would make achieving the long-term goal of limit-
ing the rise of global temperatures to 2°C realistic – the Paris Agreement can
be praised as a historic milestone for international norm of climate responsi-
bility. As an international treaty, it obliges the states that ratify it, and though
it sets no quantitative, legally binding emissions reduction obligations for any
party, nor sanctions if they fail to realise their voluntary climate strategies,
optimism after the conference about states’ ability to fulfil their mitigation
commitments was high. Perhaps the Paris Agreement’s greatest strength is
that it does not assign top-down obligations; on the contrary, parties to the
treaty can develop voluntary, domestically appropriated mitigation plans. Its
bottom-up approach thus attracted the nearly universal participation of
states, which indicates not only global concern for climate change but a strong
political will to combat it as well. Without a doubt, COP21 marked a crucial
turning point in climate responsibility, and it now seems that climate respon-
sibility has become an institutionalised international norm currently
approaching a stage of assimilation (cf. Holsti 2004, 144–145).
China and post-Paris climate negotiations
The Paris Agreement entered into force in on 4 November 2016. More than
the required 55 countries representing 55 per cent of global GHG emissions
ratified the agreement in less than a year, which made it one of the fastest
international agreements to ever take effect. Notably, China was among the
first countries to ratify the Paris Agreement in September 2016, a decision
that it publicised in a joint press conference with the United States that
clearly accelerated the willingness of other states to ratify as well. Since the
Paris Agreement created a global framework only of what states should do to
limit temperature increases but not how they could meet that goal, COP22 in
2016 decided to adopt the so-called Paris Rulebook by 2018. Although the
task was never an easy one, on the second day of COP22 the future of nego-
tiations suddenly became even more challenging as climate sceptic Donald J.
Trump was elected US president on 8 November 2016. Trump’s election
raised serious concerns worldwide over the US commitment to the Paris
Agreement, for he had repeatedly threatened that the United States would
withdraw.
Fears that Trump would vitiate the climate policies put in place by the
Obama administration elevated China to a new role of leadership in
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international climate politics. China quickly responded to those expectations
by declaring several times that it would not dilute its climate commitments
despite a potential US withdrawal from the Paris Agreement (e.g. China
Daily 2016). Although China has typically avoided intervening in other states’
internal issues, including their elections, China’s chief negotiator at the Paris
Agreement, Xie Zhenhua, issued a rare comment on presidential candidate
Trump’s plan to abandon the Paris Agreement: a ‘wise political leader should
take policy stances that conform with global trends’ (Wong 2016). Quickly
after Trump’s election, the deputy head of the Chinese climate delegation,
Gou Haibo, assured the world that China would not ‘change its stance on
climate change’ even if the United States withdrew from the Paris Agreement
(China Daily 2016). Moreover, in his famous statement at the 2017 World
Economic Forum in Davos, President Xi stated that ‘[a]ll signatories should
stick to [the Paris Agreement] instead of walking away from it as this is a
responsibility we must assume for future generations’ (World Economic
Forum 2017). Likewise, Xi’s (2017a) speech at the UN Office at Geneva
clarified to the world in general and to President Trump in particular that
China would not dilute its commitment to the Paris Agreement. In March
2017, Chinese foreign ministry spokesman Lu Kang reportedly vowed, ‘No
matter how other countries’ policies on climate change change, as a respon-
sible large developing country, China’s resolve, aims and policy moves in
dealing with climate change will not change’ (Reuters 2017).
In June 2017, Trump indeed signed an executive order to withdraw the
United States from the Paris Agreement (White House 2017), which political
leaders and non-state actors worldwide harshly criticised. Although Chinese
representatives may not have used exceptionally strong words, they unequi-
vocally condemned Trump’s decision. Yet, Chinese leaders did not make offi-
cial comments to illustrate how China would strengthen its role in
international climate politics, although various commentators around the
world seemed to expect China to fulfil the vacuum of leadership created by
the United States. In general, China seemed to respond positively to the new
expectations and, for instance, pledged to increase cooperation with the Eur-
opean Union in efforts to mitigate climate change. Amid such expectations,
however, the European Union and China failed to issue a formal climate
statement due to disagreements in trade politics in spring 2017. Nevertheless,
China, the European Union and Canada held the first Ministerial on Climate
Action in Montréal, Canada, in September 2017. Representatives of 34 states
pursued momentum for the full implementation of the Paris Agreement and
acknowledged the importance of the pre-2020 climate commitments of
developed countries, an issue which would form a pivotal part of the COP
decision in Bonn later (Ministerial Meeting on Climate Action Co-Chairs
Summary 2017).
President Xi’s speech to the 19th Chinese Communist Party Congress in
October 2017 dispelled all doubts about China’s willingness to lead interna-
tional efforts against climate change. In his oft-quoted statement, Xi (2017b)
Debate over climate responsibility 111
declared, ‘Taking a driving seat in international cooperation to respond to
climate change, China has become an important participant, contributor, and
torchbearer in the global endeavor for ecological civilization’. Although Xi
(2017b) did not mention Trump by name, he nevertheless clearly signalled to
his administration that ‘[n]o country can address alone the many challenges
facing mankind; no country can afford to retreat into self-isolation’. Despite
Xi’s strong statement concerning China’s climate leadership – altogether rare
for the president – he did not specify whether China would strengthen its cli-
mate commitments or, if so, then how. By extension, China did not represent
itself as a leader in that sense at the UN Climate Change Conference in Bonn
the following month. By contrast, together with the Like-Minded Countries
and BASIC, China resumed its pursuit of the division of developed and
developing countries that the Paris Agreement had abandoned. In response, a
senior Chinese climate negotiator reportedly said, ‘Although we heard some
different views from the developed world that we’re entering into a new world
without differentiation among developing and developed countries, I think
that is not the truth’ (Mathiesen & Li 2017).
Prior to COP23 in Bonn, both the UNEP and the World Meteorological
Organization (2017) published worrying reports on the future of climate
change. Above all, the reports indicated, without rapid cuts in global GHG
emissions, the goal of the Paris Agreement would be impossible to achieve
and a dangerous temperature hike of at least 3°C by 2100 is likely (UNEP
2017). However, neither the reports nor the fact that negotiations were
chaired for the first time by a small island state, Fiji, spurred much-needed
action in international climate negotiations. Nevertheless, on the second day
of the conference, Syria announced it would sign the Paris Agreement,
thereby making the United States the only nation in the world not party to
the agreement. Since the United States cannot formally withdraw from the
pact until 2020, it sent to Bonn a delegation consisting largely of the same
diplomats who had represented the United States during previous rounds of
negotiation. In general, the US approach demonstrated significant con-
tingency. As before, the US priority was to oppose the division of developed
and developing states, and the European Union fully supported its opposi-
tion. In addition to the official US delegation, the shadow delegation, We’re
Still In, representing US coalitions of states, cities and businesses opposed to
Trump’s anti-climate policy, launched America’s Pledge to demonstrate that
their coalition represents more than half of the US economy and that they
should thus receive a seat at the negotiation table (Neslen 2017). Taken toge-
ther, it indeed seems that limiting global temperature rise increasingly
depends on the effective mitigating actions of non-state actors.
Although the Paris Agreement applies to the post-2020 era, China and
other developing countries demanded that the COP23 agenda should formally
discuss developed countries’ pre-2020 climate commitments that they failed to
implement. In particular, developed countries have failed to provide develop-
ing countries with USD 100 billion annually by 2020 as agreed upon at
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COP15; moreover, the second term of the Kyoto Protocol has not entered
into force because not enough countries have ratified it. Despite the decision
to exclude pre-2020 actions in the Paris Rulebook, a major part of COP23
focused on pre-2020 implementations and ambitions. Importantly, it was
decided that the UNFCCC would host additional stocktaking sessions in
2018 and 2019 in order to assess progress in emissions reduction as well as
climate finance flows in 2018 and 2020. Such a decision resulted largely from
China’s climate diplomacy and indicates that China will likely be increasingly
assertive in international climate negotiations.
General climate responsibilities
Henry Shue’s (1993) dichotomy between the general responsibilities of all
states and the special responsibilities of states with greater capabilities plays
an important part in defining and distributing climate responsibility under the
UNFCCC (1992), which acknowledges that ‘change in the Earth’s climate
and its adverse effects are a common concern of humankind’. Although
developing countries have repeatedly expressed reservations about accepting
‘common responsibility’ (Porras 1993, 28), the UNFCCC (1992) assigns gen-
eral responsibilities to all parties and lists the foremost duty of each to be
fulfilling the solidarist, intergenerational responsibility to ‘protect the climate
system for the benefit of present and future generations of humankind’. Other
notable general duties include cooperation, because ‘the global nature of cli-
mate change calls for the widest possible cooperation by all countries and
their participation in an effective and appropriate international response’, and
a commitment to ‘take precautionary measures to anticipate, prevent or
minimize the causes of climate change and mitigate its adverse effects’ (ibid.).
However, those general responsibilities are limited by the principle of CBDR.
Moreover, each party needs to provide information about anthropocentric
GHG emissions by source and the removal of sinks, and states have to
develop national climate programmes and collaborate in science, education
and training, among other fields, in order to enhance the global capacity to
mitigate and adapt to climate change. Notably, the UNFCCC considers sus-
tainable development to be both a right and a responsibility of parties and
ties climate responsibility to development goals by declaring that states ‘have
a right to, and should, promote sustainable development’ (ibid.). However,
because binding emissions reduction targets would impede the development-
oriented objectives of developing countries, Article 3 of the UNFCCC not
only highlights the historically informed responsibility of developed countries
but also hints that developing ones have a right to increase their GHG emis-
sions if such increase stems from efforts that have improved the living stan-
dards of the poor. Last, the UNFCCC also confirms that the right to
sovereignty is a significant norm in international climate politics.
Largely due to US insistence, international climate negotiations have
debated all states’ general climate responsibilities at length. At UNCED,
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China strictly opposed the proposition that protecting the climate is a ‘global
issue of common responsibility for all states in an indiscriminate manner’
(Gao 2001, 281). Together with the G77, China resisted the idea of the policy
review of a state’s national development strategies and policies, which it
viewed as undue interference with the internal affairs of states. As discussed
earlier, China compromised on its previous position at the 2007 UN Con-
ference on Climate Change in Bali, at which it and other developing countries
committed themselves to implement NAMAs. Such commitment marked an
important change in the global distribution of climate responsibility, which no
longer fell exclusively to developed countries but became a general responsi-
bility of all states. Many developing countries submitted their NAMAs by
2012, and many indeed pledged to undertake action comparable to or even
more ambitious than those of developed countries (e.g. Held, Roger & Nag
2013). Another sign of the erosion of the former distinction of developed and
developing countries came with the Paris Agreement, which establishes a fra-
mework of transparency with a common binding commitment for all states to
submit a ‘national inventory report of anthropogenic emissions by sources and
removals by sinks of greenhouse gases’ and to provide information ‘necessary
to track progress made in implementing and achieving’ their national nation-
ally determined mitigation and adaptation goals (UNFCCC 2015a). Reaching
such an agreement required China, which had previously regarded reporting
obligations as a violation of its sovereignty, to compromise.
In addition to mitigating climate change, adapting to it plays an important
role in climate politics. Apart from developed countries’ special responsibility
to provide developing countries with the funding, equipment and know-how
necessary to adapt to climate change, adaptation has not been a highly con-
tested issue in international climate negotiations. Previously, adaptation was
not discussed at length in international climate negotiations because doing so
would have been viewed as avoiding the responsibility to reduce emissions.
The UNFCCC (1992) does not clearly define adaptation but acknowledges
that all states have a general responsibility to ‘take precautionary measures to
anticipate, prevent or minimize the causes of climate change and mitigate its
adverse effects’. However, it is becoming increasingly clear that states have
failed to prevent climate change, and the climate system continues to change
regardless of states’ actions. Even if a highly ambitious global treaty is
reached, climate change will continue to pose significant threats to human
security by, for example, increasing the frequency and intensity of extreme
weather events, enhancing the spread of infectious diseases and harming food
production. Therefore, adaptation has now attracted greater attention from
politicians and academics alike. In particular, an extensive body of literature
addresses resilience, a concept which social scientists have adopted from
ecology and other fields in the natural sciences. Nevertheless, there is no
common understanding of what sort of concrete policies and actions adapta-
tion should involve. Due to countries’ diverse national circumstances such as
their geographical, demographic and socio-economic characteristics, the risks
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posed by climate change vary from country to country, and the potential for
and reasonable means of adaptation are therefore diverse as well. When
defining adaptation, Barry Smit et al. (2000) suggest considering at least four
dimensions: what needs to be adapted to, who or what needs to adapt, how
that adaptation should transpire and, ultimately, the extent to which the
adaptation is good or appropriate. In general, adaptation can be proactive or
reactive, although it invariably includes, for example, the risk assessments of
health, food security, agricultural, environmental, economic and disaster
management as well as strategies to alleviate and respond to those risks.
Ultimately, adaptation is a domestic matter, and responsibility for developing
and implementing national adaptation plans falls to the governments of
states. In short, adaptation can thus be viewed as the general national
responsibility of all states.
Special climate responsibilities
According to the UNFCCC, CBDR stands as a cornerstone of international
climate responsibility by holding that developed countries have special
responsibility to respond to climate change. Although developed countries
have not caused climate change intentionally, their means of industrialisation
have made them affluent at the expense of a clean environment and impo-
verished developing countries in the process. Developing countries not only
suffer from the impacts of climate change but also lack sufficient resources to
contribute to mitigating climate change. Developed countries therefore have a
greater responsibility to help developing countries to meet basic standards of
living, as well as a positive responsibility not only to reduce emissions but
also to support developing countries’ efforts to cope with climate change.
Although developed countries generally accept CBDR, their agreement on
their special responsibilities related to climate change remains complicated. In
particular, developed states have disputed two issues: how much emissions the
United States and other industrialised countries should be ordered to cut and
how much (financial) assistance developed countries should offer developing
countries in order to increase their capabilities to respond to climate change.
Doubtlessly, ambitious emissions reductions are the most essential aspect of
climate responsibility; if no effective action is taken, then the climate will
change at an increasingly rapid rate. Although the UNFCCC acknowledged
that dynamic, it did not set quantitative emissions reductions requirements for
any party due to US refusal to accept an emissions reduction target. In
accordance with CBDR, the UNFCCC (1992) stated that developed coun-
tries have to take the ‘lead in combating climate change and the adverse
effects thereof ’ and that Annex I countries in particular should ‘adopt
national policies and take corresponding measures on the mitigation of cli-
mate change, by limiting its anthropogenic emissions of GHGs and protecting
and enhancing its greenhouse gas sinks and reservoirs’. However, it did not
require any country to achieve that target. The Kyoto Protocol, however, put
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CBDR into practice. In contrast to the UNFCCC, which encourages devel-
oped countries to decrease their emissions, the Kyoto Protocol set quantitative
requirements for them and ordered developed countries to cut their overall
GHG emissions by 5 per cent compared to 1990 levels during the first five-
year period (i.e. 2008–2012).
CBDR and the unambitious notions of climate responsibility promoted by
the United States dominated post-Kyoto climate negotiations as well. The
George W. Bush administration pursued the replacement of CBDRwith a so-
called ‘mutual-burden sharing’ approach that denied the historically informed
responsibility of developed countries and focused instead on reducing future
emissions intensity via technological innovation (Bukovansky et al. 2012,
144). By contrast, China opposed any emissions reduction targets for devel-
oping countries and emphasised the differences between the luxury emissions
of developed countries and the survival emissions of developing ones. Fol-
lowing the US presidential election of Barack Obama in 2008, new hopes for
greater US climate responsibility were aroused. Unlike the Bush administra-
tion, the Obama administration acknowledged the special climate responsi-
bilities of the United States based on historically informed responsibility and
material capabilities (e.g. Obama 2014; Obama 2015). However, Obama’s
commitments did not translate into sufficiently ambitious domestic climate
policies. In particular, due to resistance in the US Congress, the United States
could not commit to a legally binding emissions reduction target at the Paris
Conference in 2015. Therefore, the Paris Agreement does not specify a legally
binding emissions reduction target for any state but is based on states’
voluntary, nationally determined contributions instead.
Although CBDR maintains that developed countries have a special
responsibility to assist developing ones to respond to climate change, imple-
menting that responsibility has been disputed for decades. As Robert Jackson
(1996, 185–186) indicates, CBDR was nevertheless a ‘significant step in the
development of normative international relations’ because the special
responsibility was not characterised as ‘aid’ but as a ‘responsibility’. In effect,
technology transfer and other assistance cannot be regarded as charity
because ‘everyone, including developed countries, will benefit from such
transfers’ (ibid). In practice, the UNFCCC (1992) urged developed countries
to provide developing ones with ‘new and additional financial resources’ and
technology transfer to respond to climate change. It acknowledged:
The extent to which developing country Parties will effectively implement
their commitments under the Convention will depend on the effective
implementation by developed country Parties of their commitments
under the Convention related to financial resources and transfer of tech-
nology and will take fully into account that economic and social devel-
opment and poverty eradication are the first and overriding priorities of
the developing country Parties.
(UNFCCC 1992)
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This paragraph has formed a cornerstone of China’s position on international
climate negotiations. Over the years, states have established various financial
mechanisms to coordinate and implement the special responsibility of devel-
oped countries to assist policies for mitigating climate change and the actions
of developing countries. As a case in point, the UNFCCC established a
financial mechanism to offer funds to developing countries; initially, such
assistance was channelled through the Global Environmental Facility, either
directly or through two climate funds, the Least Developed Country Fund
and the Special Climate Change Fund. Later, the Adaptation Fund was
established in 2001 in order to aid developing countries of the Kyoto Protocol
to finance their concrete adaptation projects. At the 2009 UN Conference of
Climate Change in Copenhagen, developed countries made significant deci-
sions on climate finance. Furthermore, held in Cancún in 2010, COP16
established the Green Climate Fund and adopted many other concrete insti-
tution-building decisions related to adaptation (i.e. the Cancun Adaptation
Framework), technology (i.e. the Technology Mechanism) and forests (i.e.
REDD+), for instance. On the one hand, UN climate funds have helped
developing countries to begin to meet the challenges posed by climate change
(Nakhooda & Norman 2014), although developed countries have not yet
fulfilled their promises of additional resources. On the other, many bilateral
and multilateral funds, including the Climate Investment Funds, have also
been established as a result of growing disaffection with UN funds, as a list
provided by the UNFCCC (2011) shows.
China has criticised international climate negotiations for overly focusing
on mitigating climate change and paying too little attention to efforts to
adapt to it and thus failing to ‘meet the actual needs of developing countries,
in particular the least developed countries and small island countries’
(National Development and Reform Commission 2008). Since adaptation is
‘an essential component in the framework of sustainable development to
address climate change’, China demands that developed countries provide
developing countries with the technological and financial support to develop
their adaptation capacity (ibid.).
The Paris Agreement requires developed countries to ‘provide financial
resources to assist developing country Parties with respect to both mitigation
and adaptation’ (UNFCCC 2015a). Such funds can be mobilised ‘from a
wide variety of sources, instruments and channels, noting the significant role
of public funds’ and the ‘mobilization of climate finance should represent a
progression beyond previous efforts’ (ibid.). However, the agreement does not
pinpoint how much funding developed countries should provide because such
a binding commitment would require approval from the US Congress.
Nevertheless, countries at COP21 decided that in addition to the current goal
of an annual USD 100 billion, developed countries will extend their financial
assistance with a so-called ‘new collective quantified goal’ for the period after
2025 (ibid.), by which funds will be allocated through the UNFCCC’s
Financial Mechanism.
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In addition to developed countries’ special responsibility to assist develop-
ing countries to mitigate GHG emissions and adapt to climate change,
developing countries have increasingly urged them to also bear a third sort of
special responsibility: compensation for the losses and damage that climate
change causes in developing countries in general and small island states in
particular. Such efforts recall the ambitious objectives of the UNCHE to
develop a compensation framework for environmental harm. The Rio Con-
ference, unfortunately, diluted the original idea; although it promoted ‘expe-
ditious’ international cooperation in developing ‘international law regarding
liability and compensation for adverse effects of environmental damage’ (Rio
Declaration on Environment and Development 1992), it subordinated liability
and compensation to states’ national legislation. According to the Rio
Declaration (1992), ‘States shall develop national law regarding liability and
compensation for the victims of pollution and other environmental damage.’
Likewise, the International Law Commission issued preventative rules to
prevent transboundary environmental damage in 1999, which differs starkly
from the original idea of rules regarding liability to facilitate compensation
for victims of environmental damage (Koivurova 2014, 175). Partly in
response, the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage asso-
ciated with Climate Change Impacts (i.e. Loss and Damage Mechanism) was
established in 2013 to enhance ‘knowledge and understanding of comprehen-
sive risk management approaches to address loss and damage associated
with the adverse effects of climate change, including slow onset impacts’
(UNFCCC 2014).
As a result of intensive debate, loss and damage won its own article in the
Paris Agreement. Notably, parties at COP21 requested that the Loss and
Damage Mechanism not only ‘establish a clearinghouse for risk transfer that
serves as a repository for information on insurance and risk transfer’ but also
‘develop recommendations for integrated approaches to avert, minimise and
address displacement related to the adverse impacts of climate change’
(UNFCCC 2015a). In so doing, the parties acknowledged a special responsi-
bility particularly important to realising international justice: that developed
countries have a moral duty to assist developing countries to manage, for
example, damages caused by floods and extreme weather events. That
responsibility is an altruistic one, for developed countries themselves do not
benefit from such assistance. Essentially, loss and damage assistance therefore
differs from mitigation and adaptation assistance, which also advances devel-
oped countries’ interests in terms of global emissions reductions and the
creation of business opportunities, among other ends. Nevertheless, since
parties at COP21 noted in response to US demands that the ratification of the
Paris Agreement would not ‘involve or provide a basis for any liability or
compensation’ (ibid.), the principle of no harm has persisted as the critical
rule for climate change damage, one that applies to all states, even though
CBDR continues to underscore the enhanced capacities of developed coun-
tries to prevent environmental harm in practice (Voigt 2008, 17).
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The UNFCCC has not articulated the special responsibilities for great
powers but such responsibilities have been assigned to developed countries in
general. However, that situation does not mean that all developed states are
expected to shoulder similar responsibilities in practice. Small developed
countries such as Portugal and Cyprus are not under the same pressure as the
United States or the United Kingdom to take action, largely given their dif-
ferentiated material capabilities and national circumstances, and that differ-
ence has indeed been a major question in the negotiations process
(Bukovansky et al. 2012, 131). Another reason is that great powers are
expected to play the role of leader in global governance, meaning that, whe-
ther or not climate change is governed in the UN Security Council, great
powers have a responsibility to lead global efforts to combat climate change.
Accordingly, the United States has the greatest responsibility to lead,
although China cannot avoid its own level of global responsibility. In 2013,
the two countries indeed recognised the important role of US–Chinese climate
cooperation as a ‘powerful example that can inspire the world’ (White House
2013). In September 2014, President Obama (2014) linked climate responsi-
bility and great power status by declaring that the United States and China
‘have a special responsibility to lead’ international action to mitigate climate
change because that is ‘what big nations have to do’. However, the recogni-
tion of great powers’ special climate responsibility has not transformed into
the acceptance of legally binding emissions reductions targets within the
UNFCCC, largely because both China and the United States have resisted
legal obligations and emphasised nationally determined climate strategies
instead.
The special climate responsibilities of developed countries are not accom-
panied by corresponding special rights or privileges, nor do great powers have
any privileges under the UNFCCC. That dynamic likely explains in part why
the United States, which normally joins international treaties in case they
include exemptions, failed to ratify the Kyoto Protocol (Chalecki 2009, 152).
Flexible mechanisms, established three years after CBDRwas accepted in Rio
(Bukovansky et al. 2012, 130), undoubtedly facilitate the execution of the
special climate responsibilities of developed countries; however, they can
hardly be viewed as privileges.
Great climate power clubs
The UNFCCC is not the only forum for defining and institutionalising cli-
mate responsibility. Because multilateral climate negotiations have been trou-
blesome and proceeded at a crawl, many observers have suggested that they
should be replaced with so-called ‘minilateralism’ (cf. Falkner 2015). As
Moisés Naím (2009, 135) suggests, parties ‘should bring to the table the
smallest possible number of countries needed to have the largest possible
impact on solving a particular problem’. For climate negotiations, mini-
lateralism would mean smaller forums of major emitters only. Naím proposes
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that 20 is the ‘magic number’ because 20 major polluter states account for 75
per cent of the world’s GHG emissions (ibid.). Such intergovernmental
forums representing the world’s major emitters have been established over the
years and include the Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and
Climate (APP) and the Major Economies Forum on Energy and Climate
(MEF), for instance.
Dissatisfied with the Kyoto Protocol, in 2006 President George W. Bush
initiated APP, in which a pro-market coalition of Australia, Canada, China,
India, Japan, South Korea and the United States worked ‘to meet goals for
energy security, national air pollution reduction, and climate change in ways
that promote sustainable economic growth and poverty reduction’ and
‘focused on expanding investment and trade in cleaner energy technologies,
goods and services in key market sectors’ (Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean
Development and Climate 2011). Consequently, APP focused on reducing
future emissions intensity by way of technological innovation and transfer
and did not bother addressing ‘questions of equity, historical responsibility,
capabilities, or the ethical implication of cumulative per capita emissions’
(Bukovansky et al. 2012, 143–144). Completed in 2011, APP’s win–win
approach did not require significant costs or other sacrifices from any party,
and participation did not pose any risk, either.
MEF, initiated by President Obama and launched on 28 March 2009, did
not attempt to replace the UNFCCC but aimed at spurring UN negotiations
in Copenhagen. In particular, it intended to facilitate a candid dialogue
among major developed and developing economies, help to generate the
political leadership necessary to achieve a successful outcome at the annual
UN climate negotiations and advance the exploration of concrete initiatives
and joint ventures to increase the supply of clean energy while reducing GHG
emissions. The 17 participants of MEF have included Australia, Brazil,
Canada, China, the European Union, France, Germany, India, Indonesia,
Italy, Japan, Korea, Mexico, Russia, South Africa, the United Kingdom and
the United States (Major Economies Forum on Energy and Climate 2015).
During the Trump administration, however, no new MEF meeting has been
scheduled.
In line with its growing global role, China has established its own clubs in
international politics. Many of those organisations and mechanisms run par-
allel to their US-led counterparts (e.g. BRICS vs. the G8 and the Shanghai
Cooperation Organisation vs. the North Atlantic Treaty Organization). Var-
ious Chinese initiatives have addressed climate change and put forward pro-
posals to enhance green development. At the first One Belt, One Road forum
in Beijing in 2017, for instance, President Xi (2017c) pledged to establish an
‘international coalition for green development on the Belt and Road’ and to
‘provide support to related countries in adapting to climate change’. In prac-
tice, however, the Belt and Road concentrates on infrastructure and fossil fuel
energy projects, and its impacts on climate change are likely to be negative.
By contrast, China’s collaboration with the European Union and Canada
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under the Ministerial on Climate Action may pave the way for the emergence
of a new type of great climate power club.
Despite their potential to increase the willingness and capacity of major
emitters to reduce emissions, minilateral forums can be criticised from an ethical
perspective. Above all, they do not consider the viewpoints of developing coun-
tries, which are most vulnerable to the effects of climate change. In response,
Robyn Eckersley (2012) has proposed embracing inclusive minilateralism in the
form of a global climate council. Procedurally, such a council would be based on
common but differentiated representation by the most capable (i.e. leading
industrialised countries), the most responsible (i.e. the greatest emitters of his-
torical, aggregate and forecasted GHG emissions) and the most vulnerable (i.e.
developing countries that suffer the most from climate change and have the least
capacity to respond). All three groups would be included in a council composed
of the United States, the European Union, China, India, Russia, Japan, Brazil,
South Korea, Mexico plus representatives of the Alliance of Small Island States,
the African Group and the Least Developed Countries. That group of 12 would
represent approximately 70 per cent of all emissions worldwide and roughly 70
per cent of the world’s population (Eckersley 2012, 35–36). Such a composition,
however, would wholly exclude civil society, whose role in environmental nego-
tiations has been essential. Environmental NGOs, for example, have played a
critical role in identifying issues, setting agendas, facilitating education and
communication about the environment, formatting policy, democratising envir-
onmental decision making, pursuing normative development, organising poli-
tical pressure for states, international organisations and companies and
monitoring the implementation of environmental standards.
From the perspective of climate responsibility, there is no univocal argu-
ment either for or against minilateralism in climate negotiations. On the one
hand, minilateralism could enhance political dialogue, identify new solutions
to climate governance and help to more explicitly define the special responsi-
bilities of participants of a climate power club, even if such a club would
motivate or pressure participants to take more ambitious action to reduce
emissions. On the other, minilateral groups would not generate the much-
needed political will to reduce emissions globally. In particular, they erode the
legitimacy of the UNFCCC and would not encourage cosmopolitan climate
responsibility. Therefore, minilateral clubs would work best when made com-
plementary to multilateral climate practices.
Conclusion
Whether or not China was prepared, Donald Trump’s election as US pre-
sident rapidly changed China’s role in international climate politics. Above
all, the world began to expect China to shoulder increasingly more responsi-
bility to mitigate climate change. However, international expectations of
China’s leadership could prove to be overly optimistic, and as a result, no
state could assume leadership in international climate politics. Nevertheless,
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China has convinced the world that it will uphold the Paris Agreement, and
from a pluralist perspective, China no doubt aims to fulfil its responsibility to
uphold international law. Despite the content of speeches delivered by its
leaders, China has not signalled that its approach to international climate
negotiations will be more solidarist than before, despite that approach being
necessary to spurring more ambitious emissions reduction pledges required to
meet the goals of the Paris Agreement around the world. If China uses its
increasing leverage in international climate politics to restore explicit bifur-
cation in the Paris Rulebook, then a remarkably troublesome future for
international climate negotiations during the next few years is in store. At the
same time, Trump’s decision to withdraw from the Paris Agreement opened
up possibilities for other sorts of global leadership that could be far more
solidarist than ever before: the emergence of the We’re Still In coalition in
2017 indicates the growing role of non-state actors in international relations,
which, in turn, raises the question of whether non-state actors could intervene
and perform climate responsibility instead of states, whose negotiations have
proven to be insufficiently effective. For the English School, that possibility
raises other interesting questions about institutional change and the role of
civil society actors in international society.
Notes
1 For comprehensive accounts of the development of climate regime, see Yamin and
Depledge (2004) and Schiele (2014), and for developments of international envir-
onmental law, see Bodansky (2010) and Koivurova (2014).
2 According to Caldwell (1990, 41), the first important conferences included the
International Congress for the Protection of Nature in Paris in 1909, the Interna-
tional Congress on the Protection of Flora, Fauna, and Natural Sites and Monu-
ments in Paris in 1923, the International Congress for Study and Protection of Birds
in Geneva in 1927 and the Second International Congress for the Protection of
Nature in Paris in 1931.
3 Such conferences included the UN World Food Conference in 1974, the UN Water
Conference in 1976 and the UN Desertification Conference in 1977, all of which
identified climate change as a central concern.
4 Participants agreed that the Kyoto Protocol would enter into force when at least 55
countries representing at least 55% of greenhouse gas emissions produced by
developed countries ratified it.
5 See, for example, Vihma, Mulugetta and Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen (2011) for develop-
ing countries’ role in international climate negotiations and Hallding et al. (2011)
for the cooperation of emerging powers in efforts to mitigate climate change.
6 For a summary of all INDCs, see UNFCCC (2015b) and www.carbon-pulse.com/
indcs/.
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6 The fulfilment of China’s climate
responsibility
Responsibility must be demonstrated by action. It is not enough to discuss
climate responsibility; on the contrary, such responsibility must be acted upon
by formulating and implementing ambitious climate policies at the domestic
level. In this chapter, I investigate the ways in which China plans to fulfil it
climate responsibility in practice. Because climate policy cannot be viewed as
somehow unrelated to states’ overall policies and goals, I also elaborate upon
how the Chinese government’s grand strategy to develop China as a strong,
prosperous and modern socialist country shapes its domestic climate policies.
I begin by examining drivers of China’s climate policy because such factors
indicate the extent of the Chinese government’s commitment to take action
against climate change as well as to adapt to such change. Later, I review
China’s international climate commitments under the United Nations Fra-
mework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the ways by which
China has proposed to uphold those commitments by implementing, for
instance, low-carbon development plans and energy policies.
Drivers of China’s climate policy
As discussed in chapter 2, three drivers motivate states to participate in
international practices: coercion, calculations and identity and belief (Buzan
2004, 103, 130–133, 253–261; Hurd 1999; Hurd 2007, 30–40; Hurrell 2007,
67–77; Wendt 1999, 247–250). The ways in which states adopt new norms
and practices influence how profoundly, if at all, states incorporate them into
their identities. In the case of coercion, norms are only superficially inter-
nalised or incorporated into a state’s identity, and the state is therefore unli-
kely to assume the responsibilities required by the corresponding practices.
Calculations of self-interest cannot sufficiently motivate the fulfilment of
responsibilities either; they are unlikely to cause profound changes in an
actor’s preferences and values, and social practices relying on self-interest
necessarily have weak foundations. Conversely, if states that engage in an
international practice believe that the practice is legitimate, then they become
willing to shoulder their fair share of responsibility to implement the norm.
The perceived legitimacy of norms and practices is thus an essential driver of
assuming responsibility. In reality, however, that typology can seem imprac-
tical; after all, all three reasons motivate human conduct and are often diffi-
cult to differentiate. As Buzan (2004, 130) concludes, the combination of the
three reasons therefore makes politics what it is. Accordingly, in this section I
elaborate upon the underlying motives of China’s climate policies and ask to
what extent those policies respond to external pressure, calculations of self-
interest or identity and belief. Ultimately, the results can clarify what sort of
responsibility China will be willing and able to shoulder in international cli-
mate politics, as well as how it will enact that responsibility, if at all.
Coercion and regulation
As a driver of state practices, coercion does not play an important role in
international climate politics. Participation in international climate negotia-
tions is voluntary, and international treaties on climate change do not have
legal status strong enough to coerce states to take certain actions to mitigate
climate change. When entering into any international treaty, including one
concerning climate change, a state is expected to comply with the treaty’s
regulations, although no sanctions follow if it fails to meet those expectations.
For China, international climate treaties do not impose obligations that could
somehow be viewed as having coercive force on its conduct. When the Kyoto
Protocol set quantitative emissions reduction targets for developed countries
only, China had no obligation to cut emissions. Moreover, because the Paris
Agreement is based on states’ voluntary commitments to reduce emissions,
China has thus been able to independently set its own national targets.
Although social pressure can be somewhat characterised as playing a coercive
role in inter-state relations, international criticism of China’s climate irre-
sponsibility has not forced China’s government to alter its attitude towards
climate politics. However, its calculations of losses to China’s image have
played an important role in the state’s response to such criticism.
Calculations
Calculations of self-interest stand as clear drivers of China’s climate policy, as
they do for all other states. As discussed in previous chapters, national inter-
ests are not static or fixed but shift as circumstances change. For centuries,
maintaining stability and unity has been a core interest of China’s leaders,
and at present, supporting economic growth remains central to the main-
tenance of China’s domestic stability. Therefore, the Chinese government
stresses its moral responsibility to maximise economic growth, which con-
stitutes its chief priority in all policies because China has to ‘complete the
historical task of industrialization and urbanization’ (Information Office of
the State Council of the People’s Republic of China 2011). Economic growth
is thus the major driver of China’s conduct in every sector of political life.
At the same time, China’s vast economic growth has caused severe
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environmental problems, including water and air pollution, deforestation,
desertification, hazardous waste and losses of biodiversity.1 Since many Chi-
nese citizens have become ill or even died due to air, land and water pollution,
environmental problems represent a top reason for social discontent in
contemporary China. Educated middle-class citizens in particular have
increasingly urged the Chinese government to resolve problems caused by
smog – so-called ‘airpocalypses’– due to industrial pollution. To maintain
social stability and thus its own legitimacy, the party-state has consequently
had no choice but improve standards of environmental protection. Since the
burning of coal is a chief factor of air pollution in China, energy policy plays
an important role in those efforts.
As norms of climate responsibility begun to evolve, China played a con-
spicuously marginal role in international relations pertaining to greenhouse
gas emissions and international status. Between the Stockholm and Rio con-
ferences, however, China gained substantial leverage in its role in interna-
tional environmental politics. The world began to recognise China’s critical
role in global environmental change, and although China continued to be
perceived as a poor country, its large size and population were identified to
bear significant influence over environmental issues that, once purely local,
had become global problems requiring urgent international cooperation. At
the same time, as China realised its environmental power, it began to reg-
ularly participate in international environmental negotiations. The Chinese
government quickly acknowledged China’s interest in participating in the
formulation of international environmental practices, which it viewed as an
outstanding opportunity to attract foreign aid and spur technology transfer
(Kobayashi 2005, 95–96), as well as equip Chinese officials and scientists with
valuable training from international environmental organisations that could
aid China’s capacity to solve domestic environmental problems (Economy
1998, 274). From another angle, the government considered it more beneficial
to participate in developing rules for international environmental practices
than to merely comply with rules and norms set by others. In its calculations
of self-interest, China’s government perceived an opportunity to expel Taiwan
from international organisations and thereby defend the status of the People’s
Republic of China as China’s legitimate representative at the international
level. Moreover, because the Tiananmen Square incident on 4 June 1989 had
disastrously affected China’s image in international politics, the Chinese gov-
ernment regarded environmental issues as being ‘soft’ enough to restore the
state’s international image and its capacity to rejoin international society
(Harrington 2005, 110). Indeed, soon after the incident, China showed its
willingness to engage in international environmental cooperation when more
than 120 Chinese environmental groups visited their counterparts abroad and
when, in 1990 alone, foreign delegations from more than 50 nations were
received to China (Shouqiu & Voigts 1993, 24). Stemming from a fear of
international isolation following the incident, China also expanded its coop-
eration with developing countries (Kobayashi 2005, 96).
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Despite China’s burgeoning economic prosperity and enhanced interna-
tional status, the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities, cli-
mate finance and technology transfer continue to occupy central positions in
its agenda regarding international climate negotiations. Although China took
an obvious position of great power at the UN Climate Change Conference in
Paris in 2015, it also sought to re-establish a rigid division between developed
and developing countries during negotiations over the Paris Rulebook.
Clearly, China is unlikely to sign an international treaty that would hinder its
industrialisation and thus impede its development by, for example, setting per
capita emission levels that are too low. China shows a justifiable fear that
emissions controls could increase business costs in China and that investment
and jobs important to its economic growth would thus be relocated to coun-
tries where labour is cheaper. Accordingly, China aligns its interests with the
interests of all developing countries; because developed countries cannot deny
the assistance-related needs of developing countries as a group, it is rhetori-
cally more convincing to articulate the needs of that group instead of China’s
own requirements. If developed countries admit the major role of funding and
technology transfer in mitigating climate change in developing countries,
China, still categorised as a developing country, receives assistance and Clean
Development Mechanism credits.
By casting itself as the defender of the developing world’s interests, China
has boosted its image among the political leaders of developing countries. To
further differentiate China from Western countries, the Chinese government
often emphasises China’s common history with developing countries as vic-
tims of Western colonialism and exploitation. In recent years, China has
shown substantial goodwill to developing countries and increased its soft
power there by offering loans and grants, debt relief, weapon sales, student
scholarships and assistance with infrastructure projects that build roads,
schools and housing. Such efforts are important to China’s pursuit of com-
prehensive power, because developing countries represent a considerable
source of potential diplomatic support for China’s status in international
politics, especially in international organisations that maintain a one country,
one vote system. They could therefore provide China with important diplo-
matic support in its pursuit to democratise international relations, increase its
leverage in international politics and oppose Western standards of civilization
and other Eurocentric practices of the US-led world order. Moreover, China
is the only developing country with a permanent seat on the UN Security
Council, which enables it to mentor other developing countries in interna-
tional affairs. In contrast to US soft power, Chinese soft power is interactive
and ‘derives from Beijing’s courtship and what regional neighbors perceive as
mutual benefits’ (Percival 2007, 111–113). Because China’s soft power is often
dismissed at the international level – Chinese political ideals and policies do
not typically uphold US ideals and values such as human rights and democ-
racy – an important source of such power is the state’s successful development
model and new breed of diplomacy. In that sense, because many developing
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countries feel marginalised by the current US-led international society, they
view China as a generator of economic and political opportunity. In parti-
cular, many socialist and authoritarian regimes perceive the Chinese model as
an especially attractive alternative to democratisation. At the same time,
China’s ‘friendship with various dictators’ decreases its status and prestige
among other international powers (Ding 2008, 201–202).
Clearly, China’s climate policy is also partly motivated by international
pressure. As Alastair Iain Johnston (1998, 559) explains, ‘the more interna-
tional criticism China meets or is likely to meet on some issue of international
cooperation, the more likely it will try to find ways to minimise this criticism
through incrementally substantive cooperative commitments’. Such actions
are largely motivated by the pursuit of a favourable international image, or
face, which has long guided Chinese foreign policy (e.g. Brady 2012; Deng
2008; Kopra 2012; Wang 2005).2 China’s government not only wants to
assure the world that China poses no threat and that other states will even
benefit from its development but also seeks to gain face among other states,
which can support two values central to the domestic legitimacy of the
Communist Party of China (CCP): authority and national honour. Although
China did not significantly contribute to many environmental problems before
the late 1990s, it nevertheless attended the UN Conference on Environment
and Development (UNCED) and the UN Conference on the Human Envir-
onment, arguably to nurture its international image (Economy 1998, 269).
After the 2009 UN Climate Change Conference in Copenhagen, at which
China encountered harsh criticism for obstructing international cooperation,
constructing a favourable national image resumes its influence over the state’s
climate policy. Most recently, at the Paris Conference in 2015, China’s
demonstrated its preference for the moderate, voluntary commitments typi-
cally pursued during the meeting’s negotiations over legal international obli-
gations, for the former not only dispel China’s fear of failure but also allow it
to easily exceed global expectations and thus gain face. Of course, national
image building is nothing new in Chinese foreign policy. China’s Century of
Humiliation (1839–1949) and its loss of status as the most sophisticated civi-
lisation in the world have been central to its national identity and important
reasons for its eagerness to restore its status internationally. Nevertheless, as
Johnston (1998, 560) argues, it is difficult to pinpoint ‘where exactly this
concern about image or reputation comes from, or how image is to be turned
into a cost or benefit’. From the perspective of the English School, one benefit
of having a reputation as a responsible nation would be acceptance as a
member of the great power club, which would award China greater rights on
the international stage.
Although China’s attention to national image building has precedents, its
confidence in its emerging role as a leader in international politics is alto-
gether new. China no longer responds only to international expectations;
since US President Donald Trump’s decision to withdraw from the Paris
Agreement, China has proactively portrayed itself as the global leader in
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climate politics. Presumably, one reason for the shift is the approaching cen-
tennial of the CCP. As discussed earlier, the first of China’s centenary goals
expects the state to be a strong international player in all sectors of interna-
tional society by 2020. In many fields of foreign policy, including engagement
in Africa and the Arctic, both of which have been viewed as the property and
backyard of the West for historical and geopolitical reasons, China’s growing
role has raised international concerns, and it has been difficult for the party-
state to assume the role of leader. By contrast, mitigating climate change does
not hamper China’s national interests but instead offers plenty of economic
and imagological benefits for the party-state. Among the doors that President
Trump’s America First approach has opened for China’s emerging global
leadership, a position at the fore of climate politics allows the party-state to
represent itself as a strong global leader in the eyes of domestic audiences.
Although Trump’s policy has thus unintentionally helped China’s leaders to
achieve their centenary goals, China’s emerging role as leader per se is not
accompanied by new ambition in international climate politics. Because
China will not necessarily be an inspirational leader that will or even can
advance ambitious action against climate change worldwide – after all, lea-
ders can just as well advance harmful policies and practices that do not pro-
mote human values – what sort of global leader China will become thus
depends on China’s identity.
Identity and belief
Belief has driven China’s climate policy since the early 1990s. In general,
China’s political leaders do not seem to dispute whether climate change is real
or whether it is caused by human action. Published in 1990, the first report of
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change generated political will in
China to participate in international efforts to prevent climate change.
Although officials in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs emphasised China’s
status as a developing country and thus underscored the responsibilities of
developed countries to lead efforts to allay climate change, many Chinese
citizens believed that China, as a member of international society and ‘pri-
marily because the PRC, too, would be affected’, should contribute to inter-
national climate politics (Economy 1998, 271). Although that stance was
largely based on calculations of self-interest, it nevertheless indicated the
increasing belief among the Chinese that climate change poses a serious risk
both locally and globally. Indeed, the Chinese expressed a largely solidarist
perspective, for they believed that as a member of international society, China
had a responsibility to act with regard to global environmental problems
(ibid.). Accordingly, when China decided to actively participate in climate
negotiations as a leading representative of developing countries, the state’s
official position in the negotiations incorporated a synthesis of all three per-
spectives. The official position, however, more or less ignored the most soli-
darist perspectives, including the one expressed by Song Jian, then chair of
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the State Science and Technology Commission, in 1991 (quoted in Economy
1998, 276):
As we [the Chinese] develop the economy, we must guarantee a balanced
ecological environment and maintain in good order our natural resources
so that future generations will have their rightful heritage. To this end, we
should be ready to pay more or, if necessary, slow down the economic
development.
For the Chinese government, climate change is an ‘issue involving both
environment and development, but it is ultimately an issue of development’
(National Development and Reform Commission 2007). Underlying that
characterisation are two beliefs: that climate change has been caused by the
historical development processes of developed countries and that it prevents
developing countries from achieving prosperity. Accordingly, China’s gov-
ernment has maintained that the ‘ultimate solution to climate change can
only be achieved through common sustainable development of all countries’
(Xie 2010). In effect, China’s stance on climate change influences the state’s
position in international climate politics in two ways. On the one hand,
China expects developed countries to transform their consumption habits
and implement ambitious emissions cuts; on the other, it stresses the ability
of developing countries to adapt, albeit with the assistance of developed
countries, to climate change (Kopra 2016). At the same time, China’s
approach to climate change is exceptionally technocratic; the government
has even argued that ‘technology innovation and transfer are the basis and
support for addressing climate change’ (Information Office of the State
Council of the People’s Republic of China 2008). Altogether, China’s
approach to climate change suggests that global responsibility for mitigating
such change depends upon a country’s developing or developed status, not
the global impacts of its policies and actions – in other words, that
responsibility should be allocated according to emissions per gross domestic
product (GDP).
China’s government moreover believes that climate change is a ‘challenge
faced by the entire world’ and thus can be solved only by ‘extensive inter-
national cooperation’ (Information Office of the State Council of the Peo-
ple’s Republic of China 2008). Therefore, it has engaged in UNFCCC
negotiations since they began in the late 1980s and regards the UNFCCC
and its Kyoto Protocol as the ‘most authoritative, universal and compre-
hensive international framework for coping with climate change’ (ibid.). The
Chinese government has also recently begun to recognise the security-related
impacts of climate change and believes that China ranks among ‘the coun-
tries most vulnerable to the adverse impact of climate change’ (National
Development and Reform Commission 2012). Although it does not regard
climate change as an issue of national security, the Chinese government is
aware that it harms China’s economic and social development, as well as
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the lives of its citizens (National Development and Reform Commission
2014, 4). In 2011, for instance, extreme weather events and natural disasters
related to climate change affected 430 million Chinese people and caused
309.6 billion yuan in economic losses (National Development and Reform
Commission 2012). Moreover, Nicholas Stern (2006, 106) estimates that,
from 1988 to 2004, ‘China experienced economic losses from drought and
flood equating to 1.2 per cent and 0.8 per cent of GDP respectively’. On
top of such losses, climate change also seriously jeopardises food security in
China.
At present, China’s national identity is in flux. Both the Chinese general
public and its leaders believe that ‘China is a nation with a dual-identity’ –
both a developing country and a major power (Wu 2001, 293) – and that
belief has significantly complicated domestic consensus on the scope of
China’s global responsibility. Although many Chinese citizens consider that
the state should assume more international responsibility, many others believe
that it is unjustifiable to expect China to shoulder more global responsibility
before it has achieved a greater stage of development. China’s role in inter-
national climate politics reflects that dualism; not only have the Chinese
tended to discursively construct a highly dualist image and identity for the
state (Kopra 2012), but China has also participated in various, even conflict-
ing, coalitions in climate politics. As discussed earlier, China has consequently
begun to describe itself as a great power in international climate politics and
assumed a constructive role in international climate negotiations since the
2009 Copenhagen Conference. During the Obama administration, China and
the United States actively cooperated to develop policy against climate
change, which significantly influenced China’s attitudes towards climate
responsibility, particularly the Chinese government’s view that great powers
have great responsibility to mitigate climate change. However, when coop-
eration on climate policy between the great powers ended during the Trump
administration, China began to position itself as the defender of developing
countries’ interests at the 2017 UN Climate Conference, where it sought to
resume negotiation about the bifurcation of developed and developing
countries. China thus confirmed its role as the leader of the developing
world, a role which has ‘sometimes forced it to be more uncooperative in
international environmental affairs that it would actually like to be’
(Kobayashi 2005, 88). In particular, China’s participation in so-called ‘spoi-
ler’ clubs in international politics, including the Like-Minded Countries and
the BASIC (Brazil, South Africa, India and China), prevents the state from
taking more responsibility in international society. When US–Chinese
cooperation on mitigating climate change dissolved, China and the Eur-
opean Union intensified their cooperation to the same end, and time will
reveal whether such collaboration encourages China to emphasise its status
as a great power in international negotiations on climate change. For now,
it is clear that identity politics matter enormously in international climate
politics.
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China’s commitment to mitigate climate change
Until 1998, the China Meteorological Administration was responsible for
advising the Chinese government about issues in the international arena rela-
ted to climate change. Ever since, such responsibility has fallen to the pow-
erful State Development and Planning Commission (renamed the National
Development and Reform Commission in 2003), which has indicated China’s
shift from viewing climate change as a scientific issue to viewing it as a poli-
tical and economic problem (Heggelund, Andresen & Fritzen Buan 2010,
237–238). In 2008, China upgraded the State Environmental Protection
Administration to a full-fledged Ministry of Environmental Protection not
only responsible for organising national environmental policies and prevent-
ing pollution but also with a mission to ‘shoulder and materialize the
responsibility for achieving national target on emission reduction’ (Ministry
of Environmental Protection 2008). Today, although both the Ministry of
Environmental Protection and the Ministry of Science and Technology parti-
cipate in China’s climate-focused diplomacy, the ‘hardliner’ Ministry of For-
eign Affairs plays a central role in China’s international climate politics
(Heggelund, Andresen & Fritzen Buan 2010, 239).
Until recently, China had refused to make any commitments in interna-
tional negotiations addressing the climate. In 2006, when it overtook the
United States in total greenhouse gas emissions and became the largest emit-
ter of carbon in the world, its leverage in such negotiations afforded it, along
with the United States, a ‘position to make or break’ international climate
agreements (Harris 2013, 76). Since the Copenhagen Conference in 2009,
China has indeed taken a more constructive role in international climate
negotiations. Although the Chinese government stated in 2010 that China
‘could not and should not’ set a carbon cap (Lan 2010), it had committed to
pursue actions against climate change proportionate to its size and population
at the Bali Conference in 2007. According to China’s nationally appropriate
mitigation actions commitment,
China will endeavor to lower its carbon dioxide emissions per unit of
GDP by 40–45% by 2020 compared to the 2005 level, increase the share
of non-fossil fuels in primary energy consumption to around 15% by 2020
and increase forest coverage by 40 million hectares and forest stock
volume by 1.3 billion cubic meters by 2020 from the 2005 levels.
(Su 2010)
By the 2015 Paris Conference (COP21), China’s position in international cli-
mate negotiations had transformed. Prior to COP21, China had announced
important commitments to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions, and in
November 2014, it and the United States signed a historic agreement in which
it committed to stem the growth of its CO2 emissions by 2030 (White House
2014). As a result, China no longer focuses on reducing relative carbon
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intensity (i.e. amount of CO2 per unit of GDP) but has instead pledged to
reduce its absolute emissions. Such resolution sent a strong signal to interna-
tional society that both the United States and China had acknowledged their
responsibility to lead international efforts towards tackling climate change
and that an international climate treaty was possible. In June 2015, China
published its Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) to the UNFCCC,
in which it reiterated its commitment to not exceed CO2 emissions achieved
by 2030, to reduce its carbon intensity by 60–65 per cent of its 2005 level by
2030, increase the share of non-fossil fuels used in primary energy consump-
tion to roughly 20 per cent and boost the forest stock volume by approxi-
mately 4.5 billion m3 above the 2005 level (National Development and
Reform Commission 2015, 5). China’s NDC, however, neither sets a cap for
emissions nor specifies how much Chinese emissions will climb before they
peak. China also has not set any long-term goal to explain how much and by
when the state expects to reduce greenhouse gas emissions after 2030. Instead,
it stresses the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and
reminds developed countries of their historically informed responsibility to
‘undertake ambitious economy wide absolute quantified emissions reduction
targets by 2030’ and ‘provide support for developing countries to formulate
and implement national adaptation plans as well as other related projects’
(ibid., 17–18).
China’s government assures other states that China’s NDC is motivated not
only by national interests but also by its ‘sense of responsibility to fully
engage in global governance, to forge a community of shared destiny for
humankind and to promote common development for all human beings’
(National Development and Reform Commission 2015, 2). In any case, China
will benefit from fulfilling its NDC by reducing its reliance on coal to gen-
erate power, decrease air pollution and thereby prevent 100,000 premature
deaths annually and create an additional half-million full-time green jobs in
its renewable energy sector (Höhne et al. 2015, 21). However, China’s NDC
does not explain why or how it is fair and ambitious, which is necessary to
inspire similarly ambitious climate policies of other states, including devel-
oped ones that often cite China’s climate irresponsibility for their own inac-
tion. A day after the publication of China’s NDC, China’s National Center
for Climate Change Strategy and International Cooperation published a
commentary demonstrating that China has nevertheless considered the ethical
dimensions of its NDC. At the same time, the commentary not only describes
the ambitiousness and economic, technological and social challenges of cli-
mate policies but also again highlights China’s status as a developing country.
It therefore suggests that if the state manages to curb emissions at a faster
rate after 2030, China’s long-term development path will align with the
objective of limiting global average temperature increase to less than 2°C (Fu,
Ji & Liu 2015, 7–8). However, the Climate Action Tracker (2018), an inde-
pendent scientific analysis team representing four research organisations,
argues that China’s NDC will not limit global warming to less than 2°C
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unless other states commit to much more ambitious emissions reductions than
China’s. Therefore, the Climate Action Tracker (2018) gives China a rating of
‘highly insufficient’.
China has not joined the Green Climate Fund, and the 2015 Paris Con-
ference did not oblige China, as a developing country, to contribute financial
assistance, although it encouraged ‘other parties’ to ‘provide or continue to
provide such support voluntarily’ (UNFCCC 2015). Prior to the conference,
however, China had pledged to establish its own voluntary and com-
plementary South–South Cooperation Fund, which will ‘make available ¥20
billion [about 3.1 billion USD] for setting up the China South–South Climate
Cooperation Fund to support other developing countries to combat climate
change’ (White House 2015a).
China’s domestic climate policies
The UNFCCC (1992) does not specify how states should fulfil their climate
responsibility but asks them to take action appropriate to their national cir-
cumstances. In practice, each state therefore decides what sort of policies it
will undertake in order to meet its climate responsibility; a state may choose
any combination of market mechanisms (e.g. carbon trade and taxation),
technological solutions (e.g. carbon capture and storage), voluntary and
mandatory emissions limits and education. For its part, China has primarily
chosen traditional tools such as legislation and regulation, central govern-
ment planning and government-led projects and programmes to uphold its
climate responsibility at the domestic level. Because the National Develop-
ment and Reform Commission sets China’s domestic agenda on economic,
energy and climate policies, China’s climate policy has unsurprisingly priori-
tised strategies amenable to economic development and energy use and stres-
sed the principle of development first.
Low-carbon development
Although the concept of sustainable development was a major issue of debate
at UNCED, no consensus was reached regarding how such development
should be achieved in practice (cf. Hopwood, Mellor & O’Brien 2005). After
UNCED, China embraced the concept but has seemed to focus on its eco-
nomic aspects. For example, in 1996, China’s ninth Five-Year Plan confirmed
sustainable development as a national development strategy but focused on
economically sustainable development while environmental protection was
viewed merely as a tool to achieve economic development. According to then
Chinese premier Li Peng (1995), China should ‘rationally develop and utilize
resources and protect the ecological environment so as to achieve a coordi-
nated and sustainable economic and social development’. Accordingly, in one
of the first such state documents worldwide written in accordance with
UNCED, China’s Agenda 21 proposed a comprehensive approach to
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environmental protection by integrating policies such as economic develop-
ment, industrialisation, population control, agriculture, energy production,
education, health and sanitation, disaster management and the protection of
the atmosphere (Economy 1998, 276). In effect, China’s Agenda 21 demon-
strates not only that the Chinese state did not dispute whether climate change
is real even in the early stages of climate protection but also that the Chinese
government took the issue of climate change seriously.
In the early 2000s, China began to examine how it could modernise in a
more sustainable way and thereby alleviate social and environmental pro-
blems caused by its development model (Dent 2014, 57). In particular, the
concepts of scientific development and the so-called ‘harmonious society’
have served as ideological guidelines for the state’s development policies (cf.
Fan 2006, 709). For instance, China’s 11th Five-Year Plan (2006–2010), in
projecting ‘big change in the relationship between the environment and
development’ in China, announced ‘three transformations’ that would encap-
sulate China’s commitment to balance economic growth with environmental
protection. The first two transformations downgrade the previous priority of
economic development to place equal emphasis on both it and environmental
protection. The third transformation, which China arguably experiences at
present, results from ‘mainly employing administrative methods to protect the
environment into comprehensive application of legal, economic, technical and
necessary administrative methods to address environmental problems’ (Min-
istry of Environmental Protection 2008). The 11th Five-Year Plan also states
that ‘economic growth is not the equivalent of economic development’ (Fan
2006, 710) but that environmental protection is a ‘key task for modern
development’ (Ministry of Environmental Protection 2008). Since then, China
has paid special attention to the ‘greening of the economy’ and the develop-
ment of ‘green jobs’ (Pan, Ma & Zhang 2011).
Beginning in the late 2000s, the Chinese government commenced imple-
menting several policies to reduce the country’s greenhouse gas emissions. In
June 2007, the government published its first comprehensive climate policy,
the National Climate Change Programme, which pledged that ‘China will
implement its fundamental national policy of resources conservation and
environmental protection to develop a circular economy, protect the ecologi-
cal environment and accelerate the construction of a resource-conservative
and environmentally-friendly society’ (National Development and Reform
Commission 2007). The policy also promised to ‘strive to control its [China’s]
greenhouse gas emissions, enhance its capacity to adapt to climate change
and promote the harmonious development between economy, population,
resources and the environment’ (ibid.). In his report to the 17th Party Con-
gress, President Hu Jintao (2007) promised that China would ‘make new
contributions to protecting the global climate’ and ‘implement the responsi-
bility system for conserving energy and reducing emissions’. Consequently,
the government issued the first white paper on climate change in 2008, and in
August 2009, the National People’s Congress of China Standing Committee
Fulfilment of China’s climate responsibility 139
passed a resolution to actively respond to climate change, which marked the
first climate change resolution adopted by China’s top legislature body. In
particular, the resolution stressed the principle of scientific development and
vowed to strengthen China’s legal framework for climate change by declaring
that
Responding to climate change is an important opportunity and challenge
for China’s economic and social development. To actively respond to cli-
mate change is of great importance to China’s overall economic and
social development, the people’s vital interests, human survival and the
development of all countries.
(Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress 2009, my
translation)
In November 2009, to prevent greenhouse gas emissions from doubling by
2020, China announced a voluntary but nationally binding target to reduce
carbon intensity by 40–45 per cent of 2005 levels by 2020 (Xinhua 2009). In
March 2011, the target was incorporated into the 12th Five-Year Plan (2011–
2015), which also not only determined to lower energy consumption per unit
of GDP by 16 per cent by 2015 and CO2 emissions by 17 per cent but
moreover increase the proportion of non-fossil fuels in overall primary energy
consumption to 11.4 per cent compared to 2010’s 8.3 per cent. Perhaps most
dramatically, in 2014 Chinese Premier Li Keqiang announced that China had
declared war on pollution and would first focus on reducing the levels of
PM2.5 and PM10 in the atmosphere by improving energy efficiency, raising the
proportion of electricity generated by renewables and nuclear power, devel-
oping low-carbon technology, reducing vehicle exhaust emissions and shutting
down outdated industrial plants and energy producers (Li 2014). Doubtless,
all of those efforts were expected to contribute to mitigating climate change as
well.
Later in 2014, the State Council approved China’s National Climate
Change Plan (2014–2020), which introduced various measures to stem the
growth of greenhouse gas emissions, promote low-carbon development plans,
improve the state’s adaptation to climate change and expand international
cooperation in mitigating climate change. In particular, the plan prioritised
efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions in both the industrial sector and
the construction industry. Although it did not set a binding, nationwide
emissions reduction target, the plan did seek to reduce CO2 emissions per unit
of industrial added value by 50 per cent below 2005 levels by 2020. Notably,
the plan also pledged to stabilise the total carbon emissions of the steel and
cement sectors at 2015 levels by 2020 (National Development and Reform
Commission 2014, 10–11). Although the plan’s various targets sent a positive
signal to the world about the government’s strong commitment to mitigating
climate change, the plan’s feasibility received criticism due to the lack of
coordination and motivation among government sectors outside the NRDC
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(Liu & ClimateWire 2014). If met, however, the plan’s targets would halt
China’s rapid emissions growth. In the construction industry especially, the
plan promotes low carbon technologies and materials and aims for half of
newly constructed urban buildings to be green by 2020 (National Develop-
ment and Reform Commission 2014, 13). Other efforts to reduce China’s
greenhouse gas emissions include promoting the use of renewable energy
sources, improving energy efficiency, controlling emissions in transportation
and agriculture, increasing carbon sinks and promoting low-carbon lifestyles.3
Since the 18th National Congress in 2012, China has actively pursued the
development of what it calls ‘an ecological civilisation’, which China’s climate
policies have also listed as an important objective (National Development
and Reform Commission 2014, 3). Published in 2015, ‘An Opinion on
Acceleration for the Promotion of Ecological Civilization’ not only articulates
objectives and instructions for reorganising the Chinese economy to make it
greener but also addresses ways to overcome obstacles to improving the
environmental standards of Chinese society. In its 12,000 characters, the opi-
nion even declares that ‘green development’ (绿色发展) is important to the
development of China’s competitive advantage and thus plays an important
role in fostering comprehensive national power. That same year, given the
State Council’s aim to make ‘significant progress’ in cultivating a resource-
saving, ecofriendly society by 2020, China’s government relaunched the green
GDP project and announced plans to start pilot projects at the regional level
in the near future. The State Council maintains that CCP committees and
governmental officials at every level are responsible for constructing China’s
ecological civilisation. In particular, it highlights that economic performance
should no longer be the ‘only criterion in government performance assess-
ment’ but that environmental issues should have greater weight in cadre eva-
luations. At a more personal level, the State Council added that cadres have a
lifelong responsibility (终身追责) for environmental harm caused on their
watch, even after they have retired or changed positions. Accordingly, if they
manage to promote the construction of an ecological civilisation, then they
will be rewarded; however, if they fail or cause serious environmental damage,
then they cannot be promoted to higher positions (Xinhua 2015a).
In September 2015, the State Council and the Central Committee, the
highest bodies in the Chinese government and the CCP, in jointly publishing
the ‘Integrated Reform Plan for Promoting Ecological Progress’ indicated the
government’s strong political will to improve environmental protection in
China.4 The plan not only insists that ecological conservation be given a
‘position of prominence and incorporated into every aspect and the whole
process of economic, political, cultural, and social development’ but also
presents a comprehensive structural framework of institutional reforms
needed to improve the ‘formation of a new pattern of modernization in which
humankind develops in harmony with nature’ (Xinhua 2015b). Although the
plan confirms that it ‘is necessary to remain committed to the strategy of
treating development as being of the utmost importance to China’, it
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nevertheless acknowledges that development ‘is good only when it is green, cir-
cular, and low-carbon’ (ibid.). Moreover, it reiterates the lifelong responsibility of
cadres to environmental conservation and proposes the option to develop a
national supervision and inspection system to perform their ‘natural resource
asset audits’ (ibid.). To mitigate climate change, the plan announces ambitious
objectives to be achieved by 2020. First, it pledges that a ‘system for controlling
total national carbon emissions and a mechanism for breaking down the
responsibility for implementation will be gradually established’, which can be
interpreted as the Chinese government’s commitment to adopting an absolute
emissions reduction target after 2020. Second, it declares that ‘subsidies for all
fossil fuels will be phased out’ (ibid.); such a measure sets a tremendous example
for other states, which currently spend roughly 5 trillion USD annually to sub-
sidise the consumption of fossil fuels, an amount that is ‘over four times the
value of subsidies to renewable energy and more than four times the amount
invested globally in improving energy efficiency’ (International Energy Agency
2014). Last, the plan promises to invest more in the development of renewable
energy sources and establish a ‘mechanism for effectively increasing forest,
grassland, wetland, and ocean carbon sinks’ (Xinhua 2015b).
For the time being, China’s 13th Five-Year Plan (2016–2020) forms the most
significant strategic guidelines for the state, including those pertaining to prac-
tices of climate responsibility. Above all, the current plan integrates China’s
international climate commitments into the overall development objectives and
measures of the party-state. In particular, it seeks to reduce China’s carbon
intensity by 18 per cent from 2015 levels and reiterates the national energy
consumption cap of 5 billion metric tonnes of standard coal equivalent by
2020. Notably, it proposes to not only implement but also enhance the state’s
nationally determined contribution to the UNFCCC (National People’s Con-
gress & Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference 2016). At present,
some Chinese cities and provinces have also outlined exceptionally ambitious
plans to respond to climate change. At the US–China Climate Leaders Summit
held in Los Angeles in September 2015, 11 Chinese cities and provinces com-
mitted to reaching their peak greenhouse gas emissions before the national
target of 2030 and resolved to establish the corresponding Alliance of Peaking
Pioneer Cities. In particular, two of the most populous cities, Beijing and
Guangzhou, pledged to reach their peak CO2 emissions by or around 2020
(US–China Climate Leaders’ Declaration 2015). As the fact sheet of the White
House (2015b) notes, ‘The commitment of so many of its [China’s] largest cities
to early peaking highlights China’s resolve to take comprehensive action across
all levels of government to achieve its national target, put forth in last year’s
Joint Announcement on Climate Change’.
Energy policy and beyond
The demand for energy in China is massive because the country’s economic
growth is largely based on fuel-intensive heavy industry. Given the risks of
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energy shortages, energy security has been a top priority for China since the
late 1990s. At present, with coal as 60 per cent of its energy mix, China uses
more coal than any other nation in the world. Because such use causes not
only enormous carbon emissions but also severe air pollution around the
country, both domestic pressures and international commitments motivate the
Chinese government to decrease the share of coal in the country’s energy mix
and to develop alternative energy sources. In response, the government has
issued a series of policies and measures to decrease China’s dependency on
coal and other (imported) fossil fuels, as well as to promote the production of
non-fossil energy, especially hydropower and nuclear energy. The government
has also made serious efforts to decrease energy demands by promoting
energy conservation and energy efficiency. To that end, it has closed ineffec-
tive power plants and small or outdated industrial factories, promoted the
development of modern, energy-saving technology and products and estab-
lished national standards to improve automotive fuel economy.
For the first time, China’s current Energy Development Strategy Action
Plan (2014–2020) includes a cap on national coal consumption by 2020 and
pledges to raise the share of non-fossil fuels in the total primary energy mix to
15 per cent by 2020 from 2013’s 9.8 per cent (Xinhua 2014). Likewise, the
13th Five-Year Plan orders the increased proportion of non-fossil energy to
15 per cent and the decreased consumption of coal to less than 55 per cent. In
keeping with those goals, the government has also decided to abandon or
delay at least 150 gigawatts of coal-fired power projects by 2020 (Reuters
2016). At the same time, China doubtlessly already stands as the world leader
in renewable energy, including solar and wind power, hydropower and bioe-
nergy for electricity and heat, as well as a pioneer in the development of
electric vehicles. In fact, the International Energy Agency (2017) estimates
that China will account for 40 per cent of global capacity growth in renewable
energies between 2017 and 2022.
In terms of hydropower, China has the richest resources in the world and
has efficiently taken advantage of them. In particular, China’s installed capa-
city of hydropower exceeded 100,000 megawatts in 2004, 200,000 megawatts
in 2010 and 300,000 megawatts in 2015 (Li et al. 2018). Although China is
the greatest source of hydropower worldwide, its massive hydropower projects
have also caused severe social and environmental harms at the local level (e.g.
Zhao et al. 2012). For example, the Three Gorges Dam is famous not only for
its massive size but also because of the vast social and environmental pro-
blems it has caused. By contrast, the development of small hydropower
resources (i.e. hydropower stations with an installed capacity of no more than
50 megawatts) seems to pose outstanding potential to resolve energy and
environmental problems as well as alleviate poverty in rural China (e.g. Kong
et al. 2015; Kong et al. 2016).
In terms of solar power, China is also a world leader; it accounts for 60 per
cent of global solar cell manufacturing capacity annually, and the state uses
about half of all global solar power generated per year. In 2017 alone, China
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installed at least 50 gigawatts of solar power capacity, which exceed the tar-
geted 105 gigawatts that the 13th Five-Year Plan (2016–2020) projected by
2020 (Buckley, Nicholas & Brown 2018). At the same time, in terms of wind
power, abundant wind energy resources in China have motivated the Chinese
to develop wind power on a large scale (Sahu 2018). In 2016, China had
developed 35 per cent of all cumulative wind power installations worldwide.
The objective of the 13th Five-Year Plan (2016–2020) for wind power is at
least 210 gigawatts, and China is expected to achieve that target by 2019
(International Energy Agency 2017).
In addition to renewable energy sources, nuclear power plays an important
role in China’s plans to reduce the share of fossil fuels in its energy mix. Since
the 2000s, the number of nuclear power plants has increased more than ten-
fold in China, and in January 2018, mainland China had 38 nuclear plants in
operation and about 20 more under construction (World Nuclear Association
2018). After the Fukushima Daichi nuclear disaster in Japan in 2011, the
construction of new nuclear power plants slowed as the Chinese government
took ‘timely, cautious and comprehensive’ measures to ensure the safety of
nuclear plants, including those under construction (Hubbard 2014). Also in
response, the State Council issued new nuclear safety guidelines consistent
with the standards of the International Atomic Energy Agency (ibid.). Fol-
lowing safety checks, the construction of new nuclear power plants resumed,
and the Chinese government continues to regard nuclear power as an essential
part of the state’s energy mix (Zhang & Zhao 2013).
Regarding automotive emissions, China counted 200 million motor vehicles
in its population in March 2017. Despite the massive total, the figure indi-
cated only 125 vehicles per 1,000 people in China according to the 2015
census; by comparison, some developed countries count 300–500 vehicles per
1,000 people (Hao et al. 2017). Given China’s burgeoning young population,
the number of cars is expected to increase rapidly in the coming years, which
is slated to cause severe air pollution locally and hamper China from reaching
peak carbon emissions by 2030. In response, because electric vehicles are
considered to be a worthwhile alternative to traditional motor vehicles,
China’s government has issued several plans and policies to promote their
development, including 2012’s ‘Energy Saving and New Energy Automotive
Industry Development Plan (2012–2020)’ and 2014’s ‘Guiding Opinions on
Accelerating the Popularization and Application of New Energy Vehicles’
(Chen et al. 2017). Likewise, the government took a major step in September
2017 by announcing a forthcoming ban on the production and sale of fossil
fuel-powered cars (Xinhua 2017), which will no doubt urge the development
of hybrid and electric vehicles not only in China but also around the world.
In December 2017, the Chinese government took another important step
towards realising a low-carbon future by announcing that the entire power
generation sector in China, which produces nearly half of the country’s
greenhouse gas emissions, will be covered by a nationwide carbon trading
system in the future (Xu & Mason 2017). The system will be the largest in the
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world and oversee more carbon than the EU cap-and-trade system. In effect,
the announcement sent a strong signal to companies worldwide that, in the
future, successful business will be low carbon. Moreover, China demonstrates
outstanding potential for carbon capture and storage (Dahowski et al. 2009)
and is now the world’s largest investor in such technology (Garnaut 2013).
Of course, China’s current energy policy is also significantly influenced by
the One Belt, One Road initiative. To some extent, this initiative as well as
China-led financial institutions, including the Asian Infrastructure Investment
Bank and the New Development Bank, invest in green technologies in Eur-
asia and beyond. However, the initiative is technology-agnostic; it not only
pursues top advancement of green technology but also invests in old tech-
nologies (Buckley, Nicholas & Brown 2018). Since the government has
restricted Chinese companies from developing new coal-fired plants at home,
they have invested in such projects overseas, especially in developing coun-
tries. For example, three quarters of new energy generated by the China–
Pakistan Economic Corridor, which includes 19 energy projects in renewable
and coal-fired power plants, transmission and other infrastructure, comes
from coal (Shaikh & Tunio 2017). Moreover, in Kenya, a Chinese company
plans to construct a coal-fired power plant adjacent to a UN Educational,
Scientific and Cultural Organization heritage site despite environmental and
social concerns (Wesangula 2017). Although the Chinese government cannot
be held accountable for all actions taken by Chinese companies, because the
projects in Pakistan and Kenya are tied to the One Belt, One Road initiative
they are presumably linked to the state’s grand economic strategy.
Last, China supports a vast research programme on geoengineering,5 which
has been characterised as a cost-effective way to respond to climate change.
Although several geoengineering technologies have been proposed, it remains
unclear how well they would work and whether they would cause any (envir-
onmentally) harmful side effects. Morally speaking, geoengineering is a con-
tested field (e.g. Gardiner 2010; Barrett 2008, 51). Stephen Gardiner (2011,
345), for example, warns that the current generation and especially citizens of
affluent countries ‘should be especially cautious about arguments that appear
to diminish our moral responsibilities’. From that perspective, it would
therefore be ‘better if countries could commit themselves not to resort to
geoengineering’ because then the ‘world would have no alternative but to
reduce emissions’ (Barrett 2008, 46). Geoengineering is also a controversial
field from a political standpoint. As Scott Barrett (2008, 53) puts it, the pro-
blem with geoengineering is ‘“not how to get countries to do it’ but how ‘to
address the fundamental question of who should decide whether and how
geoengineering should be attempted – a problem of governance”’. In other
words, should geoengineering projects be executed multilaterally, or should
states act unilaterally, even if their projects could alter the living conditions in
other countries (cf. Steffen et al. 2011, 752)? In any case, because the potential
for geoengineering is enormous, the rules of geoengineering practices urgently
need to be negotiated or commitments made to refrain from geoengineering.
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To that end, a secondary institution is perhaps necessary to govern geoengi-
neering practices in the future.
Adaptation to climate change
Climate change clearly poses a significant threat to human security around
the world. Measured in terms of human suffering, China has faced huge
losses; from 1980 to 2002, nearly 50 million Chinese lost their homes and
nearly 45,000 Chinese were killed due to climate-related disasters (Roberts &
Parks 2007, 76). Despite the obvious difficulty of estimating the extent to
which climate change is responsible for past climate-related disasters, such
figures reveal that China is located in an area exceptionally vulnerable to such
disasters, the frequency and intensity of which are predicted to increase due to
climate change. The Chinese government has been increasingly aware of the
adverse effects of climate change in China, and in 2006, Chinese scientists
published the first National Assessment Report on Climate Change, after
which China’s first National Climate Change Programme recognised in 2007
that the climate was already changing in China. Not only had the average
surface temperature already increased 0.5–0.8°C during the twentieth century
but mountain glaciers were also melting at an accelerated rate, the frequency
and intensity of heatwaves had increased in the northern provinces and heavy
precipitation had increased in the southern ones. In addition, many Chinese
rivers had dried up due to accelerated economic and population growth, and
even more critical water shortages can be expected in the future, meaning
decreased agricultural output, particularly in China’s northern provinces. The
National Climate Change Programme therefore acknowledged that though it
is essential to ‘place equal emphasis on both mitigation and adaptation’,
given China’s status as a developing country, adaptation is a ‘more present
and imminent task’ than mitigation (National Development and Reform
Commission 2007). Since then, China’s government has sought to enhance
the country’s capacity to adapt to climate change by integrating correspond-
ing plans into China’s overall development policies.
In 2013, a year after publishing the 710-page ‘Second National Assessment
Report on Climate Change’, the Chinese government issued its first nation-
wide climate change adaptation strategy, which warned all of Chinese society
that is was poorly prepared to face serious threats posed by climate change.
The strategy informed China’s population that the government ‘attaches great
importance to climate change adaptation by integrating it into plans to
develop the national economy and society’ (National Development and
Reform Commission 2013, my translation). Taking ‘significantly enhanced
adaptation capacity’ as the ultimate goal, the plan outlined a wide range of
measures to be implemented by 2020 in order to protect water, forest and soil
resources, safeguard agricultural output, strengthen infrastructure, improve
risk management systems, increase public awareness and establish institu-
tional mechanisms (ibid.). Furthermore, China’s Nationally Determined
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Contribution to the UNFCCC announced in 2015 that the state would make
efforts to adapt to climate change
by enhancing mechanisms and capacities to effectively defend against
climate change risks in key areas such as agriculture, forestry and water
resources, as well as in cities, coastal and ecologically vulnerable areas
and to progressively strengthen early warning and emergency response
systems and disaster prevention and reduction mechanisms.
(National Development and Reform Commission 2015)
That same year, China published the 900-page ‘Third National Assessment
Report on Climate Change’ following a three-year compilation process
involving approximately 550 scientists and experts. According to the report,
average temperatures across China have increased by 0.9–1.4°C since 1909,
while the coastal sea level has by risen 2.9 mm annually between 1980 and
2012. Both estimates suggest that the climate is changing at a faster rate in
China than globally. The report projects that by the end of the twenty-first
century, average temperatures will have risen 1.3–5.0°C in China, even if the
global goal of limiting global temperature increases to 2°C is met (China
Climate Change Info-Net 2015). In particular, many of China’s metropoles
located in coastal areas, including Shanghai, Tianjin and Hong Kong, are at
high risk of flooding due to rising sea levels. It is thus argued that China will
suffer the most from the business-as-usual trend of global warming and could
gain the most from limiting warming to 2°C (Strauss, Kulp & Levermann
2015, 10). Such findings doubtlessly provide the Chinese government with
strong domestic incentives to curb emissions and pay close attention to
adapting China to climate change.
Conclusion
China’s participation in international climate politics is motivated by both
calculations of self-interest and beliefs about its identity as a nation. Tradi-
tionally, China’s chief interests in international climate politics have included
the protection of its sovereignty and the promotion of its economic develop-
ment by receiving Clean Development Mechanism projects, technology
transfer and other forms of foreign assistance. In China’s domestic develop-
ment plans, however, environmental protection has begun to receive greater
consideration than ever before. Given Chinese beliefs that technological pro-
gress combined with capitalist efficiency, demand and motivation can solve all
environmental problems, green technology and nuclear power play a key role
in China’s climate policy. Although adapting to climate change also plays an
important part, it remains an underdeveloped dimension of China’s domestic
climate responsibility. On the international stage, image politics has also
been an important driver of China’s participation in international climate
politics in the 2010s, and since the election of Donald Trump as US president,
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China has increasingly portrayed itself as a global climate leader. However,
China’s growing emphasis on environmental responsibility has not translated
into making ambitious commitments in international climate negotiations.
Although it has committed to reach peak carbon emissions by 2030, the
Chinese government continues to refuse to sign a legally binding carbon
emissions reductions target, even despite strong domestic incentives to
decrease the use of coal and to invest in clean technologies. By responding
to such incentives and upholding the Paris Agreement, the Chinese govern-
ment could not only assure its citizens that it takes their environmental
concerns and future prosperity seriously but also demonstrate to the world
that it is fit to take an active role in international efforts to mitigate climate
change.
Notes
1 For an overview of China’s environmental problems, see Kassiola and Guo (2010).
2 In Chinese culture, the concept of face is often used to describe human concerns
over honour, respect or the image of oneself presented to others.
3 For further information, see the National Development and Reform Commission
(2014) and annual white papers on China’s climate policies and actions issued by
the commission.
4 In accordance with the official translation of 生态文明, the English version of the
plan should be called the ‘Integrated Reform Plan for Promoting Ecological
Civilization’.
5 According to Scott Barrett’s (2008, 45) definition, geoengineering means ‘the delib-
erate modification of the climate by means other than by changing the atmospheric
concentration of greenhouse gases’.
Bibliography
Barrett, Scott. 2008. ‘The incredible economics of geoengineering’. Environmental and
Resource Economics 39:1, 45–54.
Brady, Anne-Marie. 2012. ‘The Beijing Olympics as a campaign of mass distraction’.
In Brady, Anne-Marie (ed.), China’s Thought Management. New York: Routledge,
11–35.
Buckley, Tim, Simon Nicholas & Melissa Brown. 2018. ‘China 2017 Review. World’s
Second-Biggest Economy Continues to Drive Global Trends in Energy Invest-
ment’. Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis, Cleveland, OH.
Buzan, Barry. 2004. From International to World Society? English School Theory and
the Social Structure of Globalisation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Chen, Zhihao, Linwei Ma, Pei Liu & Zheng Li. 2017. ‘Electric vehicle development in
China: A charging behavior and power sector supply balance analysis’. Chemical
Ingineering Research and Design (article in press). DOI: 10.1016/j.cherd.2017.11.016.
China Climate Change Info-Net. 2015. ‘《第三次气候变化国家评估报告》发布’ [The
‘Third National Climate Change Assessment Report’ released]. Accessed 4 March
2016. www.ccchina.gov.cn/Detail.aspx?newsId=56949&TId=57.
Climate Change Tracker. 2018. ‘Country summary’. Accessed 4 June 2018. http://
climateactiontracker.org/countries/china.html.
148 Fulfilment of China’s climate responsibility
Dahowski, R. T. et al. 2009. ‘A preliminary cost curve assessment of carbon dioxide
capture and storage potential in China’. Energy Procedia 1:1, 2849–2856.
Deng, Yong. 2008. China’s Struggle for Status: The Realignment of International
Relations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Dent, Christopher M. 2014. Renewable Energy in East Asia: Towards a new devel-
opmentalism. New York: Routledge.
Ding, Sheng. 2008. ‘To build a “harmonious world”: China’s soft power wielding in
the Global South’. Journal of Chinese Political Science 13:2, 193–213.
Economy, Elizabeth. 1998. ‘China’s environmental diplomacy’. In Samuel S. Kim
(ed.), Chinese Foreign Policy Faces the New Millennium, 4th edition. Boulder, CO:
Westview Press, 264–283.
Fan, Cindy C. 2006. ‘China’s Eleventh Five-Year Plan (2006–2010): From “getting rich
first” to “common prosperity”’. Eurasian Geography and Economics, 47:6, 708–723.
Fu, Sha, Zou Ji & Linwei Liu. 2015. ‘对中国国家自主贡献的几点评论’ [Comments
on China’s intended nationally determined contribution]. China’s National Center
for Climate Change Strategy and International Cooperation, Beijing.Accessed 4
March 2016. http://files.ncsc.org.cn/www/201506/20150630222928152.pdf.
Gardiner, Stephen M. 2011. A Perfect Moral Storm: The Ethical Tragedy of Climate
Change. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Gardiner, Stephen M. 2010. ‘Is “arming the future” with geoengineering really the
lesser evil?’. In Stephen M. GardinerSimon Caney, Dale Jamieson & Henry Shue
(eds), Climate Ethics: Essential Readings. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 284–312.
Garnaut, Ross. 2013. ‘China’s contribution to the global mitigation effort’. East Asia
Forum, 26 June. Accessed 3 March 2018. www.eastasiaforum.org/2013/06/26/china
s-contribution-to-the-global-mitigation-effort.
Hao, Han, Xiang Cheng, Zongwei Liu & Fuquan Zhao. 2017. ‘Electric vehicles for
greenhouse gas reduction in China: A costeffectiveness analysis’. Transportation
Research (Part D: Transport and Environment) 56, 68–84.
Harrington, Jonathan. 2005. ‘“Panda diplomacy”: State environmentalism, international
relations and Chinese foreign policy’. In Paul. G. Harris (ed.), Confronting Environ-
mental Change in East and Southeast Asia: Eco-Politics, Foreign Policy, and Sustain-
able Development. London: United Nations University Press andEarthscan, 102–118.
Harris, Paul G. 2013. What’s Wrong with Climate Politics and How to Fix It. Cam-
bridge: Polity Press.
Heggelund, Gørild, Steinar Andresen & Inga Fritzen Buan. 2010. ‘Chinese climate
policy: Domestic priorities, foreign policy, and emerging implementation’. In
Kathryn Harrison & Lisa McIntosh Sundstrom (eds), Global Commons, Domestic
Decisions. Cambridge, MA:MIT Press. 229–259.
Hopwood, Bill, Mary Mellor & Geoff O’Brien. 2005. ‘Sustainable development:
Mapping different approaches’. Sustainable Development 13, 38–52.
Hu, Jintao. 2007. ‘Hold high the great banner of socialism with Chinese characteristics
and strive for new victories in building a moderately prosperous society in all
respects’. Accessed 4 March 2018. www.china.org.cn/english/congress/229611.htm.
Hubbard, Christopher. 2014. Fukushima and Beyond: Nuclear Power in a Low-Carbon
World. New York: Routledge.
Hurd, Ian. 2007. After Anarchy: Legitimacy and Power in the United Nations Security
Council. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Hurd, Ian. 1999. ‘Legitimacy and authority in international politics’. International
Organization 53:2, 379–408.
Fulfilment of China’s climate responsibility 149
Hurrell, Andrew. 2007. On Global order. Power, Values, and the Constitution of Inter-
national Society. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Höhne, Niklas, Thomas Day, Gesine Hänsel & Hanna Fekete. 2015. ‘Assessing the
missed benefits of countries’ national contributions’. NewClimate Institute for Cli-
mate Policy and Global Sustainability, Cologne.
Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China. 2011.
‘White paper: China’s policies and actions for addressing climate change’. Accessed
3 March 2018. www.china-un.org/eng/hyyfy/t521513.htm.
Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China. 2008.
‘White paper: China’s policies and actions for addressing climate change’. Accessed
3 March 2018. www.china-un.org/eng/hyyfy/t521513.htm.
International Energy Agency. 2017. ‘Renewables 2017: Analysis and forecasts to 2022.
Executive summary’. Accessed 3 February 2018. www.iea.org/Textbase/npsum/
renew2017MRSsum.pdf.
International Energy Agency. 2014. ‘Energy subsidies’. Accessed 4 March 2016. www.
worldenergyoutlook.org/resources/energysubsidies/
Johnston, Alistair I. 1998: ‘China and international institutions: A decision rule ana-
lysis’. In Michael B. McElroy, Chris P. Nielson & Peter Lydon (eds),Energizing
China: Reconciling Environmental Protection and Economic Growth. Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press, 555–599.
Kassiola, Joel Jay & Sujian Guo (eds). 2010. China’s Environmental Crisis: Domestic
and Global Political Impacts and Responses. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Kobayashi, Yuka. 2005. ‘The ‘troubled modernizer’: Three decades of Chinese envir-
onmental policy and diplomacy’. In Paul G. Harris (ed.), Confronting Environmental
Change in East and Southeast Asia: Eco-Politics, Foreign Policy, and Sustainable
Development. London: United Nations University Press and Earthscan, 87–101.
Kong, Yigang, Jie Wang, Zhigang Kong, Furong Song, Zhiqi Liu & Congmei Wei.
2015. ‘Small hydropower in China: The survey and sustainable future’. Renewable
and Sustainable Energy Reviews 48, 425–433.
Kong, Yigang, Zhigang Kong, Zhiqi Liu, Congmei Wei & Gaocheng An. 2016. ‘Sub-
stituting small hydropower for fuel: The practice of China and the sustainable
development’. Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews 65, 978–991.
Kopra, Sanna. 2016. ‘Great power management and China’s responsibility in interna-
tional climate politics’. Journal of China and International Relations 4:1, 20–44.
Kopra, Sanna. 2012. ‘Is China a responsible developing country? Climate change
diplomacy and national image building’. Centre for Qualitative Social Research,
Department of Sociology, Hong Kong Shue Yan University, Social and Cultural
Research Occasional Paper no 13.
Lan, Lan. 2010. ‘“No intention” of capping emissions’. China Daily, 25 February. Acces-
sed 3 March 2018. www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2010-02/25/content_9499066.htm.
Li, Keqiang. 2014. ‘Report on the work of the government’. Accessed 20 February
2015. http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/special/2014-03/14/c_133187027.htm.
Li, Peng. 1995. ‘Report on the outline of the Ninth Five-Year Plan (1996–2000) for
National Economic and Social Development and the Long-range Objectives
to the Year 2010 (excerpts)’. Accessed 20 February 2015. www.china.org.cn/95e/
95-english1/2.htm.
Li, Xiao-zhu, Zhi-jun Chen, Xiao-chao Fan & Zhi-jiang Cheng. 2018. ‘Hydropower
development situation and prospects in China’. Renewable and Sustainable Energy
Reviews 82, 232–239.
150 Fulfilment of China’s climate responsibility
Liu, Coco & ClimateWire. 2014. ‘China will limit pollution from steel and cement’.
Scientific American, 6 November. Accessed 22 February 2017. www.scientificam
erican.com/article/china-will-limit-pollution-from-steel-and-cement/
Ministry of Environmental Protection. 2008. ‘National Eleventh Five-Year Plan for
Environmental Protection’. Accessed 22 February 2017. http://english.mep.gov.cn/
Plans_Reports/11th_five_year_plan/200803/t20080305_119001_1.htm.
National Development and Reform Commission. 2015. ‘Enhanced actions on climate
change: China’s intended nationally determined contribution’. Accessed 4 March 2018.
http://www4.unfccc.int/submissions/indc/Submission%20Pages/submissions.aspx
National Development and Reform Commission. 2014. ‘国家应对气候变化规划
(2014–2020年)’ [National Climate Change Plan (2014–2020)]. Accessed 22 February
2017. www.ccchina.gov.cn/nDetail.aspx?newsId=49211&TId=60.
National Development and Reform Commission. 2013. ‘国家适应气候变化战略’
[National Climate Change Adaptation Strategy]. Accessed 22 February 2017. www.
sdpc.gov.cn/zcfb/zcfbtz/201312/W020131209343322750059.pdf
National Development and Reform Commission. 2012. ‘China’s policies and actions
for addressing climate change’. Accessed 22 February 2017. www.ccchina.gov.cn/
WebSite/CCChina/UpFile/File1324.pdf.
National Development and Reform Commission. 2007. ‘China’s National Climate
Change Programme’. Accessed 22 February 2017. www.china.org.cn/english/envir
onment/213624.htm.
National People’s Congress & Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference.
2016. 中华人民共和国国民经济和社会发展第十三个五年规划纲要 [The Thirteenth
Five-Year Plan for the National Economic and Social Development of the People ‘s
Republic of China]. Accessed 23 October 2016. http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/
2016lh/2016-03/17/c_1118366322.htm.
Pan, Jihua, Haibing Ma & Ying Zhang. 2011. ‘Green economy and green jobs in
China: Current status and potentials for 2020’. Worldwatch Report 185.
Percival, Bronson. 2007. The Dragon Looks South: China and Southeast Asia in the
New Century. Westport: Praeger Security International.
Reuters. 2016. ‘China to cap coal at 55 percent of total power output by 2020: NEA’. 7
November. Accessed 22 February 2018. www.reuters.com/article/us-china-power-
consumption/china-to-cap-coal-at-55-percent-of-total-power-output-by-2020-nea
-idUSKBN1320LT.
Roberts, J. Timmons & Bradley C. Parks. 2007. A Climate of Injustice: Global
inequality, North-South Politics, and Climate Policy. Cambridge, MA, and London:
MIT Press.
Sahu, Bikash Kumar. 2018. ‘Wind energy developments and policies in China: A short
review’. Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews 81:1, 1393–1405.
Shaikh, Saleem & Sughra Tunio. 2017. ‘Pakistan ramps up coal power with Chinese-
backed plants’. Reuters, 3 May. Accessed 22 February 2018. www.reuters.com/a
rticle/us-pakistan-energy-coal/pakistan-ramps-up-coal-power-with-chinese-backed-p
lants-idUSKBN17Z019.
Shouqiu, Cai and Mark Voigts. 1993. ‘The development of China’s environmental
diplomacy’. Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal 3, 17–42.
Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress. 2009. ‘全国人民代表大会常务
委员会关于积极应对气候变化的决议’. [Standing Committee of the National Peo-
ple’s Congress resolution on tackling climate change]. Accessed 23 October 2016.
www.npc.gov.cn/npc/xinwen/rdyw/wj/2009-08/27/content_1516165.htm.
Fulfilment of China’s climate responsibility 151
Steffen, Will, Åsa Persson, Lisa Deutsch, Jan Zalasiewicz, Mark Williams, Katherine
Richardson, Carole Crumley, Paul Crutzen, Carl Folke, Line Gordon, Mario
Molina, Veerabhadran Ramanathan, Johan Rockström, Marten Scheffer, Hans
Joachim Schellnhuber & Uno Svedin. 2011. ‘The Anthropocene: From global
change to planetary stewardship’. AMBIO 40(7), 739–761.
Stern, Nicholas. 2006. ‘Stern Review: The economics of climate change’. Accessed 23
October 2016. http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.hm-treasury.
gov.uk/stern_review_report.htm.
Strauss, Benjamin H., Scott Kulp & Anders Levermann. 2015. ‘Mapping choices:
Carbon, climate, and rising seas, our global legacy’. Climate Central Research
Report, 1–38. Accessed 2 May 2018. http://sealevel.climatecentral.org/uploads/resea
rch/Global-Mapping-Choices-Report.pdf.
Su, Wei. 2010. ‘Untitled letter from Su Wei, Director-General of Department of Cli-
mate Change, National Development and Reform Commission of China to Yvo de
Boer, Executive Secretary of the UNFCCC Secretariat’. Accessed 23 October 2016.
https://unfccc.int/files/meetings/cop_15/copenhagen_accord/application/pdf/chinacp
haccord_app2.pdf.
UNFCCC (United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change). 2015.
‘Adoption of the Paris Agreement: Proposal by the president’, 12 December.
Accessed 14 March 2017. http://unfccc.int/documentation/documents/advanced_sea
rch/items/6911.php?priref=600008831..
UNFCCC (United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change). 1992.
‘United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change’. Accessed 3 March
2017. http://unfccc.int/files/essential_background/background_publications_htmlp
df/application/pdf/conveng.pdf.
U.S.–China Climate Leaders’ Declaration. 2015. ‘On the occasion of the first session
of the U.S.-China Climate-Smart/Low-Carbon Cities summit Los Angeles, CA,
September 15–16, 2015.’ Accessed 3 March 2017. http://go.wh.gov/cSqu8N.
Wang, Hongying. 2005. ‘National image building and Chinese foreign policy’. In Yong
Deng & Fei-Ling Wang (eds), China Rising. Power and Motivation in Chinese For-
eign Policy, Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 73–102.
Wendt, Alexander. 1999. Social Theory of International Politics. Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press.
Wesangula, Daniel. 2017. ‘Kenya signs China deal for coal plant beside Unesco site’.
Climate Home News, 23 May. Accessed 22 February 2018. www.climatechange
news.com/2017/05/23/kenya-signs-china-deal-coal-plant-beside-unesco-site/.
White House. 2015a. ‘U.S.-China joint presidential statement on climate change’.
Accessed 3 March 2017. www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/09/25/us-china
-joint-presidential-statement-climate-change.
White House. 2015b. ‘Fact sheet: U.S.–China climate leaders summit’. Accessed 3
March 2017. www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/09/15/fact-sheet-us-%E2%
80%93-china-climate-leaders-summit.
White House. 2014. ‘U.S.-China joint announcement on climate change’. Accessed 3
March 2017. www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/11/11/us-china-joint-announ
cement-climate-change
World Nuclear Association. 2018. ‘Nuclear power in China’. Accessed 22 February 2018.
www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/country-profiles/countries-a-f/china-nuclea
r-power.aspx.
152 Fulfilment of China’s climate responsibility
Wu, Xinbo. 2001. ‘Four contradictions constraining China’s foreign policy behavior’.
Journal of Contemporary China 10:27, 293–301.
Xie, Zhenhua. 2010. ‘Speech at the high level segment of COP16&CMP6’. Accessed
23 October 2016. http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/cop_16/statements/application/pdf/
101208_cop16_hls_china.pdf.
Xinhua. 2017. ‘Economic Watch: China mulls timetable to ban fossil fuel vehicles’. 11
September. Accessed 22 February 2018. www.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-09/11/c_
136601024.htm.
Xinhua. 2015a. ‘授权发布中共中央国务院关于加快推进生态文明建设的意见’ [Author-
ized release: An opinion of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee and
State Council regarding acceleration of promotion of the construction of ecological
civilization]. 5 May. Accessed 23 October 2016. http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/
2015-05/05/c_1115187518.htm
Xinhua. 2015b. ‘Full Text: Integrated reform plan for promoting ecological progress’.
21 September. Accessed 23 October 2016. http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/
2015-09/21/c_134646023.htm.
Xinhua. 2014. ‘China unveils energy strategy, targets for 2020’. 19 November. Acces-
sed 23 October 2016. http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2014-11/19/c_
133801014.htm.
Xinhua. 2009. ‘China announces targets on carbon emission cuts’. 26 November.
Accessed 23 October 2016. http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-11/26/content_
12544181.htm.
Xu, Muyu, & Josephine Mason. 2017 ‘China aims for emission trading scheme in big
step vs. global warming’. Reuters, 19 December. Accessed 22 February 2018. www.
reuters.com/article/us-china-carbon/china-aims-for-emission-trading-scheme-in-big-
step-vs-global-warming-idUSKBN1ED0R6.
Zhang, Hui & Shangui Zhao. 2013. ‘China moves cautiously ahead on nuclear
energy’. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 22 April. Accessed 22 February 2018.
https://thebulletin.org/china-moves-cautiously-ahead-nuclear-energy
Zhao, Xingang et al. 2012. ‘A critical-analysis on the development of China hydro-
power’. Renewable Energy 44, 1–6.
Fulfilment of China’s climate responsibility 153
7 Great climate irresponsibles?1
During the past 40 years, as environmental norms have slowly but steadily
been integrated into international society, profound normative change has
occurred as states have created a complex set of rules and institutions to sus-
tain and organise environmental practices. In that sense, the answer to Robert
Jackson’s (1996) question ‘Can international society be green?’ seems to be
positive; many environmental treaties and organisations enjoy almost uni-
versal support, and states, including great powers, routinely participate in
environmental diplomacy. International society has also succeeded in devel-
oping important rules, including common but differentiated responsibilities,
for the distribution of special climate responsibilities among states. In another
sense, as environmental degradation persistently accumulates and climate
change accelerates, it remains frustratingly difficult to give a favourable
answer to Jackson’s question. After all, international society has failed to
promote genuine international justice, real human suffering has not been
alleviated, and social disparities continue to compound both locally and
globally. In response to those failures, the need to transform international
climate practices remains critical. In this chapter, I summarise the chief con-
tributions of the book, as well as discuss weaknesses in the international
norms of climate responsibility. I argue that a more balanced, solidarist con-
ceptualisation of the human–nature relationship is necessary to achieve the
genuine change required to make international society ‘green’. From that
perspective, given their role as gatekeepers of international society, great
powers are bound to shoulder more responsibility for mitigating and adapting
to climate change.
Climate responsibility in international society
In this book, I have examined the institutionalisation of international norms
of climate responsibility via the lens of English School theory. Traditionally,
English School scholars have been largely uninterested in secondary institu-
tions (i.e. international organisations and regimes) and tended to believe that
regime theorists are responsible for studying instrumental secondary institu-
tions. Recently, however, a growing number of English School theorists have
stated that the holistic approach of the English School, which primarily
focuses on primary institutions in institutional change, is necessary to com-
prehend the evolution of international norms and practices but cannot afford
complete understanding on its own. In contrast to liberal institutionalists,
who assume that international organisations create and manage international
order by formulating international rules and procedures, English School the-
orists emphasise that international order is organised and sustained by pri-
mary institutions, which also shape the operations of secondary ones. When it
comes to international responsibilities, however, the role of secondary insti-
tutions is vital. Without the establishment of secondary institutions, it would
be difficult, if not impossible, to negotiate and mediate the positive responsi-
bilities of states concerning global problems. As I have illustrated, interna-
tional responsibilities are not given; on the contrary, participants in secondary
institutions negotiate the responsibilities of themselves and other participants,
the ethical grounds on which such responsibilities are distributed among par-
ticipants and by which mechanisms they are implemented and monitored.
However, primary institutions always shape those negotiations as well.
Although some responsibilities are formulated as legal obligations in interna-
tional treaties, most state responsibilities are uncodified in international law
and thus remain informal.
Given my interest in the evolution of international norms and practices,
I have traced the early development of rules pertaining to the norm of
climate responsibility at length. In so doing, I have sought to denaturalise
assumptions related to climate diplomacy. International norms and prac-
tices do not emerge out of thin air, nor can they be traced to a single
treaty. Although the 1992 UN Conference on Environment and Develop-
ment in Rio de Janeiro marked a watershed for the institutionalisation of
environmental norms, it would be a mistake to assume that practices of
climate responsibility began to evolve there. As I have shown, to fully
trace the evolution of climate responsibility, we need to delve further into
the past and analyse the myriad international environmental treaties and
conferences since the 1970s, if not before. As the concept of climate
responsibility was constructed, the cornerstones were laid in 1972, well
before the concept’s broader architecture was added with the formulation
of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in
1992. To trace the concept’s evolution in China in particular, I also briefly
explored ancient China’s and Maoist China’s environmental practices,
which form the ideological basis for contemporary ideas of climate
responsibility in China. As I have demonstrated, China’s stance during
international environmental negotiations since 1972 has not significantly
changed. Indeed, as my investigation into the history of climate responsi-
bility has revealed, isolated Maoist China was not a norm-taker but a
norm-maker in international environmental practices. As such, China,
amid its rise in the twenty-first century, will likely be a status quo power
in international environmental politics.
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At present, climate responsibility is a highly state-centric norm. Above all,
it focuses on interstate responsibilities – that is, states’ obligations to reduce
emissions and provide assistance to poorer states – and does not pay much
attention to cosmopolitan notions of responsibility (cf. Harris 2010).
Although the norm takes an unusually anthropocentric approach to nature, it
is not a characteristically humanist norm, for it does not clearly recognise the
environmental rights of people. At the same time, and perhaps needless to say,
climate responsibility does not position nature as its moral referent object and
largely dismisses its rights as a result. Nevertheless, the emergence of the
international norm of climate responsibility has spelled profound normative
change in international society, in which environmental stewardship has
come to constitute a collective responsibility of both states and non-state
actors (cf. Falkner 2012; Falkner and Buzan 2018). Climate responsibility has
thus clearly become an established international norm with which even the
most powerful states must comply if they wish to be and be seen as respon-
sible international agents (Kopra forthcoming). Consequently, states have
continued to participate in climate negotiations since the development of
the Kyoto Protocol even if they initially disapproved or later withdrew from the
agreement. Despite widespread, continued conflict regarding climate responsi-
bility, as well as pointed criticism of the contributions of other states, no state
has simply walked away from climate negotiations.
The UNFCCC functions as the single most important secondary institu-
tion regarding climate responsibility. Nevertheless, in being so quickly nego-
tiated – in about two years – the treaty has promoted two assumptions
regarding the governance of climate responsibility. On the one hand, its rapid
formation suggested both that states regarded climate change as a common
concern of international society and that a correspondingly strong political
will existed to take action against it. On the other, the UNFCCC was not
initially characterised as a strong organisation that could harm a state’s
sovereignty or national interests (Kopra 2018, Kopra forthcoming). Conse-
quently, the UNFCCC has failed to cultivate a so-called ‘thick’ international
society around climate responsibility, and many central questions related to
such responsibility, including finance and compensation, remain unanswered
(cf. Palmujoki 2013, 191–192). Moreover, apart from general ideas of state
responsibility, the UNFCCC imposes no rules for liability in causing envir-
onmental harm, even if compensation for damage caused to future genera-
tions or Earth itself could be calculated and given force in the first place.
Despite the UNFCCC’s failure to decelerate climate change, it clearly
remains significant in international society. In general, secondary institutions
are important because they provide a social forum in which states and non-
state actors can sustain a dialogue, which, at best, can increase their and the
general public’s environmental awareness and willingness to strengthen the
rules of environmental governance. In other words, the UNFCCC creates a
political framework in which state and non-state actors can negotiate more
effective and ambitious climate-related agreements and thus improve their
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future performance (Kopra 2018, Kopra forthcoming). If the UNFCCC were
to be dismantled, no alternative, equally effective forum for advocating inter-
national commitments would exist, and there is no time to establish another
in its stead. Nevertheless, the UNFCCC has no intrinsic value and could –
some may say it should – be displaced by post-national climate practices in
the future.
Of course, the UNFCCC is no longer the sole platform for international
climate action. A growing number of non-state climate change initiatives and
experiments take root year after year, which could signal emerging notions of
cosmopolitan climate responsibility. On the one hand, the number of non-
governmental climate initiatives and organisations indicate the UNFCCC’s
weakness in resolving the climate crisis and the failure of states to shoulder
their climate responsibility, both of which signs call for alternative approa-
ches. On the other, the active participation of non-state actors demonstrates
that world society is convinced of the urgency of climate change and that,
without their participation, efforts to mitigate climate change are likely to
fail. From the perspective of the English School, the potential fragmentation
and diversification of climate governance is not necessarily a weakness but
‘indicates a common understanding and a “thick” interpretation’ of climate
responsibility (Palmujoki 2013, 195). From that viewpoint, private and public
initiatives outside the UNFCCC not only offer multiple, potentially more
efficient channels to organise and enact climate responsibility but also engage
the broader participation of both state and non-state actors (ibid., 192). That
view also poses the critical question of whether climate responsibility will
develop into a so-called ‘standard of civilization’ that defines and validates the
practices of civilized members of international society and world society in
the future (Kopra forthcoming).
Some observers argue that sovereignty stands as the greatest obstacle to
effective environmental protection and that transcending state-centric inter-
national society is thus a precondition for the genuine assimilation of climate
responsibility (e.g. Falk 1972; Harris 2010). However, sovereignty per se is not
the principal reason why international society has failed to respond to climate
change and other global environmental problems, for any other universal
political order, whether some sort of world government or cosmopolitan
world society, would face the same problems. Moreover, no evidence suggests
that such a world government or society would somehow be more solidarist
or ecocentric than today’s state-centric one, and in any case, it would be
similarly shaped by the power struggles and calculations of self-interest
among individuals (cf. Williams 2005). Without a minimum international
order in place, responding to climate change and organising action against it
would be exceedingly difficult. If relatively small units such as states find it
challenging to agree on effective political actions, then how would larger units
be able to make any difference?
Arguably, sovereignty has to be redefined in more solidarist terms in order
to function in today’s global era; it should not only focus on inter-state
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relations and justice but also pay more attention to the wellbeing of people.
Accordingly, I conclude that a key reason for the failure of international society
to find effective and fair solutions to climate change is a lack of great power lea-
dership. Great powers have the greatest responsibility for sustaining and orga-
nising international society, and climate change has emerged as an overriding risk
to international security as well as human justice and wellbeing. Although both
the United States and China have acknowledged the existence of great power
climate responsibility, they have refused to commit to binding emissions reduc-
tion targets under the UNFCCC, and the United States in particular has failed to
fulfil its domestic climate responsibility and provide developing countries with
much-needed assistance to mitigate and adapt to climate change.
That said, great power management has played an important role in insti-
tutionalising the international norm of climate responsibility. Under the lea-
dership of the United States, prominent steps were taken from the 1960s to
early 1990s, during which time China shaped the construction of the building
blocks of environmental stewardship. Although the United States abandoned
the Kyoto Protocol and little progress was made in international climate
negotiations in the early 2000s, during the presidency of Barack Obama, the
United States acknowledged great power responsibility for climate change
and took significant diplomatic action to promote collective efforts in
response to climate change. In addition to domestic developments that ele-
vated the position of environmental issues on the Chinese government’s
agenda, such action convinced China to assume a more constructive role in
international climate politics. As China realised that climate responsibility
could cement its membership in the great power club, it began to promote
climate responsibility as an attribute of great power responsibility. In time,
US–Chinese collaboration on climate change made the establishment of the
Paris Agreement possible. However, insofar as both great powers have
advanced voluntary domestic action plans as key means to fulfil climate
responsibility, great power climate responsibility continues to be an informal
international norm that will not likely be formalised in the near future, par-
ticularly as long as Donald Trump’s administration continues to shirk that
responsibility. Nevertheless, as long as China insists upon the link between
great power status and responsibility for climate change, its emerging leader-
ship in international climate politics could induce profound normative change
in international society.
Climate responsibility with Chinese characteristics
After examining the Chinese government’s notions of national responsibilities
and interpretations of the international norm of climate responsibility, I argue
that we cannot regard China as being irresponsible in international climate
politics. After all, it has participated in international collaborations addres-
sing climate change since the 1980s, taken more voluntary action than inter-
national law requires, and constructed a comprehensive environmental policy
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framework from scratch since the late 1970s. Nevertheless, China’s notion of
climate responsibility has remained highly retrospective by exclusively pursu-
ing historical justice. That conceptualisation stresses the cumulative responsi-
bility of developed countries to address climate change while allocating little
responsibility to developing countries, among which China counts itself.
However, China’s position in international climate negotiations has changed
dramatically since the 2009 UN Climate Change Conference in Copenhagen.
Symptomatic of that transformation, responsibility has entered the party-
state’s lexicon, and today, Chinese political leaders and the general public
widely agree that China’s economic miracle has come at a high environmental
price. Above all, they recognise that they – and the planet – cannot afford to
follow the Western model of industrialisation based on the ‘pollute first, clean
up later’ mentality (Xie 2010).
Because coping with environmental degradation ranks among the greatest
challenges that China faces today, the Chinese government has had no choice
but to integrate environmental protection, emissions reduction and energy
conservation into the country’s overall development targets. China’s climate
policy is thus largely driven by the Communist Party’s concerns with its
legitimacy. In terms of mitigating climate change, the motive of emissions
reductions is therefore not nearly as important to China developing what it
calls an ‘ecological civilisation’. Only time will tell whether eco-civilisation
remains primary a device of party rhetoric or exerts real political influence in
transforming China’s path towards development. In the meantime, however,
when it comes to great power climate responsibility, drivers of climate policy
do matter. A state can be defined as a great power only if it and other mem-
bers of international society regard it as having special rights and responsi-
bilities on the international stage (Bull 1980). By contrast, China’s climate
policy is chiefly motivated by domestic interests, and China can thus hardly
be regarded as fulfilling great power responsibility.
Although the chief referent objects of China’s climate responsibility are not
humankind or the environment but the party-state and the Chinese nation,
China no longer focuses solely on national responsibilities. Consequently, it
seems that China increasingly identifies itself as a great power. Such a change
in identity has become especially visible in the context of international finan-
cial governance, in which China has established new, alternative multilateral
organisations that may challenge their US-led counterparts in the future.
Because China has published all recent important climate change mitigation
objectives as well as ratified the Paris Agreement in joint press conferences
with the United States, it appears that it has formulated its climate policies in
reference to its potential great power status. However, China continues to
oppose formal discussions on climate change at the UN Security Council,
largely because it does not operate under the principle of common but dif-
ferentiated responsibilities, which absolves it from assuming legally binding
climate responsibilities. Furthermore, China’s conviction of the importance of
assuring that the voices of all developing countries are heard in international
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climate negotiations has supported its stance that, as a decision-making body
not based on universal participation, the UN Security Council is not an
appropriate forum for discussing climate responsibility (cf. Wang 2011). From
a realist perspective, China’s motives in underscoring the UN system are
clear; the Chinese government wants to preserve its privilege of having a
permanent seat on the UN Security Council in order to restrain US hege-
mony and also support the principle of common but differentiated responsi-
bilities, which guarantees that developing countries, including itself, need not
commit to legally binding greenhouse gas emissions reductions. The Kyoto
Protocol’s flexible mechanisms, particularly the Clean Development Mechan-
ism, represent important incentives for countries reluctant to take action
against climate change, and China has undoubtedly benefitted a great deal
from such projects. From the perspective of the English School, however,
China’s increasing participation in multilateral cooperation suggests that
China has fully integrated into international society and may become willing
to shoulder more responsibility in addressing global concerns such as climate
change.
To evaluate whether China’s notion of climate responsibility is ethically
acceptable, it is useful to examine whether China has taken action that could
be viewed as irresponsible. In other words, we can gain a better understanding
of Chinese practices, perceptions and objectives by highlighting what China
‘is not doing’ (Medeiros 2009, 213). First, China does not promote its poli-
tical objectives by aggressive means but participates in international multi-
lateral negotiations. Second, it does not promote a radically alternative
regional or global order but instead supports international organisations and
regimes. Third, it does not pursue confrontation with the United States but
seeks to actively cultivate a peaceful relationship with the United States and
other great powers. Fourth, it does not dispute the reality of climate change
but has integrated climate change plans into its overall policy strategies.
Nevertheless, since Robert B. Zoellick’s speech in 2005, Western countries
began urging China to become a ‘responsible stakeholder’ and shoulder more
global responsibility, including climate change responsibility, which indicates
that China had not been a responsible stakeholder theretofore. Because, as
Chen Zhimin (2009, 26) points out, ‘undertaking and demanding interna-
tional responsibility are both noble causes’, it is not inappropriate to ask
China to shoulder more global responsibility, for doing so will ‘enhance the
awareness of responsibility’ among China’s political elite and its general
public. At the same time, a few important aspects should be remembered
when criticising China of irresponsibility in international climate politics.
First, per capita emissions are much lower in China than in the United States
and many other developed countries. Second, the lion’s share of China’s
increasing greenhouse gas emissions are caused by exports to the West,
meaning that Western consumers are partly responsible for increasing emis-
sions in China. Last, all states have national responsibilities and cannot
assume international responsibilities that are beyond their economic or
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political abilities to bear. Indeed, all three points are central to China’s stance
on climate responsibility: that international expectations of its global respon-
sibility should be closely linked to its stage of development.
China’s permanent seat on the UN Security Council imposes special
responsibilities upon the Chinese government. From that viewpoint, China
arguably has a moral duty to bear more responsibility than smaller states and
cannot escape its obligation to develop strong policies to mitigate climate
change. Although China recognises that great powers have great responsi-
bilities, it does not unequivocally define itself as a great power in the context
of climate politics but describes itself as simply a responsible major or big
power, mostly in reference to its size and population. Although many rural
citizens remain poor in China, many urban ones are extremely wealthy and
pursue lifestyles as unsustainable as those of Westerners, if not more so. At its
current level of development, China’s wealth and capacity to execute ambi-
tious actions against climate change will continue to expand and make it
increasingly difficult for its government to assure the world that it is a devel-
oping country. After all, if the Chinese state can afford to twice hold an
extravagant Olympic Games and venture into space, then how can it not
afford to mitigate climate change? Consequently, many observers have sug-
gested that China should abandon its identity as a victim of the Century of
Shame. Jin Canrong (2011, 6–7, 11–12) proposes, for instance, that China
should ‘establish and adjust to the great power mentality’, which partly
involves proactively assuming international responsibilities. Jin’s con-
ceptualisation of great power status clearly binds that status to great responsi-
bilities: ‘What’s more, a country with great power mentality should be
responsible and sympathetic over the weak, advocate equality and justice and
work for the well-being of the people and the peace of the world’ (ibid., 7).
Responding to the issue of climate change could provide China with an
opportunity to prove to the world its emerging status as a world leader.
Prospects for China’s leadership in international climate politics
In line with China’s rising international status, many observers have begun to
worry whether China will cooperate in line with contemporary international
norms and practices created by the United States after World War II.
Although others have suggested that China will attempt to shape con-
temporary international society and pursue some sort of China-centred
international order instead, China’s increasing interest in multilateral coop-
eration during recent decades could signal its acceptance of contemporary
international norms and its felt responsibility as a member of international
society. Even if China did overtake the United States as the hegemonic leader
of the world, it would face a starkly different sort of international society than
previous rising powers – for example, the United States in the early twentieth
century.2 Unless world war breaks out, it is unlikely that existing secondary
institutions will collapse, meaning that China will lack the opportunity to
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design a radically new system of global governance in accordance with its
preferences. Moreover, contemporary problems differ fundamentally from
those faced before and after World War II; instead of the balance-of-power
security dilemmas characteristic of the Cold War period, today’s problems
vary from terrorism to financial crises and from environmental degradation
and climate change to issues of global health and food security. No matter
how powerful a state, it cannot solve those problems unilaterally but has to
depend upon international cooperation. Therefore, it is unlikely, if not
impossible, that China will abandon international society. In reality, voluntary
participation in international organisations and compliance with international
law can be important factors of a state’s soft power and reputation as a good
international citizen, as well as its legitimacy and credibility. Indeed, all of
those values are significant drivers of Chinese politics.
Regarding climate change, David G. Victor (2011) divides the states of the
world into two categories: enthusiastic and reluctant. Enthusiastic states –
mostly EU countries but also essentially all developed nations – are keener to
devote their resources to cutting emissions and leading international efforts
against climate change. Given the President Obama’s active role in international
climate negotiations, Victor ranks the United States among the enthusiastic
states despite its refusal to ratify the Kyoto Protocol and failure to adopt a pro-
gressive national climate policy. Today, however, led by climate-sceptic Donald
Trump, the United States undoubtedly falls into the latter category – reluctant
states. In 2011, Victor’s reluctant country group included China and all other
BRIC countries, which, despite becoming major greenhouse gas emitters, had
not prioritised action against climate change on their national agendas but
focused on maintaining economic growth and demanded that developed coun-
tries shoulder all responsibility for mitigating climate change. In Victor’s frame-
work, reluctant countries remain unwilling to take action against climate change
unless emissions controls coincide with their national interests, such as ensuring
energy security and reducing local pollution. Indeed, China long resisted taking
any responsibility for mitigating climate change by instead insisting upon the
historically informed responsibility of developed countries to lead those efforts,
as well as refused to commit in any binding emissions reduction targets because
emissions controls would have raised the cost of doing business in China. China’s
attitude towards allaying climate change, however, has transformed since Vic-
tor’s book was published in 2011. Today, identity and belief are important dri-
vers in shaping China’s role in international climate negotiations and it seems
liable to emerge as an enthusiastic country with exceptional potential to fuel a
new era of international climate politics.
Most likely, China will not abandon international climate negotiations.
Mitigating climate change does not contradict the objectives of the Chinese
party-state, and there are strong domestic incentives to decrease the use of
fossil fuels and develop green technologies instead. Moreover, since the
beginning of the Trump administration, climate politics has given China an
opportunity to represent itself as an international leader and make normative
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claims about what it means to be a responsible great power in the twenty-first
century. For China, climate responsibility is thus an appealing alternative to
liberal political solidarist norms of human rights as a ‘new standard of civi-
lization’ and a moral foundation for great power responsibility (Kopra 2018;
Kopra forthcoming). At the same time, China’s emerging role as leader does
not mean that it has somehow become a more solidarist international agent
than before. Because the post-American era is not necessarily post-hege-
monic, a China-led international society is apt to propagate a new type of
hegemony (Callahan 2008). Consequently, the focal questions to address are
what sort of great power responsibility China intends to shoulder, how it will
demonstrate that responsibility in international affairs and what normative
change its rise will generate globally.
For sceptics of technology’s role in solving environmental problems,
China’s emerging climate leadership is not necessarily good news. Nuclear
power stands as the key means to reduce China’s dependency on fossil fuels,
and China has invested heavily in carbon dioxide capture and storage tech-
nology. Furthermore, China’s climate policy – and international climate poli-
tics in general – does not take a clear stance on the role of geoengineering in
mitigating climate change, while the construction of China’s massive hydro-
power plants have engendered numerous social problems. In short, China’s
domestic climate policies and human rights record do not suggest that it
would be a solidarist climate leader that would promote human values glob-
ally or take a more solidarist approach at the international level. With its
hard-line coalitions, China sought to re-establish the division between devel-
oped and developing countries at the 2017 UN Climate Change Conference
in Bonn. Although such bifurcation is justified from the perspective of inter-
national justice and the emphasis on developed countries’ pre-2020 climate
commitments in Bonn was important to advance post-2020 actions against
climate change, China and other major emitters arguably support bifurcation
simply to avoid more ambitious emissions reduction targets for middle-
income countries such as themselves.
Arguably, international society cannot be green without a major paradigm
shift that promotes a new ecological consciousness and solidarist morals.
State responsibility does not stand upon the number of international treaties
signed but the scope and ambition of international practices, which include
forming treaties. Vaclav Havel has eloquently described the need for funda-
mental change in contemporary international society:
It is my deep conviction that the only option is a change in the sphere of
the spirit, in the sphere of human conscience. It’s not enough to invent
new machines, new regulations, new institutions. We must develop a new
understanding of the true purpose of our existence on this Earth. Only by
making such a fundamental shift will we be able to create new models of
behaviour and a new set of values for the planet.
(Quoted in Speth 2008, 200)
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Yet, instead of merely pointing out the need for change, we need to examine
what the critical drivers of such change are. Who or what can generate the
change needed for international and world society to assume climate respon-
sibility, and how? Although I have emphasised the central role of secondary
institutions in the processes of defining and distributing global responsibilities,
I do not maintain that they play the key role in generating the necessary
change in international society. Secondary institutions and international law
represent the minimum, not the maximum, standard of conduct in interna-
tional relations; moreover, they cannot guarantee that states and individuals
change their environmentally harmful practices and pollutive lifestyles. Laws
cannot force people to obey them, and not even authoritarian governments
such as China’s can achieve widespread compliance simply by issuing a policy
or law. To some extent, genuine entrenchment of climate responsibility is con-
tingent on the communiqués of global leaders and role models. From that per-
spective, Pope Francis’s encyclical letter Laudato si: On Care for Our Common
Home, the joint climate statement of religious and faith leaders around the world
prior to the 2015 UN Climate Change Conference in Paris and the increasing
number of celebrities who participate in environmental campaigns are highly
auspicious signs, for they could exert significant impact on civil society’s envir-
onmental awareness and discourse on climate change. In China, by analogy,
former basketball player Yao Ming and film star Jackie Chan have played an
influential role in WildAid’s successful campaign against shark fin soup. If civil
society views mitigating climate change as a moral responsibility, then it can
likely influence international climate practices as well.
Based on the theoretical and empirical findings of this book, I conclude
that great power management is an essential driver of fundamental change in
international society. Accordingly, the leadership of the United States and
China will be especially crucial to mobilising the political will needed to
strengthen climate responsibility globally. Given President Trump’s reluctance
to shoulder climate responsibility, the future of great power climate responsi-
bility looks quite grim. At the same time, China has great potential to act as
a role model for climate responsibility as long as it manages to develop its
sought-after ecological civilisation and modernise without recklessly increas-
ing greenhouse gas emissions. China has already introduced new concepts of
state responsibility – namely, ecological civilisation and a new type of great
power relationship – both of which have the potential to transform interna-
tional norms and practices. It remains unclear, however, whether that trans-
formation will be pluralist or solidarist in nature.
Although I have not examined ancient Chinese conceptions of the human–
nature relationship in great depth, that does not mean that they are insignif-
icant to contemporary Chinese climate practices or international society in
general. Indeed, I suggest that international relations theorists pay more
attention to traditional Chinese philosophy, the ideas of which could spur
innovation among scholars. For instance, Kubin (2010, 524) suggests that, in
the global era, the ‘Chinese view of natura naturans and the Christian concept
164 Great climate irresponsibles?
of natura naturata could complement one another so that nature becomes
both the real and the spiritual home of man’. Similarly, Daoism and Bud-
dhism could provide fruitful ideas for innovative environmental practices both
locally and globally. However, for the time being, they seem to have had little
effect on Chinese attitudes and behaviours towards nature and are unlikely to
increase their popularity in Chinese political spheres because they form ‘too
radical an alternative to the Communist Party’s statist tradition of remolding
nature’ (Shapiro 2001, 214). By contrast, Confucianism’s anthropocentrism
could be ‘well tempered through incorporating a Daoist sense of humility and
understanding of humans as part of nature, an approach articulated by a
surprising number of educated young Chinese’ (ibid.).
From the perspective of climate responsibility, an important question is
whether China’s new notions of responsibility and its philosophical traditions
will exert genuine global influence on how great power responsibilities are
defined or provide the world with new ideas about humankind’s relationship
with nature. At present, I remain highly sceptical of China’s potential to effect
the mentioned fundamental change in values in international society. China
has insufficient soft power to generate such change because its autocratic gov-
ernance system and the recent decision to elevate President Xi Jinping as a
lifelong leader of the state raise considerable suspicions and fears worldwide.
Such concerns urge the renewal of US leadership in international climate pol-
itics. As an established great power, the United States needs to fulfil not only its
pluralist great power responsibility to maintain international order and secur-
ity by taking global climate security challenges seriously but also its solidarist
great power responsibility to advance human wellbeing globally by using dip-
lomatic tools to promote the efficient implementation of emissions reductions
around the world. Without ambitious great power leadership, it is unlikely that
international society will manage to prevent dangerous climate change from
happening – and that would be the ultimate tragedy for all humankind.
Notes
1 Cf. Bull (1980).
2 However, as Buzan and Cox (2013) demonstrate, the rise of the United States and
China show interesting similarities.
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